Geske v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, Civil Action No. 3:11-CV-3337-L
| Decision Date | 12 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:11-CV-3337-L |
| Parties | TOMMY R. GESKE, JR., AND MELISSA L. GESKE, Plaintiffs, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee for the Certificateholders of Park Place Securities, Inc. Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-WCW3, Through its Mortgage Servicer, Bank of America, N.A., and RECONSTRUCT COMPANY, N.A., as Substitute Trustee, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand, filed January 3, 2012; and Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, filed December 29, 2011. After carefully reviewing the motions, briefing, pleadings, and applicable law, the court denies Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand, grants Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, and dismisses this action with prejudice.
Plaintiffs Tommy R. Geske ("Geske") and Melissa L. Geske (collectively, the "Geskes") brought this lawsuit against Defendants Wells Fargo Bank, Nation Association ("Wells Fargo") and Reconstruct Company, N.A. (collectively, "Defendants") for failure to modify their homesteadmortgage under the Home Affordable Modification Program ("HAMP"). The Geskes seek specific performance of the HAMP Agreement, reinstatement of their homestead loan, and a permanent injunction to prevent Defendants from foreclosing on their real property located in Waxahachie, Texas. The action was originally filed on October 31, 2011, in the 40th Judicial District Court of Ellis County, Texas. On December 2, 2011, before Plaintiff effected service, Defendant Wells Fargo, National Association ("Wells Fargo") removed the action to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs entered a purchase money mortgage ("Loan") in 2001. The Loan was subsequently assigned to Wells Fargo and administered by mortgage servicer Bank of America, N.A. ("BOA"). After suffering a loss in income because of the downturn in the economy, Geske approached BOA about a permanent home mortgage loan modification under HAMP, which was enacted in 2009 to reduce foreclosures. In the first step of the HAMP process, Geske signed a Trial Period Plan ("TPP")1 in which he agreed, among other things, to make three monthly payments of $3,255 by the first of September, October, and November 2009, and to provide documents regarding the Geskes's finances. Under the TPP, BOA would suspend any pending foreclosure sale pending the Geskes satisfying certain conditions during the TPP "Trial Period" and BOA's tender of an executed Modification Agreement (the second part of the process) prior to the TPP's expiration ("Modification Effective") date.
The Geskes contend that they made the scheduled payments pursuant to the TPP under HAMP, but BOA nevertheless notified them in July 2011 of its intent to commence foreclosure onNovember 2, 2011. On October 31, 2011, the state court entered a temporary restraining order and, on November 10, 2011, extended the restraining order until November 22, 2011, at which time a hearing was scheduled on the matter. It is not clear from the record before the court whether that hearing took place before the case was removed to this court by Wells Fargo.
A federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over civil cases "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," or over civil cases in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and in which diversity of citizenship exists between the parties. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and must have statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a claim. See Home Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). Absent jurisdiction conferred by statute or the Constitution, they lack the power to adjudicate claims and must dismiss an action if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. Id.; Stockman v. Federal Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Veldhoen v. United States Coast Guard, 35 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1994)).
Diversity of citizenship exists between the parties only if each plaintiff has a different citizenship from each defendant. Getty Oil Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 841 F.2d 1254, 1258 (5th Cir. 1988). Otherwise stated, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires complete diversity of citizenship; that is, a district court cannot exercise jurisdiction if any plaintiff shares the same citizenship as any defendant. See Corfield v. Dallas Glen Hills LP, 355 F.3d 853, 857 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806)), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1073 (2004). "[T]he basis on which jurisdiction depends must be alleged affirmatively and distinctly and cannot beestablished argumentatively or by mere inference." Getty, 841 F.2d at 1259 (citing Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. v. Pargas, Inc., 706 F.2d 633, 636 n.2 (5th Cir. 1983)). Failure to allege adequately the basis of diversity "mandates remand or dismissal of the action." Stafford v. Mobil Oil Corp., 945 F.2d 803, 805 (5th Cir. 1991).
The citizenship of a trustee who possesses "customary powers to hold, manage, and dispose of assets for the benefit of others" is determined by the citizenship of the trustee, not the trust beneficiaries. Navarro Sav. Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 464-66 (1980) (footnote omitted). Control of the assets held in the name of the trustee must be "real and substantial." Id. at 465. A national bank, for diversity purposes, "is a citizen of the State in which its main office, as set forth in its articles of association, is located." Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 307 (2006). For diversity purposes, the amount in controversy is determined by the amount sought on the face of the plaintiff's pleadings, so long as the plaintiff's claim is made in good faith. St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir. 1998); De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 865 (1995). Removal is thus proper if it is "facially apparent" from the complaint that the claim or claims asserted exceed the jurisdictional amount. Allen v. R&H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 70 F.3d 26 (5th Cir. 1995). Any doubts as to the propriety of the removal should be construed strictly in favor of remand. Manguno v. Prudential Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002). "The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction in federal court rests on the party seeking to invoke it." St. Paul Reinsurance, 134 F.3d at 1253. Accordingly, if a case is removed to federal court, the defendant has the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.
To defeat a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2008); Guidry v. American Pub. Life Ins. Co., 512 F.3d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 2007). A claim meets the plausibility test Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal citations omitted). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it must set forth "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). The "[f]actual allegations of [a complaint] must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. (quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted).
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Sonnier v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 509 F. 3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007); Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F. 3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). In ruling on such a motion, the court cannot look beyond the pleadings. Id.; Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1229 (2000). The pleadings include the complaint and any documents attached to it. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496,498-99 (5th Cir. 2000). Likewise, "'[d]ocuments that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to [the plaintiff's] claims.'" Id. (quoting Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993)).
The ultimate question in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether the complaint states a valid claim when it is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002). While well-pleaded facts of a complaint are to be accepted as true, legal conclusions are not "entitled to the assumption of truth." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 (citation omitted). Further, a court is not to strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff and is not to accept conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions, or legal conclusions. R2 Invs. LDC v. Phillips, 401 F.3d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). The court does not evaluate the plaintiff's...
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