Gerijo, Inc. v. Fairfield

• Decision Date: 14 September 1994
• Docket Number: Nos. 93-1300,93-1434,s. 93-1300
• Citation: 70 Ohio St.3d 223,638 N.E.2d 533
• Parties: GERIJO, INC., Appellee, v. CITY OF FAIRFIELD, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 223

70 Ohio St.3d 223

638 N.E.2d 533

GERIJO, INC., Appellee, v. CITY OF FAIRFIELD, Appellant.

Nos. 93-1300, 93-1434.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted April 26, 1994.

Decided Sept. 14, 1994.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

A party who attacks a municipal zoning ordinance on constitutional grounds must prove, beyond fair debate, both that the enactment deprives him or her of an economically viable use and that it fails to advance a legitimate governmental interest.

Plaintiff-appellee Gerijo, Inc. ("Gerijo") is an Ohio corporation owned by members of the Oliver family. The Olivers, either individually or through the corporation, have owned the property at issue in this appeal since the 1870s. The subject property consists of approximately thirty-seven acres situated one thousand feet southwest of State Route 4 in Fairfield, Ohio.

In 1979, defendant-appellant city of Fairfield adopted a comprehensive land use plan ("the 1979 Plan") in response to the rapid population growth the city had experienced during the preceding two decades. The city devoted one section of the 1979 Plan to the perceived need for land use management as a means to foster relationships among the residential, commercial and industrial segments of the city. One objective articulated in the land use section was to create a housing mix of seventy percent owner-occupied and thirty percent renter-occupied dwellings. In 1986, the Fairfield City Council passed a resolution retaining this ratio but specifying that the owner-occupied units must be single-family homes. Thereafter in 1989, Fairfield adopted a revised land use plan ("the 1989 Plan") in which it again stated the city's desire for a seventy-thirty ratio between single-family and multifamily dwellings. The 1989 Plan also included an intent to confine all industrial development to the areas east of State Route 4.

Throughout most of the last century, the Olivers and/or Gerijo farmed the land at issue in this case. Approximately ten years ago, however, the property ceased to be used as a farm and has since remained vacant. In its current state, the Gerijo property is an undeveloped area surrounded on three sides by multifamily residential developments. The fourth side, lying to the north and northwest of the subject property, is zoned for commercial uses. While the subject parcel was once zoned as a multifamily residential area, the city of Fairfield rezoned the area in 1989 as M-1, an Industrial Park District. According to Chapter 1169 of the Fairfield Planning and Zoning Codes ("the zoning code"), M-1 is a light industrial district reserved for particular uses including warehouse storage, trucking terminals, laboratories, product manufacturers, and public utilities. Those uses are further limited by certain conditions and prohibitions outlined in the zoning code. ¹ In the 1989 Plan, the city defined "light industrial" areas as those "located in the most visible industrial portion of the city. The purpose here is to attract less environmentally disruptive development that typically includes high growth and high tech type industries. [T]his type [of] development is the key to the City's economic and tax base. * * * "

In recent years, the Oliver family had received several offers from prospective buyers who were interested in developing the subject property. Most of the solicitations proposed multifamily developments similar to those located on surrounding properties and included offers ranging from $30,000 to $70,000 per acre. Gerijo also received one offer for $40,000 per acre to develop the property under the existing light industrial zoning classification.

On April 24, 1989, Gerijo filed a petition with the Fairfield City Council requesting that the subject property be rezoned from M-1 light industrial to R-3 multifamily residential. Gerijo sought the reclassification so that it could pursue an offer extended by Trammell Crow Residential Corporation to develop five hundred thirty-two multifamily units on the subject property at a price of $65,000 per acre. At the time Gerijo filed its petition, Fairfield housing reflected a fifty-fifty ratio of single-family to multifamily units. Approval of the rezoning and subsequent development of the five hundred thirty-two units would have altered the housing ratio to roughly forty-eight to fifty-two in favor of multifamily units. On August 14, 1989, the Fairfield City Council rejected Gerijo's application.

Once the city denied its request to rezone the property, Gerijo filed a complaint with the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County challenging the constitutionality of the M-1 zoning scheme as it related to the subject parcel. Gerijo argued the M-1 zoning prevented "the highest and best use of the Property, and it is arbitrary, confiscatory, unreasonable, and not based on the public health, safety moral[s] and general welfare." While finding that Gerijo failed to prove the M-1 zoning was confiscatory, the trial court ultimately invalidated the classification on the grounds that it failed to substantially advance a legitimate governmental interest. The court of appeals affirmed.

