Gibson v. Outokumpu Stainless Steel U.S., LLC

• Docket Number: Civil Action 21-00103-JB-N
• Decision Date: 22 March 2023
• Parties: BRADLY GIBSON, Plaintiff, v. OUTOKUMPU STAINLESS STEEL USA, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

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BRADLY GIBSON, Plaintiff, v. OUTOKUMPU STAINLESS STEEL USA, LLC, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 21-00103-JB-N

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division

March 22, 2023

ORDER

JEFFREY U. BEAVERSTOCK CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On October 25, 2022, the Court held a hearing on the cross motions (partial) for summary judgment pending in this action. Plaintiff Bradley Gibson (“Plaintiff”) moved for partial summary judgment on his claims under the FLSA and common law, but not as to damages. (Doc. 91 (“Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment”). Defendant, Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC (“Defendant”) moved for partial summary judgment on a subset of Plaintiffs' FLSA claims and the common law claims of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. (Doc. 98 (“Defendant's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment”)).

The Court has reviewed the motions and supporting briefs (Docs 91, 98 and 100), the Plaintiff's Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 92) Defendant's Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 112 (“Defendant's Response”)), Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 117 (“Plaintiff's Reply”)), Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 110 (“Plaintiff's Opposition”)), Defendant's Reply in Support of its Motions for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 118 (“Defendant's Reply”)), and the various exhibits filed in support of the motions. This matter is now ripe for a decision. For the reasons discussed below, the motions are granted in part and denied in part.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Bradley Gibson, a former forklift operator at Defendant's steel mill in Calvert, Alabama, filed this action on March 5, 2021. (Doc. 1). In his amended complaint, Plaintiff seeks relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”) 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. and/or the common law of Alabama for 1) failing to pay overtime correctly and timely; and 2) failing to pay for all time clocked in. (Doc. 73). This action is one of three actions pending before this Court concerning Defendant's timekeeping and pay practices. Though the allegations have evolved, they remain essentially the same. See Hornady v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, 2022 WL 495186, *6 (February 17, 2022) (“More specifically, Plaintiffs allege Defendant failed to pay overtime correctly, at the correct rate or amount, timely and for all time worked as the result of the violation of four separate regulations as follows . . .”). Here, again, Plaintiff claims Defendant failed to pay overtime correctly, at the correct rate or timely, in violation of FLSA 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. and a series of attendant regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 516 et seq. See also, e.g., Longcrier v. HL-A Co., Inc., 595 F.Supp.2d 1218, 1221 (January 23, 2009) (“With respect to each of these alleged violations, Plaintiffs' theory is that HL-A, by virtue of this conduct, has failed to pay them statutorily required overtime compensation of 1.5 times their regular hourly rate for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek.”).

For the purposes of keeping the record organized, Plaintiff's claims can be more succinctly set out as follows:

1) a claim that Defendant willfully violated the FLSA by adopting a rounding policy pursuant to which Plaintiff and similarly situated employees' time worked was always rounded down in favor of the employer, in violation of 29 C.F.R. § 785.48 (the “rounding practices violation claim”);

2) a claim that Defendant willfully violated the FLSA by failing to calculate wages according to a fixed, recurring 168-hour period in violation of 29 C.F.R. §§ 778.104105 (the “workweek violation claim”);

3) a claim that Defendant willfully violated the FLSA by failing to recalculate Plaintiff's regular hourly rate of pay, to include the monthly incentive bonuses, for the purposes of calculating the overtime rate, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 207€ (the “bonus violation claim”);

4) a claim that Defendant willfully violated the FLSA by failing to correctly calculate the regular rate of pay for the purposes of paying overtime (the “RROP calculation violation claim”);

5) a claim that Defendant willfully violated the FLSA by failing to correctly pay overtime on the regular payment date or to timely pay overtime, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 206(b) and 29 CFR § 778.106 (the “true up violation claim”); and

6) a claim Defendant violated the FLSA by failing to keep accurate wage records pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 516.2 (the “record keeping violation claim”).

(See Doc. 73). Additionally, Plaintiff avers Defendant was “unjustly enriched at [all] the Plaintiff's expense,” violating Alabama common law. (See Id. at ¶65).

A. The Motions for Partial Summary Judgment

Plaintiff contends summary judgment as a matter of law is due to be granted on the following violations of the FLSA: the bonus violation, the rounding practices violation, the workweek violation, the “RROP” calculation violation, and the true up violation. (Doc. 91). Plaintiff also asserts summary judgment is due to be granted on his common law unjust enrichment claim. Id.

Defendant argues it is entitled to summary judgment on the following: 1) the bonus violation; 2) the workweek violation; 3) the true up violation; and 4) Plaintiff's state law claim for unjust enrichment or quantum meruit. (Doc. 98).

The motions have been thoroughly briefed by the parties and the Court conducted a hearing.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Standards of Review

Summary judgment should be granted only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. If a party asserts “that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed”, the party must:

(A) cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or

(B) show[] that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)&(B).

The party seeking summary judgment bears “the initial burden to show the district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the non-movant to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to make ‘a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,' the moving party is entitled to summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)) (footnote omitted). “In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBHSiegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Summary judgment is justified only for those cases devoid of any need for factual determinations.” Offshore Aviation v. Transcon Lines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).

Here, both sides have moved for summary judgment on the claims asserted in this action. It is well-settled that “[t]he applicable Rule 56 standard is not affected by the filing of crossmotions for summary judgment.” Page v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 1334, 1345 (S.D. Ala. 2010) (citations omitted); see also Murray v. Holiday Isle, LLC, 620 F.Supp.2d 1302, 1307 (S.D. Ala. 2009) (same). The Eleventh Circuit has explained that “[c]ross-motions for summary judgment will not, in themselves, warrant the court in granting summary judgment unless one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not genuinely disputed.” United States v. Oakley, 744 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted); see also Wermager v. Cormorant Tp. Bd., 716 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1983) (“the filing of cross motions for summary judgment does not necessarily indicate that there is no dispute as to a material fact, or have the effect of submitting the cause to a plenary determination on the merits”). “‘When both parties move for summary judgment, the court must evaluate each motion on its own merits, resolving all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration.'” Muzzy Products, Corp. v. Sullivan Indus., Inc., 194 F.Supp.2d 1360, 1378 (N.D.Ga. 2002) (quoting Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1338-1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). “Nonetheless, ‘cross-motions may be probative of the absence of a factual dispute where they reflect general agreement by the parties as to the dispositive legal theories and material facts.'” Page, 702 F.Supp.2d at 1345 (quoting Murray, 620 F.Supp.2d at 1307).

B. Statement of Law

Section 7(a)(1) of the FLSA requires that employers compensate their employees for hours worked in any workweek in excess of forty “at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which [they are] employed.” 29 U.S.C § 207(a)(1). Therefore, “[u]nder the FLSA, an employer may not employ his employee for a workweek longer than forty hours unless his employee receives overtime compensation at a...