Gibson v. Sellars

• Decision Date: 31 October 1952
• Citation: 37 A.L.R.2d 1435,252 S.W.2d 911
• Parties: GIBSON et al. v. SELLARS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Page 911

252 S.W.2d 911

37 A.L.R.2d 1435

GIBSON et al. v. SELLARS.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Oct. 31, 1952.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Dec. 19, 1952.

Byron, Sandidge & Holbrook, Ownersboro, Hunt & Palmore, Henderson, for appellants.

King & Craig, Henderson, for appellee.

DUNCAN, Justice.

Appellee as plaintiff below sought by this action to quiet his title to the oil and gas in place beneath one hundred acres of land situated in Henderson County, Kentucky.

The sole question involves the construction of an exception appearing in a deed from Mrs. Lockie Gibson to one King executed on October 27, 1908. The appellants claim by descent from Mrs. Lockie Gibson and the appellee as a remote vendee of King, the grantee.

The deed in question was a conveyance of the fee-simple title to certain lands including the one hundred acres here in question and contained this exception:

'It is expressly understood and agreed by the parties that the coal and mineral rights underlying said tract of land have been heretofore sold by the First Party and are not intended to be conveyed by this deed and are expressly excluded herefrom.'

It was stipulated by the parties that the only recorded conveyance from Lockie Gibson executed prior to the deed in question was a deed dated November 2, 1907, by which she conveyed to Morris Baker the coal in and under this land.

Appellee insists and the court found that the exception when considered in the light of the prior conveyance of coal only did not except the oil and gas and that these substances passed under the deed to King. Appellants insist that the exception included oil and gas and that the grantee acquired title to only the surface.

This court has long since established the rule that the term 'minerals' includes oil and gas, and that a reservation or exception of 'coal and minerals' excepts the oil ans gas. Scott v. Laws, 185 Ky. 440, 215 S.W. 81, 13 A.L.R. 369; Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v. Preece, 260 Ky. 601, 86 S.W.2d 163; Hurley v. West Kentucky Coal Co., 294 Ky. 96, 171 S.W.2d 15; Franklin Fluorspar Co. v. Hosick, 239 Ky. 454, 39 S.W.2d 665; Berry v. Hiawatha Oil & Gas Co., 303 Ky. 629, 198 S.W.2d 497.

The many variations of the term which have been given the effect of including these substances are well illustrated by the specific provisions involved in the several cases. In the Scott case, the term was 'all the mineral right and coal privileges'. In the Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. case, [260 Ky. 601, 86 S.W.2d 164] it was "all the coal, salt water, and minerals". In the Hurley case [294 Ky. 96, 171 S.W. 16], it was "All the coal, mineral and mining rights". The rule has been followed even though the conjunction 'and' is omitted. In the Berry case, it was concluded that an exception of the "coal mineral rights" excepted the oil and gas. In the Hosick case [239 Ky. 454, 39 S.W.2d 667], an exception of "coal, minerals and mining privileges" was given the same effect.

Applying the definition so often adopted by this court, we conclude that the term 'coal and mineral rights' has a definite and certain meaning which includes oil and gas.

Appellee concedes the generally accepted definition of the term involved, but insists that our construction should be controlled by the intention of the parties. We recognize that to be the general rule with reference to all instruments. The question is, how far shall we go in determining the intention of the parties? Should we confine our investigation to the four corners of the instrument itself, or should we extend our search entirely beyond its terms to determine whether or not the parties meant something different from what they said?

The question presents a fundamental rule of construction. Although generally referred to as the parol evidence rule it is more than a rule of evidence. It is one of substantive law and is generally recognized and applied in all jurisdictions. The rule is stated in 32 C.J.S., Evidence, § 851, page 787, as follows:

'It has been asserted that the rule under discussion is one of evidence merely. However, according to the modern and better view, the parol evidence rule, as applied to contracts, is a rule, not of evidence or of evidence merely, but of substantive law, it being considered that parol evidence is excluded because the law requires the terms of the agreement to be found in the writing itself * * *.'

Extrinsic proof is competent and may be employed in construing language, the meaning of which is obscure or which is susceptible of two or more interpretations. However, because of the inherent danger of the rule, its use is permitted only in those cases where the language to be construed is so ambiguous or obscure in meaning as to defy interpretation otherwise. An extension of the rule would result in chaos and confusion, and it would be impossible to determine the rights of the parties to a contract without viewing all the circumstances surrounding the execution of the document in question.

The determining the intention of the parties to the contract before us, we are, therefore, restricted to the instrument itself and we have no right to vary or alter the meaning of the words used in the exception by reference to any prior conveyance.

It is of particular significance that the exception here did not contain any language restricting the minerals excepted to those previously conveyed. The grantor did not say that she was...