Gifford v. Poplar Bluff R-1 Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 03 December 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:12-cv-183 SNLJ |
| Parties | HEATHER GIFFORD, Plaintiff, v. POPLAR BLUFF R-1 SCHOOL DISTRICT d/b/a POPLAR BLUFF TECHNICAL CAREER CENTER Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Plaintiff was a student in the defendant Poplar Bluff R-1 School District d/b/a Poplar Bluff Technical Career Center ("School District"), which provides education in cosmetology that is accredited by the Missouri State Board of Cosmetology. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against defendant following a dispute about plaintiff's tuition payment. The lawsuit was originally filed in the Circuit Court of Butler County, Missouri, on October 29, 2012. The defendant removed the matter to this Court on November 5, 2012. The defendant has moved for partial summary judgment (#14). The motion has been fully briefed and is now ripe for disposition.
The following facts are undisputed except where indicated. Plaintiff was admitted and enrolled in the School District's cosmetology program for the year 2008. At that time, plaintiff paid a portion of the $4,490 tuition. At the time plaintiff interviewed for and was accepted to the program, plaintiff had recently been in a car accident and had suffered a broken leg. She missed several days of the program in order to attend doctor and physical therapy appointments. Each student is require to attend 1,220 hours to complete the program. Excessive absenteeism canresult in a student's termination from the program, and plaintiff was in fact terminated from the program for that reason in July 2008. Plaintiff appealed that decision, and the School District sent her a letter stating that she could re-enroll in the program, but plaintiff states that she never got the letter because the District sent it to the wrong address. Plaintiff did not re-enroll as a result. Instead, plaintiff enrolled in another accredited cosmetology program and obtained Certificate in Cosmetology.
On July 14, 2008, defendant reported to the Missouri State Board of Cosmetology ("Board") that plaintiff had not made a complete payment for the 2008 cosmetology program. When plaintiff sought her license from the Board, the Board refused to grant the license due to the defendant's report to the Board that she had an outstanding balance with the defendant. Plaintiff ultimately paid the balance (which she disputes was owed) in order to take the licensing exam and obtain her license from the Board.
Plaintiff's complaint includes six counts.
Count I seeks a refund of payments she made to defendant for services defendant failed to provide.
Count II is for violations of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act arising from the defendant's alleged "deception, fraud, false pretense, misrepresentation, unfair practices and concealment, omission and suppression of material facts upon" plaintiff. In particular, plaintiff asserts that defendant unlawfully retained her money, retained her cosmetology kit that plaintiff paid for, and prevented her from obtaining a license by reporting an unpaid balance to the Board.
Count III is for breach of contract.
Count IV is for tortuous interference with plaintiff's business relationship with the Board.
Count V is apparently for defamation, based on defendant's alleged publication of false statements to the Board.
Count VI is for deprivation of plaintiff's property interest in obtaining a license from the Board in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendant now seeks summary judgment on Counts I-II and IV-VI.
Pursuant to Rule 56(c), a district court may grant a motion for summary judgment if all of the information before the court demonstrates that "there is no genuine issue as to material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962). The burden is on the moving party. Mt. Pleasant, 838 F.2d at 273. After the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party must do more than show that there is some doubt as to the facts. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the nonmoving party bears the burden of setting forth specific facts showing that there is sufficient evidence in its favor to allow a jury to return a verdict for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must review the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and give that party the benefit of any inferences that logically can be drawn from those facts. Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 1983). The court is required to resolve all conflicts of evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chem. Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 210 (8th Cir. 1976). With these principles in mind, the Court turns to the discussion.
Defendant contends that sovereign immunity bars plaintiff's tort claims asserted in Counts II, IV, and V. In addition, defendant contends that summary judgment is appropriate as to Counts I and VI for other reasons, as discussed further below.
Defendant School District, as a public school district providing post-secondary education, is entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity from and against tort claims under § 537.600 R.S.Mo unless a statutory exception applies. The plaintiff does not contest that Counts II, IV, and V contain tort claims that would ordinarily be subject to immunity by a state. Instead, plaintiff contends that the defendant School District is subject to the Missouri common law "proprietary exception" to sovereign immunity. A municipality is deprived of immunity when performing proprietary functions. Beiser v. Parkway School Dist., 589 S.W.2d 277, 280 (Mo. banc 1979) (citing St. Joseph Light & Power Co. v. Kaw Valley Tunneling Inc., 589 S.W.2d 260 (Mo. banc 1979)).
However, as the Missouri Supreme Court stated, State ex rel. Missouri Dep't of Agric. v. McHenry, 687 S.W.2d 178, 181-82 & n.5 (Mo. banc 1985) (citing Rennie v. Belleview School Dist., 521 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. banc 1975); Smith v. Consolidated School Dist., 408 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. banc 1966)). Indeed, school districts are not municipalities for purposes of sovereign immunity. See Rennie, 521 S.W.2d at 424 (); see also State exrel. Lebanon School Dist. R-III v. Winfrey, 183 S.W.3d 232, 234 n.2 (Mo. banc 2006) (citing Beiser, 589 S.W.2d 277). The Court acknowledges the confusion surrounding the matter of sovereign immunity and school districts in that McHenry does not mention State ex rel. Allen v. Barker, 581 S.W.2d 818 (Mo. banc 1979), which did apply the proprietary/governmental dichotomy test to a school district. But Barker is inconsistent with both prior and more recent Missouri Supreme Court decisions, and, as such, appears to be an aberration. See Wollard v. City of Kansas City, 831 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Mo. banc. 1992) ("The common law governmental/ proprietary test retains vitality only in suits against municipal corporations that do not involve the express waivers contained in § 537.600."); State ex rel. Bd. of Trustees of City of North Kansas City v. Russell, 843 S.W.2d 353, 358-59 (Mo. banc. 1992) (quoting Woolard). In light of ample authority that school districts are not municipalities and thus are not subject to the governmental-proprietary dichotomy test, the Court will grant summary judgment to defendant on Counts II, IV, and V because defendant is entitled to sovereign immunity as to those tort claims.
Plaintiff states in her brief that Count I states a claim for assumpsit. Assumpsit "an action on a contract implied by law and for a consideration received, as distinguished from a suit for tort or for the breach of an express contract." U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 153 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Mo. App. E.D. 1941). Plaintiff attempts to connect her "assumpsit" claimto the covenant of good faith and fair dealing — but that covenant is implied in all contracts. See Farmers' Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Missouri Dep't of Corr., 977 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Mo. banc 1998). Moreover, such a claim would be subsumed by plaintiff's Count III, which is for breach of contract and which defendant does not contend is appropriate for summary judgment. Ultimately, plaintiff's "assumpsit" claim cannot stand because school districts are prohibited from making any contract that is not in writing. § 432.070 RSMo. As a result, Missouri courts have held that "[s]chool districts cannot be held liable on implied contract." Strain-Japan R-16 Sch. Dist. v. Landmark Sys., Inc., 51 S.W.3d 916, 922 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001) (citing § 432.070 RSMo.). The Court will therefore grant summary judgment to the defendant on Count I.
Count VI is for violations of plaintiff's civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Missouri Constitution. Defendant states that it is entitled to summary judgment on this count because plaintiff did not have a "protected property interest" that was deprived "without due process of law."
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