Georgia Casualty Co. v. Little
Decision Date | 17 February 1926 |
Docket Number | (No. 6920.) |
Citation | 281 S.W. 1092 |
Parties | GEORGIA CASUALTY CO. v. LITTLE. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Navarro County; Hawkins Scarborough, Judge.
Suit by the Georgia Casualty Company against Catherine Little to set aside an award of the Industrial Accident Board for the death of her husband, Manuel Brown. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
H. T. Cooper, of Fort Worth, and Thomas, Frank, Milam & Touchstone, of Dallas, for appellant.
W. H. Jack and Wm. Harry Jack, Jr., both of Corsicana, for appellee.
The Georgia Casualty Company brought this suit in the district court of Navarro county, Tex., to set aside an award of the Industrial Accident Board against it in favor of Catherine Little for the death of her husband, Manuel (or Emanuel) Brown, resulting from injuries sustained by him while in the employ of J. E. Metcalf & Son, contractors, of Corsicana, Tex. The case was tried to the court without a jury. The trial court sustained the award for $3,587.55, one-third of which was awarded to her attorneys. From this judgment the casualty company has appealed.
Appellant has abandoned all but 4 of its 45 assignments of error. The first of those relied upon here is that the evidence is insufficient to show that the injuries received by Manuel Brown while employed by Metcalf & Son were the proximate cause of his death.
Brown was employed by Metcalf & Son as a cement mixer on construction work. He was protected by the policy at the time of his injury. Appellant's physician rated him as totally disabled, and appellant paid him full compensation in the sum of $12.11 per week, he remaining under the treatment of the casualty company's physician. Several weeks after the injury he developed a case of diabetes, and died some eight months after the injury, his total disability continuing up to his death, during all of which time he was continuously paid weekly compensation by appellant. As to the causes of his death, Dr. Burnett, who was appellant's physician and on whose diagnosis appellant relied in paying compensation while Brown lived, and who was employed by appellant to treat him, testified, amongst other things, as follows:
It may be conceded that this testimony was not as positive and emphatic as it might have been as to what caused the death of Manuel Brown. But, taking it as a whole in connection with other undisputed facts and circumstances, we think it reflects and expresses the professional opinion of appellant's own physician that the injury received by Brown, while under the protection of the compensation policy, was the cause of his death. It was not denied that Brown was strong, robust, and healthy before the injury; that he was totally disabled by the injury which total disability continued and was recognized by and compensated by appellant up to his death; that diabetes developed after his injury, which, in the opinion of Dr. Burnett, was caused by the injury, and which caused his death. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, it was not necessary that Dr. Burnett should have seen Brown at the time of his death or immediately prior thereto in order to testify as to the cause of his death.
We have carefully considered all the authorities cited by appellant on this issue, but deem it unnecessary to discuss them here. All of them are suits for damages in negligence cases, and most, if not all, were sharply contested. We make no dissent from the rules announced therein to the effect that a finding based on mere conjecture cannot stand, but that same must be sustained by competent evidence calculated to show with reasonable certainty a cause for which the defendant is liable. In the instant case the court found against the appellant, who introduced no evidence whatever. The only issue here is, Was there any evidence, in legal contemplation, to sustain that finding?
No such strict construction of the term "proximate cause" as used in the law of negligence, can be applied to compensation cases under our compensation statute (Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, arts. 5246h-5246zzzz). Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App.) 266 S. W. 576. The courts have uniformly made a liberal interpretation and application of the Compensation Act so as to effectuate its purposes. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Jimenez (Tex. Civ. App.) 267 S. W. 753; Employers' Liability Ass'n Corp. v. Light (Tex. Civ. App.) 275 S. W. 685. And where the evidence has any probative force in support of the judgment we are not at liberty to disturb it. Ins. Ass'n v. Jimenez, supra; Wade v. Madison (Tex. Civ. App.) 206 S. W. 118. Numerous compensation cases have been before the appellate courts of the state in recent years in which the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict was raised. We refer without comment to the following cases, wherein the quantum of proof was in most of them no greater than in the instant case, and which were sustained on appeal. Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Smith, supra; Ins. Ass'n v. Jimenez, supra; Millers' Indemnity Underwriters v. Schrieber (Tex. Civ. App.) 240 S. W. 963; Same Co. v. Heller, 253 S. W. 853; Consolidated Underwriters v. Free (Tex. Civ. App.) 253 S. W. 941; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Herring (Tex. Civ. App.) 269 S. W. 249; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Shipley (Tex. Civ. App.) 260 S. W. 646.
Appellant's second contention is that the evidence was insufficient to show that appellee was the wife of Manuel Brown. We cannot sustain this contention. The deceased negro appears to have been called both Manuel and Emanuel. He was unable to read or write. Appellee was married to Manuel Brown on August 14, 1920, at Rosser, in Kaufman county, Tex. Her own testimony as to what occurred thereafter was, in part, as follows:
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