Tadlock v. US

• Decision Date: 30 August 1990
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. J89-0437(W).
• Citation: 774 F. Supp. 1035
• Parties: Jean TADLOCK, Ralph Tadlock, Oliver Tadlock, Irene Tadlock, Bill C. Tadlock, Robert B. Tadlock, Jane Tadlock, and Gay T. Jones, Plaintiffs, v. The UNITED STATES of America, Weeks Exploration Company, a Delaware Corporation; Neste Oil, Inc., A Texas Corporation; BHP Petroleum (Americas) Inc., and Rubie C. Bell, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

774 F. Supp. 1035

Jean TADLOCK, Ralph Tadlock, Oliver Tadlock, Irene Tadlock, Bill C. Tadlock, Robert B. Tadlock, Jane Tadlock, and Gay T. Jones, Plaintiffs, v. The UNITED STATES of America, Weeks Exploration Company, a Delaware Corporation; Neste Oil, Inc., A Texas Corporation; BHP Petroleum (Americas) Inc., and Rubie C. Bell, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. J89-0437(W).

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, W.D.

August 30, 1990.

Daniel Lynn, Asst. U.S. Atty., Ed Brunini, Auvergne Williams, III, Jackson, Miss., for defendants.

Walker Watters, Jackson, Miss., for plaintiffs.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

WINGATE, District Judge.

This case was tried to the court sitting without a jury on July 25, 1990, and August 23, 24, 1990. The question presented to the court was whether either the plaintiffs or the defendant holds title to certain tracts of land in Scott County, Mississippi. Having filed suit on August 2, 1989, plaintiffs allege jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1402(d),¹ which grants to district courts jurisdiction over actions to quiet title to real property in which interest is claimed by the United States. The Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a, provides the exclusive means by which adverse claimants can challenge title to property vested in the United States. Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 1819, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983); Borough of Marcus Hook v. Marine Investors, 678 F.Supp. 109 (E.D.Pa.1987). Plaintiffs, Ralph Tadlock, Jean Tadlock, Oliver Tadlock, and Irene Tadlock claim title to a strip of land along the south side of the SE ¼ of the NW ¼ of Section 19 lying south of an east west fence line. Plaintiffs Robert Tadlock, Bill C. Tadlock, Jane Tadlock, and Gary T. Jones claim title to a strip of land located in the NE ¼ and SE ¼ of the NW ¼ of Section 19 and lying east of a fence line running north and south. Both set of plaintiffs claim by way of adverse possession and by way of estoppel. The defendant United States of America disputes all of plaintiffs' claims and asserts in addition that plaintiffs' action is barred by the dictates of 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g)² because plaintiffs failed to commence this action within the twelve years period of limitations.

Having reviewed all of the evidence in this case, pursuant to Rule 52, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court is now prepared to announce its decision. For the reasons which follow, the court finds for the defendant United States of America and against the plaintiffs.

Background

This boundary dispute was initiated by plaintiffs after a recent survey showed that they held no legal title to two parcels of land adjacent to a tract of government property upon which a producing oil well had been drilled in 1989. If determined to be owners of the two disputed tracts in question, plaintiffs would stand to share in royalty payments flowing from the oil well.

The two disputed tracts are deeded to the United States, as the United States is capable of tracing its chain of title back to a patent on June 9, 1840. The United States acquired title to the disputed tracts on December 31, 1935, by warranty deed from the Bienville Lumber Company.

Plaintiffs do not claim deed coverage to the disputed tracts. Plaintiffs further acknowledge that they have not paid taxes on the subject property, nor mortgaged it, nor leased it to anyone. Hence, neither the tax records nor tax assessments on their face dispute the government's legal title.

The Issues

Plaintiffs recognize that they may not assert adverse possession against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(n); U.S. v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 67 S.Ct. 1658, 1668, 91 L.Ed. 1889 (1947); U.S. v. Pappas, 814 F.2d 1342, 1343 (n. 3) (9th Cir.1987); Sweeten v. United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service, 684 F.2d 679, 682 (10th Cir.1982). The plaintiffs' argument is that prior to the government's purchase of the land in 1935, they and their predecessors had acquired title by adverse possession against the Bienville Lumber Company.

Plaintiffs contend that on both tracts of land (see exhibit G-2 which is attached hereto) there are fences recognized by all as the boundary lines between the Tadlocks' property and that of the Bienville Lumber Company/United States. According to plaintiffs, they and their predecessors treated the land within the fences as theirs, as they farmed it, lived on it, ran cattle on it, and sold timber off of it. Further, says the plaintiffs, after purchasing the property, the United States recognized their ownership of the land since the United States posted its "property boundary" signs beyond the fence lines.

