Georgia Pac. Corp. v. Blalock, 52154
| Citation | 389 So.2d 498 |
| Decision Date | 01 October 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 52154,52154 |
| Parties | GEORGIA PACIFIC CORPORATION et al. v. Billy BLALOCK et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi |
O. B. Triplett, Jr., Forest, John C. McLaurin, Jr., McLaurin & McLaurin, Brandon, W. Major Holifield, Laurel, for appellants.
Leon Mangum, Decatur, Thomas D. Lee, Forest, for appellees.
Before WALKER, BROOM and BOWLING, JJ.
BROOM, Justice, for the Court:
Adverse possession is the basis upon which the Chancery Court of Newton County decreed a land title to be vested in the appellees (complainants below): Billy Blalock, "Young" Bunyan Blalock, Zula Blalock, Lucy Leake, Lottie Hall and Ruby Furdge. Their bill to quiet title named as individual defendants (appellants here): Camellia Baskin, Mable Blalock and Otis Blalock; Georgia Pacific Corporation is the sole corporate defendant. In addition to decreeing title in favor of appellees, the lower court awarded them a $96,006 money decree for the value of the timber the individual defendants sold to Georgia Pacific which Georgia Pacific cut off the controversial land. We reverse.
Common source of title to the disputed 120 acre tract was Singleton Blalock, now deceased, who acquired record title in the early 1900's. Singleton was the grandfather of the individual litigants. For his failure to pay taxes (sometime between 1905 and 1919), Singleton lost his title which became vested in McMullan and Son. In 1919, McMullan and Son conveyed this land to Singleton's son, Bunyan Blalock (now deceased), who thereafter resided in Laurel, Mississippi, until he died intestate in 1960. His heirs are the individual appellants herein.
Another of Singleton's sons was Acquilla (Quilla), who just after World War I (about 1919 or 1920) moved upon the property where he continued to reside until his death in 1963. After Singleton lost his property and Bunyan acquired it, Quilla cared for his father there until Singleton died in 1922. Quilla's descendants assert, and the lower court found, that Quilla, by adverse possession against his brother Bunyan, gained title to which the appellees succeeded upon Quilla's death. Appellants take the position that when Quilla began occupying the property about 1920, his occupation was permissive pursuant to an understanding with Bunyan (record title holder) that Quilla might live there and have what he made provided he would take care of their parents, Singleton and Lucy Blalock, and an "afflicted" sister. Other facts and testimony will be stated where appropriate in this opinion.
The dispositive issue is: Did Quilla's occupation and acts with reference to the disputed lands ripen into title by adverse possession?
According to the record, Quilla continuously occupied the land after about 1920, farmed it until he died in 1963, and reared his family there. Most of the time, Quilla and his heirs (appellees) paid taxes on the property. All the while, the tax assessment was in Bunyan's name until his death after which the land was assessed to his heirs (appellants). In 1933, Quilla acquired title to and claimed homestead exemption on a 160 acre tract adjacent to the subject land. After Quilla's death his survivors continued to claim homestead exemption on the tract purchased in 1933. In his lifetime Quilla performed the following significant acts consistent with a claim of ownership: put up fences; built and repaired the house there; pastured cows; raised row crops; cut trees for posts, firewood and cash; planted trees; built outbuildings and added a bathroom to the house; raised truck crops; dug a pond and stocked it with fish; made a well; and paid taxes. Quilla received all profits from the land.
Subsequent to Quilla's death, his heirs continued to perform similar acts regarding their use of the disputed land. According to the testimony of several elderly residents of the community, it was the general reputation there that the land in controversy was part of the "Quilla Blalock place." Based upon the evidence submitted on behalf of the appellees, the chancellor ruled that Quilla (though he had no color of title) gained title by adverse possession prior to his death and prior to the death of Bunyan Blalock. 1
The appellants presented testimony indicating that Quilla's occupation and acts upon the land were permissive and in recognition of the fact that title belonged to his brother Bunyan. It is not contradicted that taxes on the disputed property were assessed in the name of Bunyan Blalock throughout all the years in question. Especially significant is the fact that when he paid the ad valorem taxes on the property in Bunyan's name, Quilla forwarded the tax receipts to Bunyan who then deducted the amount from his income tax returns. Homestead exemption on the subject property was never claimed by Quilla or appellees, but they claimed it on adjacent property. In 1971 the appellees executed an oil lease to Mr. George May on their 160 acre adjacent tract but did not lease the disputed property. They told Mr. May that Bunyan Blalock held record title to the land in controversy. A recital in the lease executed by the appellees on their adjacent land states:
This lease also covers and includes all land owned or claimed by Lessor adjacent or contiguous to the land particularly described above, whether the same be in said section or sections, grant or grants, or in adjacent sections or grants, although not included within the boundaries of the land particularly described above. For the purpose of calculating the rental payments hereinafter provided for, said land is estimated to comprise 160 acres, whether it actually comprises more or less.
According to Camellia Baskin, appellant daughter of Bunyan Blalock, a year or two after Quilla died, Quilla's son Billy (appellee) came to Laurel and sought out appellants in an attempt to buy one acre of land out of the controversial subject property for a homesite. Camellia stated that they refused to sell him any of their land but told him he could stay there and take care of the place. Billy recalled the incident and testified, "I wanted them to deed me the land so I could get a loan on it."
Appellants presented other testimony from people who...
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