Gibbons v. Brown
Decision Date | 09 September 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 98-619,98-619 |
Citation | 716 So.2d 868 |
Parties | 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2120 Martine GIBBONS, Appellant, v. Donna BROWN, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Robert B. Guild, of Hession & Guild, Jacksonville, for Appellant.
Linda L. Winchenbach, of Moody & Salzman, Gainesville, for Appellee.
This appeal arises from an appealable non-final order denying Martine Gibbons' motion to quash service of process and, alternatively, motion to dismiss Donna Brown's complaint. We have jurisdiction under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i). The appellant contends that the lower tribunal erred in denying her motion, in that the appellee's complaint failed to set forth sufficient allegations of ultimate fact to establish the Florida court's proper exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over the appellant pursuant to section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1997). Concluding that the allegations satisfied neither the statutory prerequisites nor the constitutional requirements of due process, we reverse the order with directions that the cause be dismissed. Venetian Salami v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla.1989).
In her complaint in Duval County Circuit Court Case No. 97-5904, Mrs. Brown alleged 1) that she is a resident of Florida; 2) that Ms. Gibbons has subjected herself to the personal jurisdiction of the Florida court by bringing a prior lawsuit in Circuit Court Case No. 95-6244 against Clarence Brown (Mrs. Brown's husband) in Duval County "involving the same subject matter"; 3) that on August 24, 1994, Mrs. Brown and Ms. Gibbons were passengers in a motor vehicle driven by Mr. Brown near Montreal, Quebec, in Canada, when Ms. Gibbons negligently directed Mr. Brown to turn onto and proceed in the wrong direction on a one-way road; 4) that Ms. Gibbons owed Mrs. Brown a duty to exercise reasonable care for her safety while giving traffic directions to the driver of the vehicle; 5) that as a direct and proximate result of Ms. Gibbons' negligence, Mr. Brown headed the wrong way on the road and crashed head-on into another vehicle on a hilly curve; and 6) that as a result of Ms. Gibbons' negligence, Mrs. Brown suffered injury. The plaintiff, Mrs. Brown, demanded judgment against Ms. Gibbons for damages, post-judgment interest and costs, and a jury trial.
In her motion to quash service of process and, alternatively, motion to dismiss, Ms. Gibbons stated that she is a resident of Texas. Noting that her 1995 civil action "arising out of the same subject matter" was brought against Mr. Brown, and not against Mrs. Brown, Ms. Gibbons challenged the allegations in the 1997 complaint as insufficient to establish proper service on her, and inadequate to satisfy the strict requirements of the Florida long-arm statute. Citizens State Bank v. Winters Gov't Securities Corp., 361 So.2d 760 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) ( ).
Obtaining in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant requires a two-pronged showing. First, the plaintiff must allege sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the defendant within the coverage of the long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes. Parthenais, 554 So.2d at 502. If that prong is satisfied, then the second inquiry is whether sufficient "minimum contacts" are shown to comply with the requirements of due process. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). Generally speaking, Florida's long-arm statutes are of a class that requires more activities or contacts to allow service of process than are currently required by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Youngblood v. Citrus Assocs. of the New York Cotton Exchange, Inc., 276 So.2d 505, 507-08 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).
As to the first part of the inquiry, Mrs. Brown contends that the allegations in her complaint satisfy section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes (1995), which states:
A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity.
The parties agree that as a general rule in Florida, a plaintiff, by bringing an action, subjects herself to the jurisdiction of the court and to subsequent lawful orders entered regarding the same subject matter of that action. Glass v. Layton, 140 Fla. 522, 192 So. 330 (1937) ( ); Edwards v. Johnson, 569 So.2d 473, 474 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Burden v. Dickman, 547 So.2d 170 (Fla. 3d DCA) (, )rev. den., 557 So.2d 866 (Fla.1989); Palm Beach Towers, Inc. v. Korn, 400 So.2d 110, 111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (); Shurden v. Thomas, 134 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961) ( ). Mrs. Brown broadly construes this general rule to mean that by initiating the 1995 action, Ms. Gibbons subjected herself to Florida jurisdiction with respect to any "lawful orders" that were entered subsequently regarding "the subject matter of the action." On the other hand, Ms. Gibbons notes that her prior suit was brought in 1995, whereas Mrs. Brown did not file her complaint until October 20, 1997. Although Ms. Gibbons acknowledges that her prior action arose from the same vehicular accident as Mrs. Brown's instant suit, Ms. Gibbons notes that Mrs. Brown was not a party in the earlier action. Furthermore, several years separate the filing of the two proceedings. For purposes of the resolution of the question on appeal, we assume that the 1995 proceedings were over by the time Mrs. Brown brought her 1997 suit.
In Milberg Factors, Inc. v. Greenbaum, 585 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), the Florida-based guarantor of debts owed by a New York textile manufacturer to Milberg Factors, Inc. (a Delaware factoring and commercial financing corporation with its principal place of business in New York) brought a declaratory judgment action in Florida seeking to determine the extent of the guarantor's liability. Id. at 1090-91. In support of jurisdiction in the Florida court, the plaintiff alleged that Milberg had entered into five factoring agreements over a ten-year period with Florida-based companies, had filed U.C.C. financing statements in Florida, and had filed lawsuits against account debtors in Florida. Noting that Milberg was a foreign corporation that did not solicit business or maintain an office, agent, employee, or telephone listing in Florida, the district court found that Milberg's contacts with Florida were "isolated." Id. at 1091. Observing that an entity cannot control where its account debtors choose to relocate, the court stated that "the filing of lawsuits unrelated to this action against account debtors in Florida does not subject Milberg to the jurisdiction of our courts." Id. at 1091-92.
Even if we assume (without deciding) that bringing an action in a Florida court can constitute a "substantial and not isolated activity" in some instances, we nevertheless note that Mrs. Brown...
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