Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Matthews

• Decision Date: 18 April 1979
• Docket Number: No. 56733,56733
• Parties: GEORGIA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. MATTHEWS.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 413

254 S.E.2d 413

149 Ga.App. 350

GEORGIA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. MATTHEWS.

No. 56733.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Submitted Oct. 10, 1978.

Decided Feb. 23, 1979.

Rehearing Denied March 16, 1979.

Certiorari Denied April 18, 1979.

Twitty & Twitty, Frank S. Twitty, Sr., Camilla, for appellant.

Hatcher & Strickland, Charles F. Hatcher, Albany, for appellee.

SHULMAN, Judge.

In May, 1976, appellee was involved in an automobile collision. She was treated for injuries to her neck, for which injuries she was compensated by appellant under the provisions of an automobile insurance policy. In August of the same year, appellee fell in her home, injuring her back. She sought payment of her medical expenses from appellant, alleging that the fall merely aggravated a back injury sustained as a result of the automobile collision in May. Appellant denied coverage. Appellee brought suit on the policy and received a jury verdict awarding her the benefits sought plus a 25% Bad faith penalty and attorney fees. This appeal is from the judgment entered on that verdict.

1. Appellant's first two enumerations complain of the trial court's denial of appellant's motions for a directed verdict, for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and for a new trial. The basis for both enumerations is that there was no competent evidence that appellee's back injury was attributable to the automobile accident in May. Appellant points out that the testimony of appellee's expert medical witness connecting the back injury to the automobile accident was based solely on a medical history given to the doctor by appellee. Citing East Point Ford Co. v. Lingerfelt, 123 Ga.App. 520(1a), 181 S.E.2d 713, appellant contends that such testimony constitutes inadmissible hearsay. Although there was no objection to the admission of such hearsay, appellant contends that such hearsay has no probative value. Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Davis, 226 Ga. 221, 173 S.E.2d 691. Therefore, appellant insists, there was no evidence to support the verdict and it was error to deny its various motions.

However, appellant has overlooked the testimony of appellee. She testified that her back was injured in the automobile accident and that she has suffered increasingly from that injury since the accident in May. Her testimony was internally consistent and without vagueness. It constitutes some evidence that the injury for which appellee sought insurance coverage had its genesis in the automobile accident, not the fall at home. Compare Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 73 Ga.App. 673, 37 S.E.2d 723.

" In reviewing the overruling of a motion for a directed verdict, the proper standard to be utilized by the appellate court is the 'any evidence' test. (Cits.)" Speir v. Williams, 146 Ga.App. 880, 881, 247 S.E.2d 549, 551. There being some evidence to support the verdict, there was no error in denying appellant's motion for a directed verdict. Similarly, where there is some evidence to support the verdict, it is not error to deny the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. Interstate Life, etc., Ins. Co. v. Brown, 130 Ga.App. 850(1), 204 S.E.2d 755.

2. In its third enumeration of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the issue of bad faith penalties. We agree and reverse that portion of the judgment comprising penalties for bad faith.

The penalties here sought are provided for in Code Ann. § 56-3406b: "In the event the company fails to pay each benefit when due, the person entitled to such benefits may bring an action to recover them, and the company must show that its failure or refusal to pay was in good faith, otherwise the company shall be liable for a penalty not exceeding 25 per cent. of the amount due and reasonable attorney's fees."

The issue here is whether the question of good or bad faith should have been submitted to a jury. In construing § 56-3406b, this court has held, citing Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Mowery, 145 Ga.App. 45(2), 244 S.E.2d 573, that "ordinarily, the determination of 'good or bad faith of the insurer is for the jury.' " Miller v. Spicer, 147 Ga.App. 759(3), 250 S.E.2d 492, 494. In Bituminous Cas., supra, this court held, without using the word "ordinarily," that the issue is one for the jury. However, that statement must not be taken for a holding that there are no instances in which the issue is one of law for the court. The cases cited in Bituminous Cas. in support of that proposition hold, for the most part, that under the evidence in those cases, the issue was one for the jury. One of the cases cited, however, contains a holding most appropriate for this case: "Though ordinarily these are questions for the jury, if there is no evidence of such frivolous or unfounded refusal to pay, Or if the question of...