Weinberg v. ARA Vending Co.

• Decision Date: 04 August 1992
• Docket Number: No. 14440,14440
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Mark WEINBERG v. ARA VENDING COMPANY, et al.

Page 1203

612 A.2d 1203

223 Conn. 336

Mark WEINBERG v. ARA VENDING COMPANY, et al.

No. 14440.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 3, 1992.

Decided Aug. 4, 1992.

Covello, J., dissented and filed opinion in which Berdon, J., joined.

Richard K. Mulroney, Bridgeport, for appellant (plaintiff).

Thomas H. Cotter, Bridgeport, for appellees (defendants).

Before CALLAHAN, GLASS, COVELLO, BORDEN and BERDON, JJ.

GLASS, Associate Justice.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-349(a), ¹ an award received by the plaintiff from the Veterans Administration (VA) for a service-connected injury that resulted in a 20 percent permanent partial disability of his back must be credited against the 30 percent permanent partial disability of his back found to exist after he sustained an injury in the course of his employment by the named defendant. The plaintiff, Mark Weinberg, appealed the decision of the compensation review division ² reversing a workers' compensation commissioner's award ordering that the defendant employer, ARA Vending Company (ARA), ³ pay the plaintiff 156 weeks of compensation for a 30 percent permanent partial disability of his back. We reverse the decision of the review division.

The parties stipulated to the facts essential to the disposition of this appeal. On June 11, 1987, the plaintiff was employed by ARA, which had offices in Derby. Prior to the plaintiff's employment by ARA, on July 26, 1979, while he was a member of the United States Air Force, the plaintiff had fallen from a truck and injured his back. As a result of that injury, the VA awarded the plaintiff a pension based on a 20 percent disability of the lumbosacral spine. On June 11, 1987, during the course of his employment by ARA, the plaintiff suffered an injury to his back that resulted in the herniation of a disc. Both the plaintiff's physician and ARA's examining physician assigned to the plaintiff a 30 percent disability of the lumbosacral spine, which included the prior existing disability of 20 percent resulting from the service-connected injury.

The commissioner made findings in accordance with the stipulation of the parties and ordered ARA to pay 156 weeks of compensation to the plaintiff for the entire resulting 30 percent permanent partial disability of his back. Thereafter, ARA filed a motion to correct, which the commissioner denied. ARA appealed to the review division, claiming that, pursuant to § 31-349(a), the plaintiff's VA disability award should be deducted from the workers' compensation benefits payable for his overall 30 percent disability of the back. A majority of the review division concluded that § 31-349(a) required that the plaintiff's VA pension be set off against the workers' compensation award and, therefore, remanded the case to the commissioner. ⁴ The plaintiff appealed the decision of the review division to the Appellate Court and we transferred the appeal to ourselves pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c).

The plaintiff claims that the review division improperly concluded that § 31-349(a) requires that the disability pension awarded him by the VA be deducted from his recovery for permanent partial disability under the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. The parties stipulated that the 30 percent disability of the plaintiff's lumbosacral spine found to exist after his work-related second injury included the prior disability of 20 percent awarded by the VA. Since there is no dispute concerning the percentage of disability attributable to the plaintiff's existing and prior disabilities, the disposition of this appeal turns on whether the review division properly construed the applicable provisions of § 31-349(a). ⁵

"The construction of a statute generally is a question of law for the court." Pokorny v. Getta's Garage, 219 Conn. 439, 453, 594 A.2d 446 (1991). Thus, in reviewing the decision of the review division, we must determine whether its interpretation of § 31-349(a) is legally and logically correct. Id.

At the time relevant to this appeal, § 31-349(a) provided in relevant part: "If an employee who has previously incurred, by accidental injury ... permanent physical impairment, incurs a second disability by accident ... he shall receive compensation for the entire amount of disability ... less any compensation benefits payable or paid with respect to the previous disability...." (Emphasis added.) The plaintiff argues that he is entitled to receive workers' compensation for his entire 30 percent disability because the term "compensation benefits," as used in § 31-349(a), refers only to compensation under the act. ARA contends that the review division properly concluded that the plaintiff's VA disability pension constitutes "compensation" within the meaning of § 31-349(a), to be deducted from his recovery under the act. ARA argues, moreover, that to hold it responsible for the plaintiff's entire disability would contravene the intent of § 31-349 by, in effect, allowing the plaintiff a "double recovery" for his prior disability.