The United States quarrels with all of plaintiffs' conclusions. The United States first points out that only it holds legal title to the property in question. Then, the United States denies that plaintiffs adversely possessed the tracts from the Bienville Lumber Company prior to the United States' purchase of it in 1935. Specifically, by way of expert testimony, the United States has presented evidence of aerial photographs and government surveys which purport to show that, contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, the fences in question in 1923-24, if erected, would have been demolished that year and that the fences were not in existence in 1935, or 1940, or 1946. Further, the United States has sought to show that in 1923-24 the Bienville Lumber Company cut timber off the disputed tracts, thereby evidencing Bienville's claim to the property at the time. Finally, the United States has presented proof that while its employees posted government signs beyond the fence lines, that this was but an error predicated upon a misunderstanding born in 1953 when certain Forest Service officials proposed to deed the land in question to the plaintiffs. However, says the government and borne out by the facts, this agreement was never signed by the United States, never consummated, never filed of record. Hence, says the United States, while this circumstance supplied confusion, it did not supply any legal title upon plaintiffs.

Adverse Possession

Plaintiffs who are claiming adverse possession have the burden of proof. Roy v. Kayser, 501 So.2d 1110, 1111 (Miss. 1987); Gadd v. Stone, 459 So.2d 773, 774 (Miss.1984); Georgia Pacific Corporation v. Blalock, 389 So.2d 498, 502 (Miss.1980). In order to prove title acquired through adverse possession, "the evidence should be clear and fairly convincing." Fairley v. Howell, 159 Miss. 668, 131 So. 109, 110 (1930). Thus, the plaintiffs had to satisfy their burden through proof that is clear and convincing. Anderson v. Anderson-Tully Company, 196 F.2d 684, 687 (5th Cir.1952). In order to prevail, they must show that the possession is: (1) hostile and under claim of right; (2) actual; (3) open, notorious, and visible; (4) exclusive; (5) continuous and uninterrupted; and (6) peaceful. Stallings v. Bailey, 558 So.2d 858, 860 (Miss.1990); McNeely v. Jacks, 526 So.2d 541, 544 (Miss.1988); Roy v. Kayser, 501 So.2d at 1111; also see Houston v. United States Gypsum Company, 652 F.2d 467, 472 (5th Cir.1981).

Of course, as recognized by all parties, in order to prevail, plaintiffs must prove adverse possession against Bienville Lumber Company before Bienville sold its interests in the disputed property to the United States, since plaintiffs may not claim adversely against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(n). U.S. v. California, 67 S.Ct. at 1668; U.S. v. Pappas, 814 F.2d at 1343 (n. 3); Sweeten v. United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service, 684 F.2d at 682. Specifically, plaintiffs must prove that between the years 1925 and 1935 they and their predecessors had adversely possessed the land in question from Bienville Lumber Company.³

Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of proof in establishing that they adversely possessed the land in question before the United States purchased it. Plaintiffs have never paid taxes on this property or mortgaged it. Plaintiffs claim that certain fences have always delineated the boundaries. Yet, this contention is thoroughly undermined by the government's proof. Experts for the government testified that aerial surveys coupled with timber sale records firmly establish that in 1923-24 the disputed tracts were harvested by the Bienville Lumber Company, a fact which shows that Bienville asserted ownership of the property and, further, that because of the way the harvesting was done, no fences could have survived in the area. Specifically, the government's proof on this matter showed that in 1923 and 1924 the North ½ of Section 19 was split into a North half and a South half by a dummy line running east and west on which Bienville Lumber Company operated a steam donkey. This steam donkey was a steam engine driving a cable winch puller that snaked the logs into the dummy line tract from ¼ mile North and ¼ mile South, thus logging the entire NW ¼ of Section 19 and part of the NE ¼ as well. This snaking of the logs plowed open the ground in fairly straight drag paths back to the steam puller on the dummy line. This is clearly visible on aerial photographs. One immediately recognizes that these log-paths show that the Bienville Lumber Company did not stop its logging short of its deed lines for a fence. The log drag paths run in lines which would have totally destroyed a fence had one existed in the location of the present fences claimed to by the plaintiffs.

Then, the government brought in government surveys from 1940 until 1953. The United States government surveys from 1940 until 1953 located, monumented, and marked the lines around the northwest ¼ of Section 19, Township 5 North, Range 8 East, according to the government deed, and the land was included, recognized, and managed as part of the Bienville National Forest. These surveys also thoroughly undermine plaintiffs' contentions that the claimed fences were then in existence, in the locales of the present fences.

In 1940, the General...