Gibbs v. Arras Bros., Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 January 1918
• Citation: 222 N.Y. 332,118 N.E. 857
• Parties: GIBBS v. ARRAS BROS., Inc.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

222 N.Y. 332

118 N.E. 857

GIBBS

v.ARRAS BROS., Inc.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Jan. 15, 1918.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Action by Benjamin D. Gibbs against Arras Bros., Incorporated. From an order of Appellate Division (170 App. Div. 897,154 N. Y. Supp. 1123), affirming a determination of the Appellate Term which affirmed a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals by permission. Reversed.

The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion.

Chase, Hogan, and Cardozo, JJ., dissenting.

Theodore B. Chancellor, of New York City, for appellant.

Samuel Schwartzberg, of New York City, for respondent.

COLLIN, J.

In June, 1914, the plaintiff and a companion were refused in the liquor saloon of the defendant drinks, respectively, of beer and gin, because they were colored men. Thereupon the plaintiff, in his own right and as the assignee of his companion, brought this action in the Municipal Court of the city of New York to recover, and did recover, the penalties provided for violations of section 40 of the Civil Rights Law. The Appellate Term and the Appellate Division have affirmed the recovery.

Section 40, in so far as relevant to this action, reads:

‘All persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages and privileges of any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No person being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employé of any such place, shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages or privileges thereof * * * on account of race, creed or color. * * * A place of public accommodation, resort or amusement within the meaning of this article, shall be deemed to include any inn, tavern or hotel, whether conducted for the entertainment of transient guests, or for the accommodation of those seeking health, recreation or rest, any restaurant, eating house, public conveyance on land or water, bathhouse, barber shop, theater and music hall. * * *’

The next following section prescribes the penalty for a violation recoverable by the person aggrieved or an assignee of his cause of action, and, further, that each violation shall constitute a misdemeanor punishable by a fine or imprisonment, or both fine and imprisonment. Civil Rights Law (Cons. Laws, c. 6) §§ 40, 41, amended by L. 1913, c. 265.

The parties recognize and express the fact that the Legislature did not specifically declare a liquor saloon included within either of the designations ‘a place of public accommodation, resort or amusement.’ The question, therefore, as presented by the facts, the briefs and arguments of the counsel for the parties, and correctly, is, Is a liquor saloon a place of public accommodation, within the intendment of the statute?

[1] The intention of the Legislature must dictate our determination. We must effectuate the legislative purpose and design as, through legitimate rules of interpretation, we find them expressed by the language and spirit of the statute. By virtue of those rules, the statute must be strictly construed, for the reasons that it imposes restrictions upon the control or management of private property by the owner and is both penal and criminal. Its effect is not to be extended through implication or analogy. Equally true it is, however, that the clear intention of the Legislature is not to be defeated through interpretation; but beyond that clear intention the penalty will not be enforced. Burks v. Bosso, 180 N. Y. 341, 73 N. E. 58,105 Am. St. Rep. 762;Butts v. Merchants' & M. Transportation Co., 230 U. S. 126, 33 Sup. Ct. 964, 57 L. Ed. 1422;Woollcott v. Shubert, 217 N. Y. 212, 111 N. E. 829, L. R. A. 1916E, 248, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 726.

The classifications by the Legislature, in civil rights statutes, of the places expressly and specifically included in the general designations, ‘a place of public accommodation’ or ‘a place of public amusement’ or ‘a place of public resort’ are trustworthy evidence or explanation of the legislative meanings of those designations. The original civil rights statute of 1873 secured to each citizen the ‘equal enjoyment of any accommodation, advantage, facility or privilege furnished by innkeepers, by common carriers, whether on land or water, by licensed owners, managers or lessees of theaters, or other places of amusement, by trustees, commissioners, superintendents, teachers and other officers of common schools and public institutions of learning, and by cemetery associations.’ Laws of 1873, c. 186, § 1. This provision became in ...