Ghori-Ahmad v. U.S. Comm'n On Int'l Religious Freedom

• Decision Date: 17 September 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 12–00936 (BJR).
• Citation: 969 F.Supp.2d 1
• Parties: Safiya GHORI–AHMAD, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

969 F.Supp.2d 1

Safiya GHORI–AHMAD, Plaintiff,

v.UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 12–00936 (BJR).

United States District Court,

District of Columbia.

Sept. 17, 2013.

Eric J. Mahr, Perry A. Lange, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Stacy E. Frazier, Covington & Burling, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Jennie Leah Kneedler, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's Motion for Partial Dismissal

BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on a motion for partial dismissal by Defendant, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (hereinafter “USCIRF”). See Def.'s Mot., Dkt. # 9. Plaintiff Safiya Ghori–Ahmad alleges discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Congressional Accountability Act (“CAA”), 2 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. Ghori–Ahmad also brings a claim for detrimental reliance. USCIRF moves to dismiss the detrimental reliance claim, the retaliation claim, and portions of Ghori–Ahmad's discrimination claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Having reviewed the parties' briefs together with all other relevant materials, the Court now finds and rules as follows:

I. BACKGROUND

Ghori–Ahmad is a Muslim of Indian descent. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 12. On June 1, 2009, USCIRF offered Ghori–Ahmad a position as South Asia Policy Analyst, which she accepted on June 12, anticipating a start date of July 14. Id. ¶¶ 29–30. After accepting the offer Ghori–Ahmad resigned from her then-current position. Id. ¶ 31. USCIRF, through its Acting Executive Director Knox Thames, rescinded the job offer on July 1, 2009, and later offered Ghori–Ahmad a 90–day position with USCIRF, which she accepted. Id. ¶¶ 47, 58.

On August 14, 2009, Ghori–Ahmad sought Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) counseling, and filed a formal complaint on September 17, 2009. Id. ¶ 81. The EEO counselor issued a Report of Investigation on March 10, 2010, and Ghori–Ahmad requested a hearing with an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Id. ¶ 83. The ALJ dismissed the complaint on the ground that Title VII did not apply to USCIRF. Shortly thereafter, Congress amended the International Religious Freedom Act to extend the protections of the CAA (including its incorporated anti-discrimination provisions) to USCIRF employees. See International Religious Freedom Reform and Reauthorization Act (IRFRRA), Pub. L. No. 112–75, § 3, 125 Stat. 1271, 1273 (2011); 22 U.S.C. § 6432b(g). On December 27, 2011, Ghori–Ahmad requested counseling with the Office of Compliance as provided in the CAA dispute resolution procedures, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1401–02. Compl. ¶ 91. The parties proceeded through mediation, as required by 2 U.S.C. § 1403, and the mediation period ended on March 7, 2012. Id. ¶ 92. This action followed.

Ghori–Ahmad alleges that USCIRF discriminated against her on the basis of her religion, race,¹ and national origin when it rescinded the job offer. Id. ¶¶ 96, 105. USCIRF's motion does not address those discrimination claims. Ghori–Ahmad also alleges that USCIRF discriminated against her when it did not extend her 90–day position. Id. ¶¶ 98, 107. USCIRF moves to dismiss this claim under Rule 12(b)(6), on the ground that Ghori–Ahmad was an independent contractor during those 90 days and not covered by the CAA's anti-discrimination protections. Def's Mot. at 15–16.

Ghori–Ahmad also alleges that USCIRF retaliated against her EEO activity by isolating her on the job, threatening to escort her from the building, downgrading her job duties, withdrawing all recommendations for full time employment, and failing to renew or extend the 90–day position. Compl. ¶¶ 114–15. USCIRF moves to dismiss Ghori–Ahmad's retaliation claim under Rule 12(b)(6), on the ground that she was an independent contractor during the 90–day position, therefore not covered by the CAA. Def's Mot. at 27. USCIRF also contends that Ghori–Ahmad failed to allege any “materially adverse action.” Id.

