Gibson Products Co., Inc. of Tulsa v. Murphy
| Decision Date | 27 February 1940 |
| Docket Number | 29366. |
| Citation | 100 P.2d 453,186 Okla. 714,1940 OK 100 |
| Parties | GIBSON PRODUCTS CO., INC., OF TULSA, et al. v. MURPHY, Com'r of Labor, etc., et al. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied March 26, 1940.
See Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, for all other definitions of "Delegation of legislative authority".
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The Oklahoma Unemployment Compensation Law, Ch. 52, S.L.1936-37 p. 30, 40 Okl.St.Ann. ch. 6, § 211 et seq., is not unconstitutional as measured by Sec. 57, Art. V Constitution, Okl.St.Ann., for no elaborate statement of the subject of an Act is necessary, provided matters considered in the text of an Act are germane to the title.
2. The Oklahoma Unemployment Compensation Law is not violative of Art. IV, or Sec. 1, Art. V, Constitution, Okl.St.Ann., and its enactment was not a delegation of legislative authority because of provision that the law should cease to be operative in event Title IX, of the federal Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1101 et seq., be held invalid.
3. The Legislature possessed the power to provide under Sec. 19 (f) 4, of the Act, 40 Okl.St.Ann. § 229(f)(4), for the grouping of employers to determine applicability of the law and fix applicability at the number of eight employees, and such power exercised is not violative of the contract clause of the State Constitution, Sec. 15, Art. 2, when measured by Sec. 47, Art. IX, Constitution, a provision empowering legislative alteration of corporate charters "whenever in its opinion" the corporate charter may be injurious to the citizens of this state and limited only by injustice to incorporators.
Appeal from District Court, Oklahoma County; Frank P. Douglass Judge.
Actions by the Gibson Products Company, Incorporated, of Tulsa, Oklahoma, and Gibson Products, Incorporated, against Pat Murphy, as Commissioner of Labor and Director of the Oklahoma Unemployment Compensation and Placement Division, and Richard H. Lawrence, as Director of the Oklahoma Unemployment Compensation and Placement Division, to recover payments made as required by the Oklahoma Unemployment Compensation Act. From adverse judgments, the plaintiffs appeal.
Judgment affirmed.
Leslie L. Conner, of Oklahoma City, for plaintiffs in error.
Kathryn Van Leuven and Lynne B. Sells, both of Oklahoma City, for defendants in error.
Plaintiffs in error have appealed from adverse judgments in two actions instituted to recover payments made as required by the Oklahoma Unemployment Compensation Act. Ch. 52, S.L.1936-37, p. 30, Title 40, Ch. 6, § 211 et seq., Okl.St.Ann.
Plaintiffs are separate corporations controlled by the same officers and directors. As provided in the Act, plaintiffs were found to be an employing unit. Subdivision (f) 4, Sec. 19. Contributions or payment of taxes as ordered were made under protest. The facts are not disputed. The controversy is limited to the constitutionality of the Act.
It is first contended that title to the Act is defective and not in compliance with the requirements of Section 57, Art. V, Constitution, Okl.St.Ann., in that matters dealt with in the body of the Act are not mentioned in the title.
Among other things the Act provides for contributions by employers of more than eight persons employed within the year for twenty weeks or longer. Section 19 (f). Then the text of the Act provides for the grouping of employers who employ less than eight persons where the employing units are "owned or controlled * * * directly by the same interest". Thus in the case at bar, as contemplated by the Act, the contributions for unemployment were enforced, in the same manner as if each of the corporations concerned has employed the minimum number of employees under par. 1(f), Section 19.
The title to the Act, stripped of redundant matter, provides for and relates to unemployment compensation, stabilization of employment and contributions by employers. By title words it is indicated that every employer is to be made subject to the provisions of the Act. Therefore, it seems that the fact that there is provided in the body of the Act a requirement of a minimum of eight employees in a single employment or the grouping of employing units owned or controlled by the same interests so as to constitute a minimum of eight employees, as a condition of applicability of the Act, would not violate the cited constitutional provision as to title, unless it is essential that a title should be so worded as to be a complete index to all the details of the Act. This is not required. Perry v. Carter, 173 Okl. 267, 48 P.2d 278.
