Pappas v. City of Lebanon

• Citation: 331 F.Supp.2d 311
• Decision Date: 16 August 2004
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:03-CV-1112.
• Parties: George C. PAPPAS, Plaintiff v. CITY OF LEBANON, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

331 F.Supp.2d 311

George C. PAPPAS, Plaintiff v. CITY OF LEBANON, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:03-CV-1112.

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

August 16, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robert William McAteer, Wiley P. Parker, Henry & Beaver LLP, Lebanon, PA, for Plaintiff.

John C. Romeo, Steven K. Ludwig, Fox Rothschild LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

CONNER, District Judge.

Presently before the court is a motion (Doc. 18) in which defendants, the City of Lebanon ("Lebanon"), the Lebanon Police Pension Fund Board ("Board"), and members of the Board, seek summary judgment on the claims of plaintiff, George C. Pappas ("Pappas"), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pappas asserts that the Board violated his rights to due process by failing to assist him in meeting statutory prerequisites for receipt of pension benefits and by denying his request to vest benefits without notice and a hearing.

The question presented is whether an agency's denial of a claim to a benefit constitutes a "deprivation" of "property" under the Due Process Clause when governing law imposes conditions on receipt of the benefit that have not yet been deemed satisfied. For the reasons that follow, the court holds that it does not and will grant defendants' motion for summary judgment.

I. Statement of Facts ¹

The facts of this case are as simple as they are unfortunate. After serving as an officer of the Lebanon Police Department for approximately eighteen years, Pappas submitted a letter of resignation to Robert A. Anspach ("Anspach"), the Mayor of Lebanon and chairperson of the Board. The resignation, to be effective on November 26, 2002, was accepted by Anspach on November 18, 2002. (Doc. 20 ¶¶ 2, 4-6, 12; Doc. 24).

The next day, Pappas notified the Board by letter that he wished to vest benefits that had accrued under a police pension plan:

I would respectfully request to vest my pension per the Codified Ordinances of the City of Lebanon, Section 175.06 "Persons Entitled to Benefits and Pensions," ... which states "a Police Officer shall be entitled to apply to the Pension Fund Board and shall receive his pension vested pursuant to existing state law for Police Officers providing for vesting of pension after twelve (12) years of service". [sic]

Please accept this letter as notification of my intent to vest my pension and inform me of my rights and obligations in order to accomplish this goal.

(Doc. 20 ¶¶ 13, 15; Doc. 20, Ex. E; Doc. 24). Pappas received no response to the letter before the effective date of his resignation, nor any notification of a hearing on his request. (Doc. 20 ¶¶ 16, 21).

Upon receipt of the letter, Anspach recognized that the request was untimely under the governing statute and ordinance, which require notice of an intention to vest at least thirty days prior to the retiree's termination date.² Had Pappas been informed of this problem before November 26, 2002, he could have deferred his termination date to render his notification timely. (Doc. 20 ¶ 17; Doc. 20, Exs. H, M; Doc. 21, Ex. A; Doc. 21, Attach. 5 at 27; Doc. 23 ¶¶ 9, 11; Doc. 24; Doc. 28 ¶ 9). However, neither Anspach nor other members of the Board alerted Pappas to the issue. Instead, Anspach asked the municipal solicitor to provide an advisory opinion on whether the untimely notice precluded the vesting of benefits. (Doc. 20 ¶¶ 16-17; Doc. 21, Attach. 5 at 27; Doc. 23 ¶ 9; Doc. 24; Doc. 28 ¶ 9). The solicitor concluded that it did, and the Board voted to deny the application to vest benefits. Pappas received notice of the decision in May 2003. (Doc. 20 ¶¶ 17-23; Doc. 24).

Pappas requested a rehearing. He argued that the Board had violated due process requirements in denying the application without providing prior notice or an opportunity for a hearing. The Board denied the request. (Doc. 20 ¶¶ 25-26; Doc. 20, Exs. J, K; Doc. 24).

