Giant Cab, Inc. v. CT Towing, Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. A-1-CA-36212,A-1-CA-36212 |
| Citation | 453 P.3d 466 |
| Parties | GIANT CAB, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CT TOWING, INC., Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Whitener Law Firm, P.A., Thomas M. Allison, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee
Western Agriculture, Resource, and Business Advocates, LLP, A. Blair Dunn, Albuquerque, NM, Law Office of Andrew G. Thornton, Andrew G. Thornton, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant
{1} Defendant CT Towing, Inc. appeals a district court judgment awarding Plaintiff Giant Cab Incorporated compensatory damages and costs for CT Towing’s failure to allow Giant Cab to remove certain attached equipment from an accident-damaged taxicab CT Towing had lawfully towed and stored on its lot. CT Towing contends the district court erred in concluding (1) the items were not subject to the lien it lawfully held on the taxicab under NMSA 1978, Section 48-3-19 (1967), and (2) Giant Cab satisfactorily established its ownership of the items as required by 18.3.12.24(B)(1)(c) NMAC (2/13/2015). We conclude the district court correctly interpreted the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions and substantial evidence supported the district court’s finding that Giant Cab provided proof of ownership. We affirm.
{2} We draw the facts from the testimony presented at the bench trial. At the direction of law enforcement, CT Towing towed a damaged taxicab from the scene of an accident to its storage lot. Robert Torch, the owner of Giant Cab, went to the storage lot the following morning to check on the condition of the vehicle and to retrieve certain items. Torch presented Martha Stanke, co-owner of CT Towing, his identification and asked to examine the vehicle and to retrieve the registration and other personal items. Torch was permitted onto the lot, where he retrieved the registration and observed that the vehicle was likely inoperable. He returned to the front office and showed Stanke the registration that had been stored in the vehicle. Stanke presented him with an invoice for the towing charges, which he signed. Based on standard CT Towing practice, his signature on the invoice indicated he had shown proof of ownership for the cab.
{3} Torch then asked Stanke for permission to return to the vehicle to remove the taxicab’s fare meter, the dome light painted with his company name and telephone number, and the relay, which operated the dome light, as he could still make use of those items. He explained to Stanke that removal would be straightforward, need not damage the vehicle, and could be accomplished in approximately fifteen minutes. Torch had installed the fare meter and the dome light himself in customizing and painting the cab after purchasing it, as was his general practice.
{4} Stanke denied Torch’s request, citing insurance concerns.1 She later testified that the registration Torch retrieved from the vehicle appeared to be for a different vehicle and she had asked him to return with the correct registration. Regardless, instead of granting Torch’s request to return to the vehicle, Stanke offered him an alternative—he could pay CT Towing’s towing and storage fee, they would tow the vehicle off the lot, and he could retake possession of the vehicle and the items he sought.
{5} That alternative was unacceptable to Torch and he left the lot. A few days later, Torch filed an action in district court, alleging claims of conversion and prima facie tort based on CT Towing’s refusal to let him remove the items. The district court later held a one-day bench trial. Based on the evidence presented, the district court concluded Torch should have been allowed to remove the dome light, fare meter, and relay because the items constituted personal property under 18.3.12.24(B)(1)(c) NMAC (2/13/2015), which the parties agreed was exempt from the tow company lien under Section 48-3-19. The court awarded Torch compensatory damages and costs. CT Towing appealed.
{6} We review the district court’s findings of fact for substantial evidence. See Williams v. Mann , 2017-NMCA-012, ¶ 25, 388 P.3d 295. We review de novo the district court’s application of law to the facts. See TPL, Inc. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t , 2003-NMSC-007, ¶ 10, 133 N.M. 447, 64 P.3d 474. We also review the district court’s interpretation of the statutory and regulatory language de novo. See Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 2010-NMSC-009, ¶¶ 22, 24, 147 N.M. 583, 227 P.3d 73.
