Gil v. Courthouse One

• Decision Date: 14 January 1997
• Docket Number: No. 15429,15429
• Citation: 239 Conn. 676,687 A.2d 146
• Parties: . Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 146

687 A.2d 146

239 Conn. 676

Karyn GIL v. COURTHOUSE ONE et al.

No. 15429.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 2, 1996.

Decided Jan. 14, 1997.

Nancy R. Sussman, Assistant Attorney General, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, and William J. McCullough, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant defendant Second Injury Fund.

Robert J. Farrell, Jr., Wethersfield, with whom was Robert F. Carter, Woodbridge, for appellee plaintiff.

Jason M. Dodge, filed a brief for the Connecticut Business and Industry Association as amicus curiae.

Michael P. Meotti, Sheila A. Huddleston and Nancy J. Valerio, Hartford, filed a brief for the American Insurance Association as amicus curiae.

Nathan J. Shafner, Norwich and Amy M. Stone, New Orleans, LA, filed a brief for the Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and BERDON, NORCOTT, PALMER and McDONALD, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Chief Justice.

The issue in this appeal from the workers' compensation review board (board) concerns the proper method of calculating the cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) of the plaintiff, Karyn Gil, whose injury occurred prior to October 1, 1991, and whose workers' compensation benefits extend beyond October 1, 1991, the effective date of Public Acts 1991, No. 91- 339, § 27 (P.A. 91-339), which amended General Statutes § 31-307a (a). ¹ The defendant, the second injury fund (fund), appealed to the Appellate Court ² from a decision of the board, which reversed a finding and award of the workers' compensation commissioner for the sixth district. We transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). We reverse the judgment of the board and remand the case for further proceedings.

The relevant facts are as follows. On December 1, 1983, the plaintiff was exposed to chlorine gas during the course of her employment. As a result, she suffered permanent injury to her respiratory system. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff earned an average weekly wage of $139.96; her base compensation rate ³ was $93.35. The fund assumed liability for the plaintiff's claim in November, 1986. The plaintiff has received total incapacity benefits from the date of her injury to the present, and in accordance with § 31-307a (a), she has received COLAs that have been added to her base compensation rate each October 1. ⁴ In 1991, the legislature enacted P.A. 91-339, § 27, amending § 31-307a (a). Prior to the enactment of P.A. 91-339, § 27, COLAs were calculated annually on October 1 by means of a flat dollar adjustment equal to the flat dollar increase in the maximum compensation rate from year to year. ⁵ Public Act 91-339, § 27, altered the method by which COLAs were calculated, replacing the flat dollar adjustment method with a percentage adjustment method. ⁶

In order to allay confusion caused by the new method of calculating COLAs, the then workers' compensation commission chairman, John Arcudi, on October 30, 1991, promulgated an interpretation of P.A. 91-339, § 27 (Arcudi method). Arcudi interpreted § 27 to mandate percentage adjustments, rather than flat dollar adjustments, for all total disability claimants, including the plaintiff, on and after October 1, 1991. COLAs, under the Arcudi method, were calculated by multiplying the percentage increase each year of the maximum compensation rate by the claimant's current adjusted compensation rate. Consequently, the claimant's new adjusted compensation rate was comprised of that year's COLA added to the previous year's adjusted compensation rate.

Workers' compensation payors followed Arcudi's interpretation until June 5, 1995, when the board issued its decision in Wolfe v. JAB Enterprises, Inc., 14 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 127 (1995). In Wolfe, the board concluded that "[b]y its plain language, the statute [P.A. 91-339, § 27] increases the base compensation rate at the time of the injury by the percentage of the increase in the maximum compensation rate. The statutory formula does not contemplate an increase based in part on prior COLAs, as those take place [after] the time of the injury. This language is unambiguous, and we do not have discretion to construe it otherwise." Id., 128.

