Gevas v. Mclaughlin
| Decision Date | 09 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 08-1379,08-1379 |
| Parties | DAVID GEVAS, Plaintiff, v. C. MCLAUGHLIN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Before the court are Defendants, Geraldo Acevedo, Nicholas Bryan, Michael Chapin, Richard Hall, Duane Price, Cornealious Sanders, David Unsworth and Roger E. Walker, Jr.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [125], Paintiff's response [132] and Defendants' reply [134]. Defendants move for partial summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56(b) and Local Rule 7.1(D) and submits their Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated in the Illinois Department of Corrections, has filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, for violations of his civil rights. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to protect him from assault by another inmate. Specifically, Plaintiff was involved in an altercation with his cell mate, Inmate Adkins, on May 29, 2008, wherein he was stabbed in the neck with a pen. Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment because 1) Plaintiff admits Defendants Sanders and Hall are not a part of this failure to protect case, 2) Plaintiff did not inform Defendants Chapin, Price, Unsworth or Bryan that he needed to be protected from Inmate Adkins, 3) Defendant Walker did not personally sign off on inmate grievances, and therefore is not personally involved in the allegations and 4) Defendant Acevedo does not personally review mail from inmates, and therefore is not personally involved in the allegations.
1. Plaintiff was involved in an altercation with his cell mate Inmate Adkins on May 29, 2008, wherein he was stabbed in the neck with a pen. (Deposition of Plaintiff p.11, attached as Exhibit A and Incident Report, attached as Exhibit B).
2. Plaintiff admits that Defendant Sanders is not a part of his failure to protect claim. (Exhibit A p. 52 ¶16-19).
3. Plaintiff admits that Defendant Hall is not a part of his failure to protect claim. (Exhibit A p. 22-23).
4. Plaintiff did not tell Defendant Chapin that he was afraid of Adkins or that Adkins had made any threats to him prior to the May 29, 2008 altercation. (Exhibit A, pp. 21-22).
5. Plaintiff did not tell Defendant Price that he feared for his safety prior to the May 29, 2008 altercation. (Exhibit A, p. 50).
6. Plaintiff did not have any communications with Defendant Unsworth prior to the May 29, 2008 altercation. (Exhibit A, p. 60 ¶6-15).
7. Plaintiff did not have any communications with Defendant Bryan about inmate Adkins prior to May 29, 2008. (Exhibit A, p. 79 ¶19-21).
8. Plaintiff had no communications with Defendant Walker, other than through the grievance process. (Exhibit A, p. 63).
9. Defendant Walker is a part of Plaintiff s failure to protect claim because he denied Plaintiff's grievances.2 (Exhibit A, p.63),
10. As the former Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections, Defendant Walker did not personally sign letters from the ARB that addressed inmate grievances. Terri Anderson signed Roger E. Walker Jr.'s name on letters from the Administrative Review Board that addressed inmate grievances, as indicated by her initials below Defendant Walker's signature. Terri Anderson had the authority to review and sign on the Director's behalf as an administrative designee. (Affidavit of Terri Anderson, attached as Exhibit C).
11. Plaintiff's only communications with Defendant Acevedo were two letters sent to him on May 23rd and May 26th. (Exhibit A, p. 73).
12. Defendant Acevedo is the Acting Warden of Hill Correctional Center. (Plaintiff's Complaint).
13. Defendant Acevedo does not review mail from inmates. Defendant has delegated that task to his secretary who reviews mail from inmates on his behalf. It is the practice of his secretary to forward any mail from inmates alleging their safety is threatened directly to the Internal Affairs Unit at Hill Correctional Center for immediate investigation.3
(Defendant Acevedo's Interrogatory Response, attached as Exhibit D).
Affidavits must be based on the personal knowledge of the affiant and "set out facts that would be admissible in evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). Personal knowledge may include inferences and opinions drawn from those facts. Visser v. Packer Eng. Assoc., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 1991). Visser, 924 F.2d at 659. It is also well settled that "conclusory allegations and self-serving affidavits, if not supported by the record, will not preclude summary judgment. Keri v. Barod of Trustees of Purdue University, 458 F.3d 620, 628 (7th Cir.2006) (citingHaywood v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 121 F.3d 1066, 1071 (7th Cir.1997)).
Prison officials can be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for an injury suffered by a prisoner at the hands of another only if two requirements are met. The first requirement is objective: the plaintiff must show that "he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The second requirement is subjective: the plaintiff must prove the prison official exhibited deliberate indifference to plaintiff's safety. Id. Deliberate indifference, as defined in Farmer, occurs when a prison official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate... safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference," Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The official must "demonstrate something approaching total unconcern for his [the inmate's] welfare in the face of serious risks," Duane v. Lane, 959 F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 1992) citing McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 347 (7th Cir. 1991), or must demonstrate a "conscious, culpable refusal to prevent harm." Id. citing Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F. 2d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 816(1986).
Furthermore, liability cannot be premised on the idea that a reasonable prison official would or should have known that the inmate was at risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). A prison official cannot be deliberately indifferent to an inmate without knowing the inmate was at risk of harm. Goka v. Bobbin, 862 F.2d 646, 647-48 (7th Cir. 1988)(emphasis added). However, deliberate indifference to an inmate's safety concerning the alleged failure to protect him has been found when the prison officials did nothing in response to the inmate's concern. Lewis v. Richards, 107 F.3d 549, 553 (7th Cir. 1997). In order to impose individual liability under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant had some personal responsibility for the alleged violation. Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1985). However, personal involvement cannot be established simply by alleging that a defendant was notified by letter of an alleged constitutional violation. Volk v. Coler, 638 F. Supp. 1540, 1548 (C.D. Ill. 1986). Moreover, the 7th Circuit has held that public employees are responsible for their own misdeeds, but not for anyone else's. Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir, 2009).
Plaintiff admits in his response that Defendants Bryan, Chapin, Hall, Sanders, Price and Unsworth are not a part of his failure to protect claim. Plaintiff asserts that he raised claims regarding false disciplinary/retaliation claims against these defendants. See plaintiff's response...
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