The appellate court, finding its judgment to be in conflict with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Lake County in Diversified Constr., Inc. v. Willoughby Hills (Dec. 4, 1992), Lake App. No. 91-L-145, unreported, 1992 WL 361445, certified the record of the cause to this court for review and final determination.

Graydon, Head & Ritchey, Anthony G. Covatta and Harry J. Finke IV, Cincinnati, for appellee.

Manley, Burke, Fischer & Lipton, Timothy M. Burke and Gary E. Powell, Cincinnati, Millikin & Fitton and John H. Clemmons, City Law Director, Fairfield, for appellant.

ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, Justice.

In Columbia Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Montgomery (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 60, 564 N.E.2d 455, this court held that in order to invalidate a zoning ordinance on constitutional grounds, the party attacking the regulation must establish, beyond fair debate, that the zoning classification denies him or her an economically viable use of the zoned property without substantially advancing a legitimate interest in the health, safety or welfare of the community. The question certified for our review is whether the two elements of this test must be proven in the conjunctive or the disjunctive. For the reasons which follow, we find that a plaintiff must prove both prongs in order to invalidate a zoning ordinance. The decision of the court of appeals is therefore reversed.

The authority vested in municipalities to enact zoning ordinances is clearly defined in this state. R.C. 713.06 permits Ohio cities such as Fairfield to "frame and adopt a plan for dividing the municipal corporation or any portion thereof into zones or districts, representing the recommendations of the [municipality's planning] commission, in the interest of the public health, safety, convenience, comfort, prosperity, or general welfare * * *." In addition, the Ohio Constitution explicitly subjects the right of an individual to use and enjoy his or her property to the legitimate exercise of local police power. See Section 3, Article XVIII. Inasmuch as the exercise of police power interferes with individual rights, the use of such power must bear a substantial relationship to a legitimate government interest and must not be unreasonable or arbitrary. Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc. (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 69, 9 OBR 273, 458 N.E.2d 852; Cincinnati v. Correll (1943), 141 Ohio St. 535, 539, 26 O.O. 116, 118, 49 N.E.2d 412, 414. We acknowledge, however, that the line separating the legitimate use of police power from the illegitimate is often incapable of precise delimitation, as it varies from circumstance to circumstance. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (1926), 272 U.S. 365, 387, 47 S.Ct. 114, 118, 71 L.Ed. 303, 310.

When reviewing the legitimacy of zoning ordinances, this court has repeatedly recognized a strong presumption in favor of the validity of an enactment. Hudson, supra, 9 Ohio St.3d at 71, 9 OBR at 275, 458 N.E.2d at 855; Downing v. Cook (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 149, 151, 23 O.O.3d 186, 187, 431 N.E.2d 995, 997; Brown v. Cleveland (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 93, 95, 20 O.O.3d 88, 89, 420 N.E.2d 103, 105. The party challenging an ordinance bears, at all stages of the proceedings, the burden of demonstrating that the provision is unconstitutional. Ketchel v. Bainbridge Twp. (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 239, 557 N.E.2d 779; Mayfield-Dorsh, Inc. v. S. Euclid (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 156, 157, 22 O.O.3d 388, 388, 429 N.E.2d 159, 160; Hilton v. Toledo (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 394, 396, 16 O.O.3d 430, 431, 405 N.E.2d 1047, 1049. As this court discussed in Willott v. Beachwood (1964), 175 Ohio St. 557, 560, 26 O.O.2d 249, 251, 197 N.E.2d 201, 204, a court's authority in determining the validity of zoning regulations is limited in that "the court can not usurp the legislative function by substituting its judgment for that of the council. Municipal governing bodies are better qualified, because of their knowledge of the situation, to act upon these matters than are the courts." See, also, Wilson v. Cincinnati (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 138, 142, 75 O.O.2d 190, 193, 346 N.E.2d 666, 669; Allion v. Toledo (1919), 99 Ohio St. 416, 420, 124 N.E. 237, 238. A court may substitute its judgment for that of the local governing body only when a municipality exercises its zoning power in an arbitrary, confiscatory or unreasonable manner which violates constitutional guaranties. Willott, supra, at paragraph three of the syllabus.

In our examination of the trial court's decision to invalidate Fairfield's zoning ordinance, we are necessarily constrained by the principle that judgments supported by competent, credible evidence going to all the material elements of the case must not be reversed, as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 8 O.O.3d 261, 376 N.E.2d 578, syllabus. We must indulge...