Jackson v. State

• Decision Date: 20 November 1995
• Docket Number: No. S95A1150,S95A1150
• Citation: 463 S.E.2d 699,265 Ga. 897
• Parties: JACKSON v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 699

463 S.E.2d 699

265 Ga. 897

JACKSON v. The STATE.

No. S95A1150.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Nov. 20, 1995.

Robert F. Pirkle, Hinesville, for Jackson.

Dupont K. Cheney, Dist. Atty., Hinesville, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Paige Reese Whitaker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, for the State.

HINES, Justice.

William Thomas "Junior" Jackson was convicted of malice murder in connection with the 1985 shooting death of a police informant. Prior to indictment, Jackson was released on bond. He fled the state and remained a fugitive from justice until 1994, when he was apprehended in Houston, Texas. Jackson was returned to Georgia and convicted for his part in the murder. He was sentenced to life in prison. ¹

1. Evidence was presented at trial that the victim was an informant in a drug investigation conducted by local law enforcement and the United States Army. An army lieutenant, and former undercover drug investigator, testified that the victim had arranged drug buys with, among others, Jackson. Joseph Quick was convicted of the murder in 1988. During Jackson's trial, Quick admitted that he, Quick, had fired the fatal shot. He testified that he met with Jackson and two other men to discuss killing the informant. Quick also testified that Jackson handed him the murder weapon, took him to the residence of the victim, and identified the victim as the individual to be killed. Reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Jackson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. During jury selection, Jackson, an African American, utilized 13 of his 14 peremptory strikes to excuse white veniremen from the jury panels. After the State challenged Jackson's use of the peremptory strikes, the trial court determined that such disparity between the number of whites and the singular African American Jackson excused established a prima facie case of racial discrimination. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 2359, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992), extending the principles established in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) and holding that a criminal defendant may not engage in "purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges." See State v. Carr, 262 Ga. 893, 427 S.E.2d 273 (1993). Jackson offered explanations for each of the first seven potential jurors he excused. Respecting five of the individuals excused, the trial court refused to accept Jackson's explanations as race neutral and seated them on the jury with seven jurors already accepted, thereby completing the jury of twelve. Juror Linda Ward was one of the five. Jackson contends that his explanation for striking Ward was race neutral, and that the trial court erred by seating her upon the jury. We agree.

In articulating reasons for excusing juror Ward, Jackson explained that Ward is the wife of a local bondsman and an integral employee in her husband's bonding company. The court stated that it was "not going to accept that as a racially neutral explanation." Jackson then informed the court that facts would be presented which would establish that Jackson had "jumped bond." He voiced concerns that because collecting funds from defendants who "jump bond" is part of the bonding business, Ward might harbor preconceived adverse notions about defendants.

Once the opponent of the strike establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination, "the burden shifts to the [proponent of the strike] to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question." Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1865-1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion), citing Batson, supra 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-1723. At this step of the inquiry, the proponent of the strike is not required to enunciate "an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible." Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995), rehearing denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2635, 132 L.Ed.2d 874 (1995). ² Rather,

[a] neutral explanation ... means an explanation based on something other than the race of the juror.... Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the ... [proponent's] explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.

Hernandez, supra 500 U.S. at 360, 111 S.Ct. at 1866. Furthermore, although the proponent of the strike must provide a " 'clear and reasonably specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges," Batson, supra 476 U.S. at 98, n. 20, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, n. 20 (citation omitted), "[w]hat is meant by a 'legitimate reason' is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection." Purkett, 514 U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1771.

In this instance, Jackson's explanation for striking juror Ward was based on a factor other than race. An interest in a bonding company, either fiscal or familial, "is not a characteristic that is peculiar to any race." Purkett, 514 U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1771, quoting EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188, 190, n. 3 (3rd Cir.1980). Moreover, Jackson "articulate[d] a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried." Batson, supra 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. The challenged juror worked for a bonding company and Jackson himself had "jumped bond." Accordingly, the trial court erred by not accepting Jackson's explanation as race neutral.

Assuming the trial court recognized Jackson's explanation as being facially race neutral, but refused to accept it as race neutral because it concluded that the explanation was...