Gillis v. Leekley

• Decision Date: 06 April 1905
• Parties: GILLIS v. LEEKLEY.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

80 P. 300

38 Wash. 156

GILLIS v. LEEKLEY.

Supreme Court of Washington

April 6, 1905

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Geo. C. Hatch, Judge.

Application by Robert Gillis for a writ of habeas corpus against George A. Leekley to secure applicant's release from custody. From an order quashing the writ, applicant appeals. Affirmed.

Robert Welch, Gaffney & Berg, and T. W. Gaffney for appellant.

Jesse A. Frye and Alfred E. Gardner, for respondent.

RUDKIN J.

This is an appeal from an order quashing a writ of habeas corpus and remanding the prisoner. It appears from the writ and the return thereto that the appellant is held under a rendition warrant issued by the Governor of this state upon the demand of the Acting Governor of the district of Alaska, and that the respondent is the agent designated in the rendition warrant to transfer the appellant to the district of Alaska for trial.

The first point urged on the appeal is that the respondent failed to establish the identity of the appellant as the person accused of crime, and named in the rendition warrant. This position is untenable, for two reasons: First. Because the identity of the appellant as the person named in the warrant was not put in issue by the pleadings. The petition for the writ simply averred that the petitioner was not guilty of the offense charged. With this question the courts of this state have no concern. The petition utterly failed to allege that the appellant was not the person charged with the commission of the offense, and named in the extradition warrant. Second. The warrant is prima facie evidence of the existence of every fact which the executive must determine before issuing the warrant. The warrant in this case is in due form, and is therefore prima facie evidence that a proper demand was made upon the executive of this state, that the appellant is the person charged with the commission of crime, and that he is a fugitive from justice. The burden of proof was upon the appellant to disprove these facts, or to overthrow the presumption which arose from the production of the warrant itself. This he failed to do.

The second objection urged is that the executive of this state did not require the prosecuting attorney or other prosecuting officer to investigate the grounds of the demand before issuing the rendition warrant, as required by section 2035 of Pierce's Code (Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 7016). This position is equally untenable. The Governor of a state in extradition matters, acts under the authority of the Constitution and laws of the United States. The act of our Legislature referred to simply imposes duties upon prosecuting officers, and not upon the executive. The executive may investigate the grounds of the demand in such manner and through such agency as he chooses, and no court can control his action so long as he acts within the pale of the law.

The third objection urged is that the Governor of this state is not authorized by any law of the United States or of this state to surrender a fugitive from justice upon the demand of the Governor of the district of Alaska. This contention is based on the ground that section 5278 of the ...