Gikas v. Washington School Dist.
| Decision Date | 16 May 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-1934.,02-1934. |
| Citation | 328 F.3d 731 |
| Parties | James GIKAS, Appellant v. WASHINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT, Washington Board of School Directors, Dr. Maryann B. Weinstein, Donald G. Emery, Dr. James S. Balent, Alan B. Cottrill, Jane S. Fergus, David R. Johnston, Jonathan W. Miles, Phyllis L. Waller, and Ed Westcott, individually. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Daniel W. Ernsberger (Argued), Behrend & Ernsberger, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellant.
Douglas R. Nolin (Argued), Peacock Keller Ecker & Crothers, LLP, Washington, DC, for Appellees.
Before BECKER, Chief Judge,* SCIRICA, Circuit Judge,** and SHADUR,*** District Judge.
This appeal concerns the property rights created by the Pennsylvania Veterans' Preference Act ("VPA"), 51 Pa.C.S.A. § 7104. Section 7104(a) of the VPA provides that a veteran possessing the "requisite qualifications" shall be given a preference in the assignment of public jobs. After working as a substitute teacher in the Washington School District, plaintiff James Gikas, who had received an honorable discharge from both the Army and the Navy, sought full-time employment in the District as a social studies teacher. On two occasions, non-veterans were hired into the District's social studies department instead of Gikas, who would have qualified for a preference over the non-veteran applicants if it were shown that he possessed the "requisite qualifications." Gikas asserts that the District violated his substantive due process rights by denying him the preference and by not hiring him when a position became available in the social studies department in 1999.
Gikas also claims that his procedural due process rights were violated because the District failed to define the "requisite qualifications" for the positions and to publish those requirements so that applicant veterans would know what was required in advance of applying for the positions. By not defining in advance the "requisite qualifications," Gikas maintains, the District had free rein to ignore the veterans' preference. In his submission, the District could define "requisite qualifications" post hoc as those of the most qualified applicant so that a veteran would be employed only if he was the most qualified, essentially eviscerating any preference. Gikas argues that § 7104(a) was meant to be a counterpart to § 7104(b) of the VPA, which creates a preference in the assignment of public jobs when a civil service exam is administered; if an applicant veteran passes the civil service exam, he is entitled to the position even if "his name does not stand highest on the eligible or promotional list." 51 Pa.C.S.A. § 7104(b). Thus, Gikas argues that the District must provide in advance of the hiring process an objective definition of "requisite qualifications" to ensure that applicant veterans are actually given the preference to which they are entitled under the Act.
The District Court dismissed the procedural due process claim because Gikas had "fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the substantive due process claim because "there [was] no genuine issue as to any material fact and" the defendants were "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Fed R.Civ. P. 56(c). We too conclude that Gikas has alleged neither a substantive nor a procedural due process violation. While the veterans' preference contained in § 7104(a) is a property interest subject to procedural due process protection, "not all property interests worthy of procedural due process protection are protected by the concept of substantive due process." Reich v. Beharry, 883 F.2d 239, 244 (3d Cir.1989). Rather, a property interest must be "fundamental" under the United States Constitution to be subject to substantive due process protection. In our view, the preference contained in § 7104(a) is not sufficiently "fundamental" to qualify as a property interest deserving substantive due process protection.
Moreover, we conclude that procedural due process does not require the District to publish the definition of "requisite qualifications" for a position in advance of the hiring process. The property interest at issue here is not in the teaching position itself, but in the preference. As such, the District is not required to help applicant veterans become qualified for the job; rather it is required to give those applicants a preference only if they are independently qualified. Requiring the publication in advance of the "requisite qualifications" for a position is simply too attenuated from the specific protected property interest in the preference to be required by procedural due process. In sum, Gikas has not established a federal constitutional violation, hence we are constrained to affirm the judgment of the District Court.
In 1997, James Gikas, a veteran of both the Army and the Navy who is certified to teach school in Pennsylvania, applied for a teaching position in the Washington School District and was hired as a part-time substitute teacher. In June 1998, a full-time teaching position became available in the social studies department and the District hired Cyril Walther, a non-veteran substitute teacher who had served an entire year in the position to be filled, teaching the same material required for the position. When Gikas asked why he was passed over for the position, he was told that he did not have enough experience as a full-time substitute teacher. Gikas objected because he had not been informed that working full time (as opposed to part time) as a substitute teacher would affect his ability to be hired as a full-time teacher. The school board represented that it would inform Gikas of future openings in his area of certification and would delineate the minimum qualifications for such openings.
In the summer of 1999, another full-time teaching position became available in the District's social studies department. William Watson, the District's high school principal, and Ronald Junko, the District's assistant high school principal, chose eight candidates, including Gikas, to interview for the position based on the following criteria: (1) the appearance of the application; (2) extracurricular activities; (3) grade point average; and (4) proximity of his or her residence. During the interview, Watson and Junko evaluated the applicants based on four general criteria; those criteria were further divided into subsets. The criteria were:
(1) Instruction
(A) Teaching Techniques/Learning
(B) Planning
(C) Managing Students
(D) Motivating Students
(2) Professional Development and Fit with Needs
(A) Preparation
(B) Experience
(C) Professional Growth/Responsibility
(D) Philosophy/Goals
(E) Coaching/Sponsoring
(3) Relationships
(A) Staff
(B) Parents/Community
(4) Other
(A) Standard District Measure.
The applicants were given a score in each area based on their answers to a standardized series of questions.
Based on this score, Gikas ranked sixth out of the eight candidates, and he was not offered the teaching position. Watson testified that Gikas provided only generic responses to questions related to teaching techniques, planning, managing and motivating students, and that he did not demonstrate an understanding of the District's demographics or philosophies. A non-veteran, Mark Albertina, who scored the highest in the interview evaluation, was hired.
Gikas brought suit, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Washington School District, the Washington Board of School Directors and nine members of the Washington School Board individually, seeking appointment to a teaching position with the District, with back pay and benefits, based on alleged substantive and procedural due process violations.1 Pursuant to the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and the Local Rules for Magistrates, this case was heard before Magistrate Judge Francis X. Caiazza. The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation proposing the dismissal of the procedural due process claim, pursuant to Fed. R.Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which the District Court adopted. The Magistrate Judge later filed a Report and Recommendation suggesting that the District Court grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the substantive due process claim. The District Court issued an order adopting the recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. Gikas timely appealed.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over both the order dismissing the procedural due process claim and the order granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. See United States v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 200 F.3d 143, 147 (3d Cir.1999) (); Pacitti v. Macy's, 193 F.3d 766, 772 (3d Cir.1999) ().
Gikas argues that the District deprived him of a property interest protected by substantive due process when it hired Albertina, a non-veteran, to fill the full-time teaching position in the social studies department. In particular, Gikas maintains that because he was one of eight individuals selected to be interviewed for the position, he met the "requisite qualifications" for the job, and as a result, he was entitled to a preference under § 7104(a) of the Pennsylvania Veterans' Preference Act.2 Section 7104 of the VPA provides:
(a) Non-civil service. Whenever any soldier possesses the requisite qualifications and is eligible to...
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