Gibson v. Commissioner of Highways
| Decision Date | 03 July 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 42181,42181 |
| Citation | 178 N.W.2d 727,287 Minn. 495 |
| Parties | Stanley J. GIBSON, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Josephine Sazenski, Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF HIGHWAYS of the State of Minnesota, N. Ted Waldor, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. In this mandamus action to compel the state to reopen a condemnation proceeding, there was no evidence before the court below of actual physical taking of appellant's property. However, the state can still be ordered to institute condemnation proceedings if construction of the highway and the closing of roadways 'damage' appellant's property in the constitutional sense.
2--3. Only if the mandamus court finds that there has been a taking or damage in the constitutional sense can it compel the state to initiate condemnation proceedings. The test which applies in cases of this kind is whether the alteration of traffic flow due to the closing of certain roadways leading to a property owner's property causes access to such property to become unreasonable circuitous. A property owner has no vested interest in the continued flow of the main stream of through traffic. The right to control access is an exercise of the state's inherent police power which, if reasonably asserted, does not give a property owner the right to compensation by reason of the diversion of traffic or the circuity of routes which may occur.
4. No damages as such may be assessed for diversion of traffic or for loss of customers, business, goodwill, income, or profits, since the latter depend not only on the location of access but on such complex and intangible variables as the initiative and industry of the proprietor. Hence, the diminution in value of only the real estate is relevant.
5. Since the evidence does not establish a change in the highest and best use of the property, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that appellant's property was not taken or damaged in the constitutional sense.
James Malcolm Williams, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Douglas Head, Atty. Gen., Richard H. Kyle, Deputy Atty. Gen., John E. Drawz and Leland Frankman, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., St. Paul, for respondent.
Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and NELSON, WILLIAM P. MURPHY, OTIS, and JAMES F. MURPHY, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the district court denying to petitioner-appellant, Stanley J. Gibson, a writ of mandamus to compel the State Department of Highways to reopen a condemnation proceeding; to include therein property of which appellant is lessee; and to appoint appraisers to determine the amount of damages sustained by petitioner and the owner.
In May 1964 appellant and his partner purchased an on-sale liquor license and liquor business known as Mike's Bar located at 1428 South Sixth Street in Minneapolis. The transaction included a lease of the building housing the business and an option to buy the property. Appellant subsequently purchased his partner's interest in the business. Apparently, he also purchased and has since sold the property.
In August 1966, during construction of Interstate Highway No. 94 on land duly acquired by the highway department in a condemnation proceeding, 15th Avenue South, running in a north-south direction, was temporarily closed to the south of appellant's property, beginning at Sixth Street South. In March 1967 Sixth Street South, an east-west running street, was closed at a point immediately west of appellant's business premises. The liquor business was closed in September 1967 and was reopened in April 1968 and has been operating since that time.
On June 4, 1968, appellant petitioned for a writ of mandamus commanding respondent to reopen the condemnation proceeding and to include his property therein. On June 6, 1968, an order to show cause was issued by the district court, directing respondent to appear and show cause why the petition for writ of mandamus should not be granted.
Pursuant to a district court order placing the matter on the trial calendar, the case was tried before the court, sitting without a jury, on June 3, 1969. On August 19, 1969, the district court entered judgment denying appellant's petition for the writ.
The issue before the trial court below was whether, during constitution of Interstate Highway No. 94, the access of the public was so altered as to damage the highest and best use of appellant's property to such an extent that the actions taken by the commissioner of highways constituted a compensable taking, destruction, or damage to appellant's property within the meaning of the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution.
Minn.Const. art. 1, § 13, provides:
'Private property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use without just compensation therefor, first paid or secured.'
The trial court concluded as a matter of law that appellant failed to make out a prima facie case of a 'taking' in the constitutional sense; that, since no evidence of any damage to the fee interest and no evidence indicating diminution of the highest and best use of the fee was adduced at trial, no taking or damage to the fee was established by appellant; that, since no showing of loss or diminution in the value of the lease was made, no taking of the lease interest within the Minnesota Constitution was demonstrated; and that, although appellant alleged in his petition and accompanying affidavit that he had suffered a loss of business as a result of the highway construction, no gross sales figures were introduced into evidence and thus no loss of business was adequately demonstrated.
The function of the supreme court on review is to determine whether the evidence as a whole reasonably supports the findings of the lower court. In doing so, this court must apply the rule that when an action is tried by a court without a jury, its findings of fact are entitled to the same weight as the verdict of a jury and will not be reversed on appeal unless they are manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence. Flynn v. Beisel, 257 Minn. 531, 102 N.W.2d 284; Bolduc v. New York Fire Ins. Co., 244 Minn. 192, 69...
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State by Spannaus v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.
...street or highway; his right of access is subject to reasonable regulations in the public interest. See Gibson v. Commissioner of Highways, 287 Minn. 495, 500, 178 N.W.2d 727, 730 (1970); 3 J. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain § 10.221, at 381 (3rd ed. 1985). Nevertheless, the power to reg......
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... ... 1, 171 N.W.2d 83 (1969); Johnson Bros. Grocery v. State, Dept. of Highways, 304 Minn. 75, 229 N.W.2d 504 (1975). Like other property rights, the right of reasonable access ... 2 For example, in Gibson v. Commissioner of Highways, 287 Minn. 495, 500, 178 N.W.2d 727, 730 (1970), this court said: " * * ... ...
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Nolan and Nolan v. City of Eagan, No. A03-616.
...a writ of mandamus must decide whether a taking of property has occurred in the constitutional sense. Gibson v. Comm'r of Highways, 287 Minn. 495, 498-99, 178 N.W.2d 727, 730 (1970). While either party may request a jury trial on the issues of fact, the court ultimately decides whether a ta......
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...petition the court for a writ of mandamus to compel the state to initiate condemnation proceedings. Gibson v. Commissioner of Highways, 287 Minn. 495, 498, 178 N.W.2d 727, 729-30 (1970); see also Minn.Stat. §§ 586.01-.12 II. The resolution of this case is governed by our decisions in Hendri......