Ghoussoub v. Yammine

• Docket Number: 118,944
• Decision Date: 21 June 2022
• Citation: 518 P.3d 110
• Parties: Roland Bou Dalha GHOUSSOUB, Petitioner/Appellee, v. Marie Charles YAMMINE, a/k/a Mary Yamine or Mary Yammine, Respondent/Appellant, and ReliaStar Life Insurance Company, Respondent.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

518 P.3d 110

Roland Bou Dalha GHOUSSOUB, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.Marie Charles YAMMINE, a/k/a Mary Yamine or Mary Yammine, Respondent/Appellant,andReliaStar Life Insurance Company, Respondent.

No. 118,944

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

FILED JUNE 21, 2022

REHEARING DENIED SEPTEMBER 13, 2022

Jody R. Nathan, FRANDEN, FARRIS, QUILLIN, GOODNIGHT & ROBERTS, Tulsa, Oklahoma, and Benjamin C. Faulkner, Sapulpa, Oklahoma, For Appellant,

R. Jack Freeman, LEVINSON, SMITH & HUFFMAN, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, For Appellee.

ROWE, J.:

¶1 This Court in Alexander v. Alexander¹ approved the procedure commonly used in marriage dissolution actions in which district courts grant a divorce and retain jurisdiction over property division or other issues for later determination. We retained this appeal to address a question of first impression — whether Oklahoma's revocation-upon-divorce statute, 15 O.S.2011 § 178(A), applies when one party dies after the granting of the divorce but prior to final judgment on all issues.

I. BACKGROUND

¶2 Dr. Jean Bernard ("Bernard") and Marie Yammine ("Yammine") were married in 2003 in the Maronite Church in Lebanon, and later in an Oklahoma civil ceremony. On June 5, 2007, ReliaStar issued "Jean J. Bernard" a two million dollar term life insurance policy on his life effective June 12, 2007 (Policy), for which he designated Yammine the sole primary beneficiary and his brother, Roland Ghoussoub ("Ghoussoub"), the contingent beneficiary.

¶3 Following the spouses' separation in 2010, after which Yammine moved to Lebanon with their two minor children, Bernard filed in 2015 to annul their ecclesiastical marriage in Lebanon and to dissolve their civil marriage in Tulsa County District Court. Yammine filed a counterclaim in the dissolution proceeding, seeking an equitable share of their property and an order requiring Bernard to maintain life insurance to secure his child support obligation during the children's minority.

¶4 In March 2017 when Bernard learned he was terminally ill, he moved for an order to dissolve the marriage and to bifurcate and reserve final judgment on all issues pursuant to Alexander . The hearing on his motion was set for mid-May 2017.

¶5 Prior to hearing, Bernard unilaterally, and without court approval, changed the primary beneficiary on the Policy to "Julien Boudhia 50% & Nisrine Masrouha 50%," effective March 31, 2017. On or about April 1, 2017, Bernard was found in a coma and hospitalized in critical condition. Two days later, his counsel filed an emergency ex parte motion for divorce alleging Bernard's death was imminent and seeking an immediate divorce to prevent Yammine from inheriting from Bernard's estate. At the hearing held the same day, the trial court granted the divorce order over Yammine's objection, reserving final judgment on property and debt issues. Yammine timely appealed the Order Granting Divorce.

¶6 Bernard was transported to Lebanon in a vegetative state in May 2017, pursuant to a guardianship order of the District Court of Tulsa County. The next month, Yammine applied for injunctive relief alleging Bernard violated the automatic temporary injunction ("ATI") mandated by 43 O.S.2011 § 110(A)(1)(b)(4)² when he removed her beneficiary designation from the policy. She alleged indirect contempt was not an option due to Bernard's medical state and relocation to Lebanon. Claiming their marital properties in the U.S. were "being tapped" for his medical expenses, Yammine also requested to be reinstated as the Policy's primary beneficiary to protect her equitable share of the marital property. Bernard's counsel objected, arguing that the ATI dissolved when the divorce was pronounced and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue orders during Yammine's appeal from the Order Granting Divorce.

¶7 By order filed October 5, 2017, the trial court, pursuant to Okla.Sup.Ct.R. 1.37(a)(5),³ enjoined Bernard's removal of Yammine as Policy beneficiary, finding his "changes were in violation of the [ATI]" and ordering restoration of the Policy's original beneficiaries.

¶8 On November 22, 2017, Yammine moved to dismiss her appeal of the Order Granting Divorce. Bernard died in Lebanon on December 14, 2018. At the time of his death, Yammine was the primary beneficiary and Ghoussoub was the contingent beneficiary of the Policy. Six weeks later, Ghoussoub filed this declaratory judgment action against Yammine and ReliaStar in Tulsa County District Court.⁴ ReliaStar's motion to interplead the Policy's death benefit proceeds in the declaratory judgment action was granted.

