Gibbs v. Primelending

• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas
• Citation: 381 S.W.3d 829,2011 Ark. 255
• Docket Number: No. 10–1250.,10–1250.
• Parties: Mark and Karla GIBBS, Petitioners v. PRIMELENDING, a Plains Capital Company, et al., Respondents.
• Decision Date: 27 July 2011

2011 Ark. 255
381 S.W.3d 829

Mark and Karla GIBBS, Petitioners
v.
PRIMELENDING, a Plains Capital Company, et al., Respondents.

No. 10–1250.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

June 16, 2011.
Rehearing Denied July 27, 2011.

[381 S.W.3d 830]

Almand, Orsi & Campbell, PLLC, Little Rock, by: Donald K. Campbell, III and Anne Orsi, for petitioners.

Warner, Smith & Harris, PLC, by: Robert A. Frazier and Emily Milholen Reynolds, Rogers, for respondent Corinthian Title Company, Inc.

Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, LLP, Little Rock, by: Stephen R. Lancaster, Regina A. Young, and Jane A. Kim, for respondent Shelley Hickson.

Cross, Gunter, Witherspoon & Galchus, P.C., Little Rock, by: M. Stephen Bingham, for respondent Jeffrey Brown.

Campbell Law Firm, P.A., by: H. Gregory Campbell, for respondent Amy Christine Tueckes.

Brian G. Brooks, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brian G. Brooks, for amicus curiae Arkansas Trial Lawyers Association.

[381 S.W.3d 831]

JIM HANNAH, Chief Justice.

[2011 Ark. 1]This case involves a question of law certified to this court by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas in accordance with Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6–8 (2010) and accepted by this court on December 16, 2010. See Gibbs v. Primelending, 2010 Ark. 503, 2010 WL 5185466. The question certified is “[w]hether the use of the conspiracy theory of in personam jurisdiction violates Arkansas Code Annotated section 16–4–101.” We answer in the negative.

The following facts were provided in the federal district court's certification order. In January 2009, Morgan Stanley contacted Plaintiffs, Mark and Karla Gibbs, with an offer to refinance their home. At the time of the offer, Morgan Stanley was the financial advisor for Plaintiffs, and C. Ryan Hill, vice president of Morgan Stanley, was their personal financial advisor. Plaintiffs agreed to refinance their home with Morgan Stanley, but they were redirected by Hill to PrimeLending. Jeffrey Brown, a PrimeLending employee, assisted Plaintiffs in their refinancing.

At the same time as Plaintiffs' refinancing, Defendants Shelley Hickson and Amy [2011 Ark. 2]Christine Tueckes were employed by LandAmerica and Commonwealth to solicit title-insurance business from PrimeLending. When LandAmerica and Commonwealth were unable to handle the title business flowing from PrimeLending, Hickson and Tueckes referred this overflow title business to eLender Services which always chose eLender Escrow as the escrow agent.

ELender Services or eLender Escrow would pay a kickback fee from this overflow business to a limited liability company formed, and owned, by Hickson and Tueckes. Hickson and Tueckes would, in turn, pay part of this fee to PrimeLending or its employees for being the source that originally contacted Hickson or Tueckes.

PrimeLending began Plaintiffs' refinancing process by contacting Hickson or Tueckes. Hickson or Tueckes referred them to eLender Services which used eLender Escrow as the escrow agent even though the State of California had previously revoked the authority of eLender Escrow to act as an escrow agent because it failed to properly file its financial statements.

To compensate for the lost license, Corinthian Title, Mark Russell, Russell Biszantz, eLender Services, and eLender Escrow developed a scheme that enabled eLender Escrow to continue to operate. In furtherance of this scheme, Corinthian Title conspired with eLender Services and eLender Escrow to allow Bryan Kelly, a Corinthian Title employee, to work on the premises of eLender Services and eLender Escrow. By allowing Kelly to work out of its offices, eLender Escrow could continue to state that it was a licensed escrow agent. Corinthian Title received some form of benefit from eLender Services or eLender Escrow in return for [2011 Ark. 3]its participation in the scheme. Because of this scheme, eLender Escrow ultimately was able to serve as Plaintiffs' escrow agent.

On July 22, 2009, PrimeLending through its agent Brown mailed the “Mortgage Loan Origination Agreement” to Plaintiffs for execution. PrimeLending charged Plaintiffs $15,095 in fees. PrimeLending contacted Plaintiffs by telephone to set a closing location. Howard Wayne Narts, a notary public, handled the closing on August 11, 2009, at the Pulaski County business offices of Plaintiff Mark Gibbs. At closing, Plaintiffs executed a promissory note payable to U.S. Bank for $1.2 million and a mortgage in favor of U.S. Bank to secure the note. Funds from this loan and

[381 S.W.3d 832]

from Plaintiffs' private accounts were transferred to eLender Services' bank account to be used by eLender Escrow to pay this Morgan Stanley note and release the Morgan Stanley mortgage. Unfortunately, the Morgan Stanley note was not paid and it was discovered that Biszantz, owner of eLender Escrow, had taken for his own use the money intended to pay off the note. As a result, Plaintiffs now have two mortgages encumbering their home and a total indebtedness of $2,702,089.17.

Plaintiffs brought claims in the federal district court against (1) PrimeLending, Corinthian Title, Brown, Hickson, and Tueckes for violations of 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a); (2) PrimeLending and Corinthian Title for fraud; (3) PrimeLending, Corinthian Title, Brown, Hickson, and Tueckes for negligence; (4) PrimeLending and Corinthian Title for negligent training, retention, and supervision; (5) PrimeLending, Corinthian Title, Brown, Hickson, and Tueckes for civil conspiracy; (6) PrimeLending, Corinthian Title, Brown, Hickson, and Tueckes for acting in concert; and (7) PrimeLending for breach of fiduciary duty. Corinthian [2011 Ark. 4]Title, Brown, Hickson, and Tueckes contended that the federal district court did not have in personam jurisdiction over them because Arkansas's long-arm statute does not allow application of conspiracy jurisdiction. Thereafter, the federal district court certified to this court the question of whether the use of the conspiracy theory of in personam jurisdiction violates...