Gilbert v. State
Citation | 226 Ga.App. 230,486 S.E.2d 48 |
Decision Date | 25 March 1997 |
Docket Number | No. A97A0615,A97A0615 |
Parties | , 97 FCDR 1673 GILBERT v. The STATE. |
Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
Lester M. Miller, Macon, for appellant.
Charles H. Weston, District Attorney, Thomas J. Matthews, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Sammy Lee Gilbert, Jr., appeals his conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. During jury selection, Gilbert, a member of race group "B," utilized the majority of his peremptory strikes to remove individuals of another race from the jury. Gilbert contends the trial court erred when it ruled that two of Gilbert's strikes were not supported by race-neutral reasons and when it placed the burden upon him to prove that his reasons for striking the jurors were not racially discriminatory. We agree and reverse.
"[T]he equal protection clause prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the basis of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges." Chandler v. State, 266 Ga. 509, 510, 467 S.E.2d 562 (1996), citing Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992). In order to evaluate whether or not a defendant exercised his peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory fashion, (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Chandler, supra at 510, 467 S.E.2d 562.
Following jury selection, the State informed the court that Gilbert had used the majority of his strikes "to strike panel members of [another] race." The State asked the court to find that a prima facie case of racially discriminatory use of peremptory strikes had been made and to "explore the reasons for the [d]efense strikes." The court found that a prima facie case had been made and noted that of a jury panel containing twenty-three members of race "A" and seventeen members of race "B," eight members of race "B" and four members of race "A" had been selected to sit on the jury. Of Gilbert's nine peremptory strikes, eight were exercised against race "A" members.
Gilbert explained his reasons for exercising his peremptory strikes, and the court accepted his explanations for seven of the strikes as race-neutral. The court rejected, however, Gilbert's explanations for striking two male members of race "A," juror nos. 21 and 22. Gilbert asserted that he struck juror no. 21 because the juror worked for a particular business. Defense counsel had experienced "several run-ins" with this business and feared that because of those run-ins, juror no. 21 "may have heard of my name." Gilbert explained that he struck juror no. 22 because he worked at the post office, and his wife worked for a bank. Between either the post office or the bank, defense counsel felt like he had seen the juror before, although the juror denied knowing defense counsel. After rejecting Gilbert's explanations, the court reseated both jurors. Gilbert excepted on the record and stated that he had exercised these two strikes because defense counsel may or may not have had personal conflicts with juror nos. 21 and 22.
"[A]lthough the proponent of the strike must provide a clear and reasonably specific explanation of his legitimate reasons for exercising the challenges, what is meant by a 'legitimate reason' is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jackson v. State, 265 Ga. 897, 898-899(2), 463 S.E.2d 699 (1995), citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995), and Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1723-1724, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). (Punctuation omitted.) Jackson, supra at 898, 463 S.E.2d 699, citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866-1867, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (majority opinion).
To the extent that Gilbert suggested that he struck the jurors because of their employment, "[a] strike based on a party's employment status ... is not, on its face, racially discriminatory." O'Neal v. State, 226 Ga.App. 224, 255, 482 S.E.2d 478 (1997), citing Trice v. State, 266 Ga. 102, 103(2), 464 S.E.2d 205 (1995). Gilbert's other reason for striking the jurors, that defense counsel felt that he knew the jurors and may have had personal conflicts with them, is not inherently discriminatory or based upon the race of either juror. Cf. White v. State, 154 Ga.App. 527, 528, 268 S.E.2d 790 (1980) ( ). "We must keep in mind that the reasonable suspicion of a juror's impartiality that prompts the exercise of a peremptory challenge need...
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