Gibson v. Epps

• Decision Date: 12 December 1961
• Docket Number: No. 8018,8018
• Citation: 352 S.W.2d 45
• Parties: Doyle GIBSON and Grange Mutual Casualty Company, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Alberta EPPS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 45

352 S.W.2d 45

Doyle GIBSON and Grange Mutual Casualty Company, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Alberta EPPS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 8018.

Springfield Court of Appeals, Missouri.

Dec. 12, 1961.

Kearby & Calvin, Poplar Bluff, for appellant.

Jack L. Jolly, Poplar Bluff, for respondents.

McDOWELL, Judge.

The Circuit Court of Butler County, Missouri, entered a judgment for plaintiffs and against defendant in the sum of $978.00 based upon a foreign judgment rendered in the Court of Common Pleas of Trumbull County, Ohio, in a damage action growing out of an automobile collision. From this judgment defendant appealed.

The facts giving rise to this controversy are that plaintiff, Doyle Gibson, a resident of Ohio, was the owner of an automobile which was insured by plaintiff, Grange Mutual Casualty Company. On October 26, 1956, defendant, a resident of Missouri, while visiting in Ohio, driving her 1953 Pontiac automobile, was involved in a collision with Gibson's car. As a result of this collision plaintiffs instituted an action for damages for injuries sustained to the Gibson automobile in the Court of Common Pleas in Trumbull County, Ohio, a court of proper jurisdiction for such action. Defendant was duly served with process in said action but defaulted by failing to answer or file other pleadings. The cause was tried and judgment rendered for plaintiffs on December 4, 1958, for $978.00. Plaintiff, Grange Mutual Casualty Company, paid the amount of said judgment to Gibson and became subrogated to Gibson's claim to this extent.

On December 8, 1959, plaintiffs filed suit on the above foreign judgment against defendant in Butler County, Missouri, the place of defendant's residence.

The petition was in the usual form.

Defendant's amended answer pleads (1) a general denial, and, (2) a counterclaim. The counterclaim alleged, inter alia, that the collision which occurred in Ohio was due to the negligence and carelessness of the driver of the Gibson car (setting out three specific grounds of negligence relied on); that by reason of such negligence and carelessness on the part of plaintiff, as aforesaid, defendant sustained damages for personal injuries in the sum of $25,000 and property damage to her Pontiac automobile in the sum of $1500 for which amounts she prayed judgment.

Plaintiffs filed an amended motion to strike the counterclaim of defendant's answer on the ground that: (1) the counterclaim is one which cannot be properly interposed in this action.

(2) The things and matters alleged in the counterclaim have, or should have been heretofore, adjudicated in a court of competent jurisdiction and are res judicata in this case.

(3) The counterclaim is untimely and barred by the statute of limitations.

The trial court sustained plaintiffs' motion to strike the counterclaim on the first two grounds of said motion and found for the defendant on the third ground.

The only issue complained of on this appeal is that the trial court committed error in sustaining plaintiffs' motion to strike defendant's counterclaim.

To support this contention defendant-appellant cites Supreme Court Rule 74.79(h), V.A.M.R., which reads: 'Defenses--Counterclaims. Any defense, set-off or counterclaim which under the law of this state may be asserted by the defendant in an action on the foreign judgment, may be presented by appropriate pleadings and the issue raised thereby shall be tried and determined as in other civil actions. Such pleadings must be filed within thirty dasy after personal jurisdiction is acquired or within thirty-five days after the mailing of the notice prescribed in paragraph (e).'

This Rule is the same as Sec. 511.760 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., which contains sections 16 and 17 and reads:

'16. The right of a judgment creditor to bring an action to enforce his judgment instead of proceeding under this section remains unimpaired.

'17. This section shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.'

The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law was adopted by Missouri in 1951. By the Act procedure is made available under which the judgment creditor can effectively obtain relief and, at the same time, give adequate protection to the judgment debtor to present any defense that can now be interposed to an action on such judgment. The Rule of the Supreme Court was adopted in furtherance of the provisions of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. 72 A.L.R.2d, p. 1255 (Annotation--Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act).

The instant case is not an action under section 511.760 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, but an action to enforce a judgment rendered in a sister state.

The full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, art. 4, Sec. 1, precludes any inquiry into the merits of the cause of action, the logic or consistency of the decision, or the validity of the legal principles on which the judgment is based. 50 C.J.S. Judgments Sec. 891, pp. 492, 493.

A judgment is entitled to full faith and credit and is conclusive even though the judgment is inconsistent with the findings or decision on which it is based; and a default judgment, although at variance with the facts pleaded in the complaint, is entitled to full faith and credit and is conclusive. 50 C.J.S. Judgments Sec. 891, p. 493.

In the instant case appellant made no attempt to deny the judgment sued on but relies solely on the court's denial of her right to file a counterclaim which shows on the face of the pleadings that it goes to the merits of the original suit.

In McDougal v. McDougal, Mo.App., 279 S.W.2d 731, 739[25-30], Judge Stone speaking for this court, stated: '* * * Where it is reasonably possible to do so, such construction will be adopted as will give force and effect to the judgment, make it serviceable instead of useless, and support rather than destroy it. Furthermore, in respect to a judgment rendered by a court of general jurisdiction of a sister state, it is presumed, absent any showing to the contrary, not only that the court had jurisdiction both of the parties and of the subject matter (Toler v. Coover, 335 Mo. 113, 71 S.W.2d 1067, 1069(5); O'Connell v. Smith, Mo.App., 131 S.W.2d 730, 732(3); Hicks v. La Plant, 236 Mo.App. 299, 151 S.W.2d 104, 106(1)) but also that the court 'followed its laws and entered a valid judgment in accordance with the issue made in that case' * * *. A party asserting the invalidity of such judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of validity, unless the proceedings show on their face that the judgment is not entitled to that presumption.'

In the instant case there is no contention that the Common Pleas Court in Ohio, which rendered the judgment (the basis of this action) against appellant, was not a court of general jurisdiction having power to render the judgment and the pleadings show on their face that the court had jurisdiction of both the subject matter and the parties. The judgment appears to us to be one entitled to full faith and credit in so far as it finally adjudicates that in Ohio appellant was guilty of negligence, as charged in the damage action, on which the court rendered judgment in that state. Such being true, we cannot, in any sense, permit that issue to be relitigated here under the counterclaim filed by appellan...