{7} We aim to give effect to the Legislature’s intent in construing statutory provisions. See Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp. , 1996-NMSC-038, ¶ 13, 121 N.M. 764, 918 P.2d 350. We are aided by classic canons of statutory construction in discerning intent, and we look first to plain meaning. See Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm’n , 2009-NMSC-013, ¶ 9, 146 N.M. 24, 206 P.3d 135. We read provisions in their entirety and construe them in relation with all others so as to produce a harmonious whole. See Key , 1996-NMSC-038, ¶ 14, 121 N.M. 764, 918 P.2d 350. "In interpreting sections of the Administrative Code, we apply the same rules as used in statutory interpretation." All. Health of Santa Teresa, Inc. v. Nat’l Presto Indus. , 2007-NMCA-157, ¶ 18, 143 N.M. 133, 173 P.3d 55.
{8} In its interpretation of the relevant statutory and regulatory language, the district court determined that the taxi equipment was not a "fixture." CT Towing contends the district court erred in interpreting the word "fixture" and as a result erred in concluding CT Towing’s lien on the vehicle did not extend to the fare meter, dome lamp, and relay.
{9} Neither the statutory language nor the regulatory language identified by the parties, however, makes any reference to fixtures. Section 48-3-19 grants a lien on "automobiles" towed or stored, at the direction of a person lawfully in possession, for the reasonable value of those services. NMSA 1978, Section 48-3-21 (1965) establishes that an "automobile" for purposes of Section 48-3-19 includes "motor vehicles of all classes and kinds[,]" and that a "motor vehicle" is any "self-propelled device in, upon or by which, any person or property is, or may be, transported." Section 48-3-21. The pertinent regulation sets forth procedures by which automobile owners may retake possession of automobiles subject to towing and storage liens. The regulation establishes that an owner may obtain possession of a vehicle not held for further law enforcement investigation by paying certain reasonable charges and providing proof of ownership. See 18.3.12.24(B)(2) NMAC (2/13/2015). Even in the absence of payment to retake possession, the regulation also permits an owner or agent, without charge, to "remove personal property from the motor vehicle if he or she presents proof of ownership." 18.3.12.24(B)(1)(c) NMAC (2/13/2015).
{10} The statutory provision at issue here, Section 48-3-19, makes reference only to "automobiles" and does not tell us explicitly whether Torch’s equipment might have merged with the automobile. See id. The statutory definition of "motor vehicle," incorporated in the statutory definition of automobile, provides no more guidance. See § 48-3-21. Other related statutory provisions shed more light on the question.
{11} Section 48-3-19 sets forth just one of many legislatively created liens on personal property—Article 3 of Chapter 48 houses a variety of others, including mechanics’ liens, landlord’s liens, and common carriers’ liens. See, e.g. , NMSA 1978, §§ 48-3-1 (1977), 48-3-5 (1997), 48-3-8 (1923). Some of these other liens, under appropriate circumstances, may apply to vehicles much like the tow company’s lien does here. See §§ 48-3-1, -5, -8. But notably, in establishing the scope of these other liens, our Legislature has seen fit to specify that the liens may also extend to "parts" of these vehicles, depending on the nature of the services provided. See, e.g. , § 48-3-1(A) (); NMSA 1978, § 48-3-29(A) (1985) (). No such specification appears in Section 48-3-19. The omission signals the Legislature’s intent that, given the more limited nature of the services tow companies provide, the liens granted to tow companies are less expansive than those applicable to mechanics or common carriers and do not extend to equipment like that at issue here. See, e.g. , United Rentals Nw., Inc. v. Yearout Mech., Inc. , 2010-NMSC-030, ¶ 25, 148 N.M. 426, 237 P.3d 728 . Had the Legislature intended the tow company’s lien to extend not just vehicles but vehicle parts, it could have demonstrated the intent by including more specific language. See City of Eunice v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t , 2014-NMCA-085, ¶ 19, 331 P.3d 986 (). But no such language is included, and we decline to read it into the statute.
{12} Mindful of the principle that a regulation may not impose requirements inconsistent with those established by statute, we recognize the regulation’s potential distinction between "personal property" and "vehicle" may be confusing given that the vehicle itself is personal property and the tow company’s lien clearly extends to the...
To continue reading
Request your trial