Gilliam v. State
| Decision Date | 06 October 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. S97A1125,S97A1125 |
| Citation | 492 S.E.2d 185,268 Ga. 690 |
| Parties | , 97 FCDR 3718, 97 FCDR 4261 GILLIAM v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Mark J. Nathan, Savannah, for Aron Gilliam.
Melanie Higgins, Asst. Dist. Atty., Statesboro, Allison Beth Goldberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., Paula K. Smith, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, for the State.
Aron Gilliam appeals his conviction for the felony murder of high school student Jason Kelly. He challenges the refusal to change venue, the admission of his inculpatory statement, and the trial court's instruction to the jury. For the reasons which follow, we affirm Gilliam's conviction. 1
Kelly was walking to high school with two friends. Gilliam and a group of young men were standing in front of a convenience store across from the school. As Kelly and one of his friends neared the school, they were approached by Gilliam and the others. Kelly and the friend ran in separate directions with the group of boys giving chase. The friend was able to run to the safety of the school, but Kelly slipped and was thrown to the ground. Gilliam and his cohorts surrounded Kelly and began to kick and beat him. During the attack, Gilliam drew a handgun and shot Kelly in the abdomen.
The assailants fled to a "clubhouse," where Gilliam reloaded his gun and talked about shooting Kelly. The group left and was later intercepted by police. During a pat-down search, Gilliam attempted to remove a brass round or shell from his pocket and kick it under a car. A member of the group told police where Gilliam had discarded the gun and bullets, and they were found in some bushes. The bullet removed from Kelly was positively identified as having been fired from the recovered weapon. Gilliam gave a statement to police in which he admitted shooting Kelly.
Fifteen days after the incident, the sixteen-year-old Gilliam was adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court for Kelly's aggravated assault and aggravated battery as well as several related weapons charges. Kelly died as the result of his gunshot wound twelve days after the juvenile court proceeding, and Gilliam was then prosecuted in superior court for his murder. At trial, Gilliam testified that he shot Kelly because of an earlier altercation, but that he had intended only to hurt him and had aimed for his leg.
1. The evidence was sufficient to find Gilliam guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder while in the commission of aggravated assault. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. Gilliam fails in his claim that the trial court erred in denying him a change of venue. Gilliam concedes that after voir dire it was plain that few jurors remembered his case. Moreover, he has made no showing that because of any publicity in his case or in another school shooting which had gained media attention there was inherent prejudice so that Gilliam could not receive a fair trial in the community, or that a fair trial would be denied him because of individual juror bias. Lemley v. State, 258 Ga. 554, 555(4), 372 S.E.2d 421 (1988).
3. Gilliam likewise fails in his challenges to the admission into evidence of his confession to police. He first contends that it was error for the trial court to refuse to exclude the confession because of a violation of OCGA § 24-3-50. He claims that his confession was induced by the hope of benefit because detectives informed him that it would help if he told the truth, that the judge would know that he confessed, and because one of the detectives related that he had "seen cases where a person did a shooting and went home with a leg monitor." But merely encouraging a suspect to tell the truth does not amount to the hope of benefit so as to render the suspect's inculpatory statement involuntary and therefore inadmissible. Henry v. State, 265 Ga. 732, 736(4)( c ), 462 S.E.2d 737 (1995). Nor does telling a suspect that his cooperation will be made known. Arline v. State, 264 Ga. 843, 844(2), 452 S.E.2d 115 (1995). As to the allegation that a leg monitor was mentioned, the detectives involved in questioning Gilliam testified at the Jackson-Denno hearing and all denied making such a statement. It was for the trial court to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and accordingly make its determinations of fact. Arline supra at 844(2), 452 S.E.2d 115; Caffo v. State, 247 Ga. 751, 757(3), 279 S.E.2d 678 (1981).
Gilliam also urges that his statement was inadmissible because he was not advised of his Miranda rights until after he confessed. However, the officers' testimony established that the inculpatory statement at issue, which was reduced to writing, was made after Gilliam was twice given the Miranda warnings and had executed written waivers of rights. Again, it was within the trial court's province to believe the officers' version of events rather than the scenario depicted by Gilliam. Arline supra at 844(2), 452 S.E.2d 115; Caffo supra at 757(3), 279 S.E.2d 678.
Finally, Gilliam asserts that the statement was inadmissible because the police did not promptly take him before juvenile authorities, and because his mother was not present during the police interviews. Failure of the police to promptly take Gilliam before the juvenile court or to contact a juvenile court intake officer as provided by OCGA § 15-11-19(a)(3) does not, as a matter of law, make the confession inadmissible. Lattimore v. State, 265 Ga. 102, 104(2), 454 S.E.2d 474 (1995). Nor is the statement rendered illegal merely because it was made in the absence of Gilliam's mother. Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 228(2), 282 S.E.2d 301(1981). The issue is whether there was a knowing and intelligent waiver by Gilliam of his constitutional rights in making...
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