Pursuant to the Wolfe decision, COLAs were calculated by determining the percentage increase between the maximum compensation rate at the time of injury and the current maximum compensation rate, multiplying that percentage by a claimant's base compensation rate, and adding that amount to the base compensation rate. The fund altered its method for calculating annual COLAs to comply with the Wolfe decision and began implementing the new procedure in December, 1995. Under the Wolfe method of calculating COLAs, the plaintiff's biweekly check was reduced from $518.21 to $316.04. The plaintiff challenged the reduction in her benefits and was given a formal hearing before the sixth district commissioner on February 15, 1996. After the hearing, the commissioner rendered a decision ordering the fund to "reinstate the flat dollar amount of cost of living adjustments the claimant is entitled to receive through September 30, 1991 and ... only apply the formula for calculating adjustments on a percentage increase from October 1, 1991 forward in accordance with the statutory changes made by the enactment of P.A. 91-339."

The fund subsequently petitioned the board for a review of the commissioner's decision. Upon review, the board found that the amendments to § 31-307a (a) in P.A. 91-339, § 27, constituted "a change in the substance of our workers' compensation law and therefore should not be applied retroactively." The board then remanded the matter to the commissioner to enter an order in accordance with its determination that COLAs are to be calculated in accordance with the method of calculation in existence at the time of the injury. That method, in the case of the plaintiff, was the flat dollar COLA in effect prior to the effective date of P.A. 91-339. The fund appealed the board's decision to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c).

The fund urges us to adopt the Arcudi method of calculating COLAs as the proper application of the statute. Alternatively, the fund argues that the court should adopt the position of the board in Wolfe. The plaintiff would have us embrace the position taken by the board in this case and preserve the flat dollar COLA for those persons injured prior to the effective date of P.A. 91-339, applying a percentage formula only to those injured after that date. The Connecticut Business and Industry Association, an amicus curiae in this appeal, argues for a method of calculation that preserves the plaintiff's flat dollar COLAs to 1990, but applies the amended statute's percentage rate to the plaintiff as of October 1, 1991.

This is a case of statutory construction and, as such, "[o]ur analysis of the plaintiff's claims is guided by well established tenets.... [O]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) M. DeMatteo Construction Co. v. New London, 236 Conn. 710, 714-15, 674 A.2d 845 (1996); see Metropolitan District Commission v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 184, 237 Conn. 114, 120, 676 A.2d 825 (1996); State v. Burns, 236 Conn. 18, 22-23, 670 A.2d 851 (1996); State v. Spears, 234 Conn. 78, 86-87, 662 A.2d 80, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 565, 133 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995).

We acknowledge, however, that the Workers' Compensation Act is remedial and must be interpreted liberally to achieve its humanitarian purposes. Weinberg v. ARA Vending Co., 223 Conn. 336, 341, 612 A.2d 1203 (1992); Dubois v. General Dynamics Corp., 222 Conn. 62, 67, 607 A.2d 431 (1992); Hansen v. Gordon, 221 Conn. 29, 32, 602 A.2d 560 (1992); Ash v. New Milford, 207 Conn. 665, 672, 541 A.2d 1233 (1988). "Because the [Workers' Compensation Act] is a remedial statute, this court should not impose limitations on the benefits provided for a disabled worker that the statute itself does not clearly specify." Misenti v. International Silver Co., 215 Conn. 206, 210, 575 A.2d 690 (1990).

If we were to restrict our view of the question at issue to a literal application of § 27 of P.A. 91-339, the resulting method of calculation of COLAs would be the alternate position espoused by the fund and the method set forth in the board's decision in Wolfe. Basically, that method would have the current adjusted compensation rate determined by dividing the current maximum compensation rate by the maximum compensation rate on the date of the plaintiff's injury to find the percentage increase of the maximum compensation rate, and then multiplying that percentage increase by the plaintiff's base compensation rate. ⁷ The increase over the plaintiff's base compensation rate would be the COLA for the current year. This application of the statute disregards the previous flat dollar COLAs and, as noted above, reduced the plaintiff's biweekly check from $518.21 to $316.04.

In addition to § 27, however, the legislature also enacted P.A. 91-339, § 50, to take effect October 1, 1991, which provides: "Nothing in this act shall be construed to affect any claims for compensation arising from any injury that occurred before October 1, 1991. Nothing in this act shall be construed to reduce the amount of any compensation awarded for any injury that occurred before October 1, 1991." While the first sentence of § 50 concerns claims that were pending at...