"In construing any statute, we seek to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature." United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, 220 Conn. 749, 755, 601 A.2d 1005 (1992). "[W]hen the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we need look no further than the words themselves because we assume that the language expresses the legislature's intent." American Universal Ins. Co. v. DelGreco, 205 Conn. 178, 193, 530 A.2d 171 (1987). We have acknowledged, however, in the context of workers' compensation legislation, that "[s]uch guidance is often of little help ... since words seldom have precise and unvarying meanings." Jacques v. H.O. Penn Machinery Co., 166 Conn. 352, 359 n. 3, 349 A.2d 847 (1974).

When the language of a statute is unclear, we may ascertain the intent of the legislature by looking beyond the language to the statute's legislative history and the purpose that the statute was intended to serve. American Universal Ins. Co. v. DelGreco, supra. "Because the Workers' Compensation Act is a remedial statute, this court should not impose limitations on the benefits provided for a disabled worker that the statute itself does not clearly specify." Misenti v. International Silver Co., 215 Conn. 206, 210, 575 A.2d 690 (1990). In construing the act, moreover, this court "makes every part operative and harmonious with every other part insofar as is possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 103-104, 491 A.2d 368 (1985), quoting Bahre v. Hogbloom, 162 Conn. 549, 554, 295 A.2d 547 (1972). Because § 31-349(a) is part of the larger Connecticut workers' compensation scheme, the phrase "compensation benefits," as it is used in that section, must be construed with reference to the act as a whole. Accordingly, "[i]t is necessary to look beyond the express words of General Statutes § 31-349 to whatever sources might aid in its interpretation, including its legislative history, its purpose, and the construction given similar statutes in other jurisdictions." Jacques v. H.O. Penn Machinery Co., supra.

In construing "compensation benefits," as used in § 31-349(a), to include the plaintiff's VA disability pension, the review division stated: "The words of Sec. 31-349(a) ... clearly grant a credit for compensation payable or paid in connection with a previous disability. In this case the claimant has been and continues to be paid compensation in the form of a VA disability benefit for the previous service-connected disability to his back. Had the legislature intended to restrict said credit only to compensation paid for a previous disability resulting from an injury accepted as or found to be compensable under the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act, as amended, then it would or could have clearly so stated." (Emphasis in original.) Viewing § 31-349(a) in light of its legislative history and within the context of the act as a whole, we are persuaded that the legislature did thus intend to restrict the meaning of "compensation benefits."

The word "compensation" appears at several places in § 31-349(a) to refer to benefits payable under the act. For example, the first sentence of § 31-349(a) provides in relevant part: "The fact that an employee has suffered previous disability ... shall not preclude him from compensation for a later injury, nor preclude compensation for death resulting therefrom." (Emphasis added.) Section 31-349(a) also provides that "[t]he employer by whom the employee is employed at the time of the injury, or his insurance carrier, shall in the first instance pay all awards of compensation and all medical expenses provided by this chapter for the first one hundred four weeks of disability." ⁶ (Emphasis added.) As used in these provisions, it is apparent that "compensation" refers to benefits payable under the act and not to disability payments from other sources.

The review division majority concluded that the term "compensation benefits" in § 31-349(a) included benefits other than those payable under the act on the basis that "[t]he law cannot permit [the plaintiff] to enjoy a windfall, i.e., to be paid twice for a portion of his permanent partial disability." In thus attempting to enforce what it perceived as the important public policy prohibiting double recovery; see, e.g., McGowan v. General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division, 15 Conn.App. 615, 546 A.2d 893 (1988), aff'd, 210 Conn. 580, 556 A.2d 587 (1989); Pokorny v. Getta's Garage, supra; the review division ignored the "familiar principle of statutory construction that where the same words are used in a statute two or more times they will ordinarily be given the same meaning in each instance." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) AirKaman, Inc. v. Groppo, 221 Conn. 751, 758, 607 A.2d 410 (1992), quoting State ex...