Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Robinson, Record No. 1644-99-2.

• Decision Date: 21 March 2000
• Docket Number: Record No. 1644-99-2.
• Citation: 32 Va. App. 1,526 S.E.2d 267
• Parties: GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION v. Michalene L. ROBINSON.
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals

526 S.E.2d 267

32 Va. App. 1

GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION v. Michalene L. ROBINSON.

Record No. 1644-99-2.

Court of Appeals of Virginia, Richmond.

March 21, 2000.

S. Vernon Priddy III (Patsy L. Mundy; Sands, Anderson, Marks & Miller, on brief), Richmond, for appellant.

Jeremy C. Sharp (Geoffrey R. McDonald & Associates, on brief), Richmond, for appellee.

Present: BENTON, COLEMAN and LEMONS,¹ JJ.

BENTON, Judge.

Georgia-Pacific Corporation contends the Workers' Compensation Commission erred when it ruled that Michalene L. Robinson's psychiatric condition was causally related to her injury by accident. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the commission's award.

I.

Michalene L. Robinson sustained a work-related injury on January 11, 1995, when her thumb was caught in a machine. The next day, Dr. Richard Holm, an orthopedist, performed surgery on Robinson to repair a deep laceration and fracture of her right thumb. He released her to light duty to begin on January 16, 1995, instructing her not to use her right hand at work. When Robinson visited Dr. Holm on January 20, he returned her to work beginning January 23 and "with the restriction that she do no work with her right thumb." He also recommended physical therapy and informed her "that it may be a year before [she] obtain[s] a fixed and stable medical condition."

In March, Dr. Holm noted that Robinson "was extremely concerned as she was having increasing pain." Dr. Holm also noted that her pain resulted from "over use" and notified Georgia-Pacific that Robinson was to avoid unnecessary heavy gripping. Early in May, Robinson, Dr. Holm, and a Georgia-Pacific representative "had a very extended discussion ... concerning [Robinson's] treatment course ... [and] the goal of her recovery." Dr. Holm again asked Georgia-Pacific "to restrict heavy lifting, gripping and pulling activities with [her] right hand." He gave Robinson additional medication for her pain.

Robinson fainted at work on May 20, 1995, and was hospitalized. Robinson reported to the attending physician that she had "been in good health ... until January ... when she injured her thumb." Robinson said she had stress at work because of a conflict with a supervisor and her inability to use her hand; she also mentioned the death of a grandchild, which occurred May 19. The treating physician gave her medication for anxiety, admitted her to the hospital, and diagnosed her as having syncopal episode, hypokalemia, and moderate stress anxiety.

Two days after her hospitalization, Dr. Holm recommended that Robinson consult with Dr. Bryan Spader, a psychiatrist. In that report, Dr. Holm noted that Robinson "is having a great deal of difficulty returning to her job" and noted that "[d]iscussions have been held with [Georgia-Pacific] to try to modify her work environment." Dr. Holm further stated that "Robinson continues to have problems with what appears to be a relatively minor injury causing a major change in her life-style." Several days later, Dr. Holm again evaluated Robinson and expressed the "concern ... that [Robinson] is having a post-traumatic stress reaction." He found Robinson unfit for work pending her psychiatric examination.

The record reveals that Robinson was evaluated by three psychiatrists—Dr. Bryan Spader, Dr. Merritt Foster, and Dr. James Corcoran. The commission considered various reports from these psychiatrists and found that Robinson's psychiatric treatment resulted from and was necessitated by her injury by accident. Georgia-Pacific contends that no credible evidence supports the commission's findings.

II.

By statutory mandate, "an award of the Commission ... shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact." Code § 65.2-706(A). Thus, we have often expressed our standard of review as follows:

In reviewing the commission's decision, we are guided by well-settled principles. "[I]t is fundamental that a finding of fact made by the [c]ommission is conclusive and binding upon this court on review." "[T]hat contrary evidence may be in the record is of no consequence if there is credible evidence to support the [c]ommission's findings."

Sneed v. Morengo, 19 Va.App. 199, 204, 450 S.E.2d 167, 171 (1994) (citations omitted). "The scope of a judicial review of the fact finding function of a workers' compensation commission [, therefore,] is `severely limited, partly in deference to the agency's expertise in a specialized field.'" Metropolitan Cleaning Corp. v. Crawley, 14 Va.App. 261, 266, 416 S.E.2d 35, 38 (1992).

Applying equally well-settled principles, the Supreme Court has held that the "question [of causation] raised by `conflicting expert medical opinions' is one of fact." Eccon Constr. Co. v. Lucas, 221 Va. 786, 790, 273 S.E.2d 797, 799 (1981). Thus, the commission's "finding upon conflicting medical evidence that a certain condition does or does not exist is ... a conclusive finding of fact." McPeek v. P.W. & W. Coal Co., 210 Va. 185, 188, 169 S.E.2d 443, 445 (1969). "The deference that we give to the commission's fact finding on medical questions is based upon the `unwisdom of an attempt by ... [courts] uninitiated into the mysteries [of the medical science debate] to choose between conflicting expert medical opinions.'" Stancill v. Ford Motor Co., 15 Va.App. 54, 58, 421 S.E.2d 872, 874 (1992) (citation omitted).

Given these principles of appellate review, we have held that "[t]he commission's findings are binding even if the weight of the evidence is contrary to those findings." Kane Plumbing v. Small, 7 Va.App. 132, 136, 371 S.E.2d 828, 831 (1988). We apply this standard because "[a] greater number of medical opinions does not necessarily constitute a preponderance of the evidence." Island Creek Coal Co. v. Honaker, 9 Va.App. 336, 339, 388 S.E.2d 271, 273 (1990). "The probative weight to be accorded [medical] evidence is for the Commission to decide; and if it is in conflict with other medical evidence, the Commission is free to adopt that view `which is most consistent with reason and justice.'" C.D.S. Const. Services v. Petrock, 218 Va. 1064, 1070, 243 S.E.2d 236, 240 (1978). In its review of this case, the commission decided that the opinions of Dr. Spader and Dr. Corcoran were "entitled to greater weight" than those of Dr. Foster. Honaker, 9 Va.App. at 339, 388 S.E.2d at 273.

Dr. Spader noted in his initial report on May 5, 1995, that Robinson expressed anxiety about difficulties performing routine tasks with her hand after her injury. She also expressed lifestyle difficulties, such as loss of libido, loss of sleep, irritability, and thoughts of suicide following the accident. Robinson believed that, within her limitations, she was "doing her job well" after her injury, yet, "was being harassed by supervisors." Dr. Spader also reported other events in Robinson's life about which she was concerned.

In his evaluation report, Dr. Spader expressed a belief that Robinson was suffering from "Major Depression, single episode ... [,] symptoms suggestive of [Post-traumatic stress disorder], and there may be some symptoms suggestive of dysthymia and an Axis II Disorder." In a letter to Dr. Holm, Dr. Spader stated that his "evaluation suggested presence of a Major Depression with sleep and appetite disturbance, irritability, crying more readily, loss of energy and some suicidal thoughts shortly after the accident began."

By letter of June 14, 1995, Dr. Holm informed Georgia-Pacific that Robinson's psychiatric condition placed Robinson and potentially her fellow workers at risk. He reiterated that he had "nothing to indicate this is not a reaction to her injury of January 1995."

At Georgia-Pacific's request, Dr. Foster examined Robinson on two occasions. In an extensive report on June 16, Dr. Foster opined...