Finally, Ghori–Ahmad makes two claims of detrimental reliance: first, that she relied to her detriment on USCIRF's initial offer, by resigning her then-current position, and second, that she accepted the 90–day position in reliance on a promise from Acting Director Knox Thames that the temporary position would become permanent. Compl. ¶ 119. USCIRF moves to dismiss Ghori–Ahmad's detrimental reliance claims under Rule 12(b)(1), asserting that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear a claim of detrimental reliance, and that Ghori–Ahmad did not exhaust administrative procedures. Def.'s Mot. at 12–14. USCIRF also argues that even if this Court could exercise jurisdiction, Ghori–Ahmad has failed to state a claim because the CAA precludes claims for detrimental reliance. Id. at 14.

II. LEGAL STANDARDA. Rule 12(b)(6)

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the allegations within the complaint. In re Interbank Fund. Corp. Sec. Litig., 668 F.Supp.2d 44, 47–48 (D.D.C.2009) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)). The court “must construe the allegations and facts in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and must grant the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Bailey v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 544 F.Supp.2d 33, 36 (D.D.C.2008).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must plead sufficient facts, taken as true, to provide “plausible grounds” that discovery will reveal evidence to support the plaintiff's allegations. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

B. Rule 12(b)(1)

When a party files a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), “the plaintiff[ ] bear[s] the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction.” Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self–Gov't Auth., 310 F.Supp.2d 172, 176 (D.D.C.2004). The court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint, but those allegations “will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Because subject-matter jurisdiction focuses on a court's power to hear the plaintiff's claim, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion imposes on the court an affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority. Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 13 (D.D.C.2001).

III. DISCUSSIONA. USCIRF's Motion to Dismiss Ghori–Ahmad's Discrimination Claims is Denied

USCIRF asserts that Ghori–Ahmad's allegations, together with two documents USCIRF submitted along with its motion, establish as a matter of law that Ghori–Ahmad worked as an independent contractor during the 90–day position, and thus did not enjoy the anti-discrimination protections of the CAA.² The facts alleged by Ghori–Ahmad render such a conclusion premature.

Section 3 of IRFRRA, titled “Application of Anti–Discrimination Laws,” provides that “all employees of [USCIRF] shall be treated as employees whose pay is disbursed by the Secretary of the Senate or the Chief Administrative Officer of the House of Representatives and the Commission shall be treated as an employing office of the Senate or the House of Representatives.” 22 U.S.C. § 6432b(g) (emphasis added). The CAA extends the protections of Title VII, among other laws, to “[a]ll personnel actions affecting covered employees,” 2 U.S.C. § 1311(a), and defines “covered employee” to include “an employee of” the Senate and the House of Representatives. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1301(3), 1311(a) (emphasis added). Combined, 22 U.S.C. § 6432b(g) and 2 U.S.C. § 1301 operate to bring “all of the employees of [USCIRF]” within the protections of the CAA.

Ghori–Ahmad does not dispute that the CAA, like Title VII, protects “employees” only, not independent contractors. The dispute lies in whether Ghori–Ahmad was an employee or an independent contractor during her 90–day position at USCIRF.

In Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C.Cir.1979), the D.C. Circuit explained that distinguishing employees from independent contractors in Title VII cases involves “analysis of the ‘economic realities' of the work relationship.” The “most important factor” in this analysis is “the extent of the employer's right to control the means and manner of the worker's performance,” and where an employer has such right to control, “an employer/employee relationship is likely to exist.” Id. at 831–32. Spirides also identifies eleven other factors that bear on the economic realities of the relationship.³ However, the court cautioned that “[c]onsideration of all of the circumstances surrounding the work relationship is essential, and no one factor is determinative.” Id. at 831;see also Redd v. Summers, 232 F.3d 933, 938 (D.C.Cir.2000) (applying Spirides and separating the factors into four groups). To draw a distinction between employees and independent contractors is a “relatively open-ended, fact-intensive inquiry.” Konah v. District of Columbia, 815 F.Supp.2d 61, 70 (D.D.C.2011).

At this stage it is unnecessary to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the Spirides factors in order to decide USCIRF's motion. Nothing in the Spirides line of cases suggests that a plaintiff must address all (or any) of the Spirides factors in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Rather, at the pleading stage, Ghori–Ahmad need only plead factual content from which this Court can reasonably infer that she...