"No elaborate statement of the subject of an act is necessary * * *". In re Peterson's Estate, 182 Wash. 29, 45 P.2d 45, 47.
The constitutional mandate is not enforced in such a technical manner as to cripple legislation. In re County Com'rs, etc., 22 Okl. 435, 98 P. 557.
It is sufficient if the limitation contained in the body of the Act "is germane to the entire subject matter of the act". Cooper v. King, 171 Okl. 121, 42 P.2d 249, 251.
Such was the holding of our court in State ex rel. Read v. Midwest Mut. Burial Ass'n, Inc., 176 Okl. 468, 56 P.2d 124.
The purpose of the constitutional provision, supra, regarding title is to put both the individual legislator and the people on notice as to legislation. Associated Industries, etc., v. Industrial Welfare Comm., 185 Okl. 177, 90 P.2d 899. That purpose was subserved by the title now considered.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee recently so held in a very similar issue where it was contended a statute providing unemployment compensation was broader than its title. Southern Photo & Blue Print Co. v. Gore, 173 Tenn. 69, 114 S.W.2d 796, 798. Therein it was said:
While the provision for grouping of employing units under single ownership or control for ascertainment of whether the minimum of eight are employed so as to determine applicability of the Act is not mentioned in title, this provision is but a limitation on the exemption provided by subpar. 1, of Section 19(f), and it could be logically said, if we were to sustain the contention made, that the exemption provision as a whole is severable, and being severable it could be eliminated from the Act allowing the remainder to exist. So that under the title words: "providing for * * * contributions by employers * * *" every employer such as plaintiffs in error, without regard for the number employed, would be subject to the Act. Such a result is not at all necessary for the contention is not sound.
There is nothing to the contrary contained in Associated Industries of Oklahoma v. Industrial Welfare Commission, 185 Okl. 177, 90 P. 899, for there the title words specifically referred to minimum wage for "women" wherefore it was misleading when the body of the Act sought to include a minimum wage for men.
There is no merit in this contention.
It is next contended that since the continued operation of the Act is made dependent upon a future contingency, that is a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, the Act is void as a delegation of legislative power.
Section 22 of the Act, supra, 40 Okl.St.Ann. § 232, provides: "In event that Title IX of the Social Security Act, is declared invalid, this law shall cease to be operative, and all moneys then credited to the State of Oklahoma in the trust fund of the National Treasurer shall be returned to the tax payers of the State through the State Treasurer." It is likewise provided in the title of the Act.
It is urged under Art. IV, and Section 1 of Art. V, Constitution, providing for tripartite divisions of governmental powers, and the vesting of legislative authority, respectively that the Legislature may not provide for termination of legislation or the inoperation of an Act save and except by repeal. It is urged that the provision for conditional inoperation of the Act is a delegation of legislative power and authority.
We now set forth substance of a statement of the history of this social legislation as contained in the brief of defendant in error:
"The Social Security Act was enacted in August, 1935, Title IX of that Act opened the door to unemployment insurance. Before that date only one State, Wisconsin, had an active unemployment insurance law. All of the other States of the Union hesitated to enact such laws for fear that the taxes which they would have to impose on industry within their own State would redound to their serious detriment. They feared that industry in other states would have a strong competitive advantage over local industry. Title IX of the Social Security Act removed this competitive consideration. It imposed a tax on employers throughout the Nation, and it provided that, if a State should pass an unemployment compensation law, a credit up to ninety per cent of the Federal tax would be allowed to employers of that State for contributions made to a State unemployment compensation fund. The efficacy of this device to remove the fears of competition is amply borne out by the fact that in the short space of two years there had been enacted an unemployment compensation law in every State of the Union, the District of Columbia and Hawaii.
Oklahoma enacted its unemployment compensation law in December 1936. It had to enact the law in 1936 in order to claim a credit for the tax imposed for that year. Had it enacted the law thereafter, its employers would have paid a tax to the Federal Government but would not have been in a position to claim the credit measured by State...
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