¶9 The trial court declared Ghoussoub was entitled to the Policy proceeds finding the Order Granting Divorce was final before Bernard's death and that Yammine was precluded by operation of 15 O.S.2011 § 178(A) from receiving the proceeds of the death benefit of the Policy. Yammine timely appealed the judgment. On this Court's own motion, the matter was retained for disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10 Under the Declaratory Judgments Act, the determination of a competent court is reviewable in the same manner as other judgments. 12 O.S.2011 § 1654. A declaratory judgment action requires an actual controversy. 12 O.S.2011 § 1651. The controversy must be "between parties having opposing interests, which interests must be direct and substantial," and the matter must involve "an actual, as distinguished from a possible, potential or contingent dispute." Knight ex rel. Ellis v. Miller , 2008 OK 81, ¶ 8, 195 P.3d 372, 374 (quoting Gordon v. Followell , 1964 OK 74, 391 P.2d 242, 242-243 ).

¶11 A declaratory judgment action "pursuant to § 1651 is neither strictly legal nor equitable, but assumes the nature of the controversy at issue." Macy v. Oklahoma City School Dist. No. 89 , 1998 OK 58, ¶ 11, 961 P.2d 804, 807. The declaratory action and relief sought here involves opposing claims of named beneficiaries to the proceeds of a life insurance policy. This requires statutory interpretation and application to facts arising from a marriage dissolution proceeding between the policy-owner and the primary beneficiary. Legal questions "involving statutory interpretation [are] reviewed de novo , i.e. , by a non-deferential, plenary and independent examination of the trial court's legal ruling." Cole v. Josey , 2019 OK 39, ¶ 3, 457 P.3d 1007, 1009.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Statutory History.

¶12 Effective November 1, 1987, the Legislature enacted 15 O.S. § 178.⁵ At issue here, § 178 addresses several types of written contracts, e.g ., life insurance and retirement benefits, for which contracted death benefits are paid directly to a designated beneficiary upon death of the insured. The statute provides for revocation of all contract provisions in favor of a former spouse, subject to six exceptions.

¶13 In 1994, the Legislature amended § 178(A) to add "depository agreements" and "security registrations" to its list of written contracts with death benefits provisions subject to revocation. The same year, the statutes related to those contracts, e.g. "Payable on Death" (P.O.D.) accounts, were amended to make each expressly subject to 15 O.S. § 178.⁶ In 2001, the Legislature enacted 18 O.S. § 381.39a to address P.O.D. joint accounts in a savings and loan association and also made them subject to § 178. See 18 O.S.2011 § 381.39a(B)(5).

¶14 In 2012, the majority rule in the U.S. continued to support that divorce per se does not affect a designated ex-spouse's right to receive life insurance proceeds; eight states, including Oklahoma, represented the minority position that a divorce automatically revokes an ex-spouse's beneficiary status.⁷ By 2018, twenty-six states had adopted revocation-on-divorce laws.⁸

B. Appellate arguments.

¶15 Both parties agree § 178(A)'s language is clear, unambiguous and intelligible on its face. Nevertheless, Yammine argues a latent ambiguity arises when subsection A is applied to the existing facts.⁹ She asserts the Legislature contemplated but one final divorce in which all issues are adjudicated, but did not make its intent clear when drafting § 178(A). Yammine posits interpreting § 178(A) to include a divorce order that reserves final judgment on all issues deprives the divorce court of its opportunity to sit in equity and divests its retained jurisdiction.

¶16 To support her position, Yammine contends § 178(A) does not address the hybrid Oklahoma circumstance of a bifurcated divorce proceeding that this Court approved in Alexander :

It is common for district courts to grant a divorce at one point in time but then reserve jurisdiction to address other pending issues—such as division of property or determinations as to custody or child support—at a later date. See e.g., Barnett v. Barnett , 1996 OK 60, ¶ 2, 917 P.2d 473, 475 ; Hibbard v. Hibbard, 1952 OK 273, ¶ 4, 207 Okla. 44, 247 P.2d 504, 505 ("This court has repeatedly held that an action for divorce and for division of jointly acquired property presents two causes of action maintainable separately ....").

2015 OK 52, ¶ 15, 357 P.3d at 485. Although conceding the court's divorce order is procedurally consistent with Alexander , Yammine argues § 178(A) does not apply when a spouse dies after the divorce order is entered but prior to final judgment on all issues.

¶17 Ghoussoub argues § 178(A)'s plain verbiage makes no such distinction between a divorce decree on all issues and one that has been bifurcated from other issues, such as property division, as permitted by Alexander . Pointing out "property interests" and "divorce proceeding" are absent from § 178(A)'s terms, he asserts Yammine's interpretation nullifies the established legal principles pronounced in Alexander . Relying on the parties' stipulation that Yammine and Bernard were divorced when he died, Ghoussoub argues § 178(A) revokes Yammine's primary beneficiary status by operation of law.

¶18 "[L]egislative intent is to be first sought in the language of the statute and when that intent is plainly expressed so that the...