Soon thereafter, Pappas filed in a Pennsylvania court of common pleas a "complaint in the nature of an appeal from an adjudication under local agency law." (Doc. 1, Ex. A). This complaint alleged that defendants violated their legal obligations by failing to notify Pappas of the defective notice prior to his resignation and violated his rights to due process by denying his request without notice and a hearing. It asked that the court overturn the Board's decision and grant the request to vest pension benefits. (Doc. 1, Ex. A at 6-7). The complaint also included a separate claim for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of Pappas's rights to due process under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. (Doc. 1, Ex. A at 7-9).

In July 2003, defendants removed the action to federal court, where it was assigned the above-captioned docket number. (Doc. 1). Pappas thereafter filed an amended complaint, amplifying his civil rights claim for violations of the Due Process Clause. The amended complaint eliminates the demand that the Board's decision be overturned. Instead, it "specifically requests that [plaintiff's] claim in the nature of an administrative appeal from the adjudication [of the Board] remain pendent in the Court of Common Pleas."³ (Doc. 5 ¶ 31). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in May 2004.⁴ (Docs. 18, 21).

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment serves as a minimal but important hurdle for litigants to overcome before presenting a claim to a jury. It places the burden on the adverse party to produce affirmative evidence, beyond the allegations of the pleadings, in support of the claim. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Corneal v. Jackson Township, 313 F.Supp.2d 457, 464 (M.D.Pa.2003) ("[T]he non-moving party may not simply sit back and rest on the allegations in its complaint."), aff'd, 94 Fed.Appx. 76 (3d Cir.2004). Only if this burden is met, through submission of sufficient evidence to sustain favorable jury findings with respect to each essential element of the claim, can the cause of action proceed. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-57, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-89, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e) (requiring production of evidence "showing that there is a genuine issue for trial").⁵ Otherwise, summary judgment must "be rendered forthwith" against the adverse party. Id.

III. Discussion

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code offers private citizens a cause of action for violations of federal law by state officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....

Id. Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights, but merely a method to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state actors. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir.1996).

The claims in this case invoke the broad and amorphous protections of due process. The Fourteenth Amendment⁶ provides that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of ... property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. From this short phrase has emerged an immense body of law, defining and redefining the procedural and substantive rights encompassed therein. See, e.g., DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 598 (3d Cir.1995) (noting that due process is an area "famous for controversy, and not known for its simplicity") (quoting Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709, 715 (5th Cir.1987)), overruled on other grounds by United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Township of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir.2003). The nature and extent of these rights is still far from clear, but it is now well settled that the essential elements of a due process violation occur when a state actor "deprive[s]" a person of "property."⁷ U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see Gikas v. Wash. Sch. Dist., 328 F.3d 731, 735 (3d Cir.2003). Thus, the threshold issues of any due process analysis are (1) whether the person possessed a cognizable property interest and (2) whether the person suffered a deprivation of that interest by a state actor. See id.

A. Property Under the Due Process Clause

The Constitution recognizes "property," but does not create it. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), quoted with approval in Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164, 118 S.Ct. 1925, 141 L.Ed.2d 174 (1998). Property, in the constitutional sense, is merely a label applied to a benefit when an individual possesses a "legitimate entitlement" to it under "existing rules or understandings." O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 779-80, 100 S.Ct. 2467, 65 L.Ed.2d 506 (1980) (quoting Klein v. Califano, 586 F.2d 250, 258 (3d Cir.1978) (en banc)); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975); cf. Asbestos Workers Local No. 23 Pension Fund ex rel. Norcross v. United States, 303 F.Supp.2d 551, 557 (M.D.Pa.2004) (examining "property" under Internal Revenue Code).⁸ These "rules" and "understandings" arise from sources independent of the Constitution, usually state statutes and common law. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701. When these sources provide an individual with a presently enforceable right to control a benefit, the Constitution recognizes the benefit as "property" worthy of due...