Ex parte Roberts

• Decision Date: 16 April 1936
• Docket Number: 25864.
• Citation: 186 Wash. 13,56 P.2d 703
• Parties: Ex parte ROBERTS.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

56 P.2d 703

186 Wash. 13

Ex parte ROBERTS.

No. 25864.

Supreme Court of Washington

April 16, 1936

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Robert M. Jones, Judge.

Proceeding in the matter of the petition of Edward S. Roberts for a writ of habeas corpus. From a final order denying the application and remanding petitioner to the custody of the sheriff petitioner appeals.

Affirmed.

Adam Beeler, Donald A. McDonald, and Edwards Merges, all of Seattle, for appellant.

Warren G. Magnuson and John Alden Ryan, both of Seattle, for respondent.

STEINERT, Justice.

This is an appeal from a final order of the superior court denying petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus and remanding petitioner to the custody of the sheriff to await the determination of pending interstate rendition proceedings.

On February 11, 1935, the Grand Inquest for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, sitting at Boston, presented a bill of indictment charging the petitioner, Edward S. Roberts, with the crime of larceny of the sum of $5,000 in that state on February 9, 1934.

The Governor of Massachusetts issued a requisition upon the Governor of Washington, demanding that petitioner be arrested and delivered to the duly authorized and designated agent of the state of Massachusetts, for return to the latter state. The demand was accompanied by affidavits, complaint information, indictment, and warrant charging petitioner with the alleged crime and with being a fugitive from the justice of the state of Massachusetts, taking refuge in the state of Washington.

Prior to the formal requisition made by the Governor of Massachusetts, petitioner had been arrested in this state under a fugitive warrant issued by a justice of the peace in Seattle, but had been released on bail. After the issuance of the requisition, and after a hearing thereon Before the Governor of Washington, a warrant of rendition was signed by the chief executive of this state, and the petitioner was thereupon surrendered by his bondsman into the custody of the King county sheriff. Application for a writ of habeas corpus was then made to the superior court to inquire into the cause of petitioner's imprisonment and restraint. After a hearing at which considerable evidence was taken, the superior court refused to issue the writ. This appeal followed.

The appellant petitioner makes two contentions: (1) That the appellant was not shown to have fled from the demanding state; and (2) that the evidence shows that the appellant left the demanding state with the knowledge and implied consent of the prosecuting witness.

We think it but fair to say that, upon the face of the record, the circumstances under which the appellant came to the state of Washington do not show beyond question that his purpose in so doing was to evade prosecution. Close family ties, the condition of his heath, and business prospects seem to have furnished the motive, according to the evidence of appellant. From a layman's point of view, at any rate, we could quite readily accept that explanation. But the question Before us involves a subject of the law which is very restrictive in its sense and meaning.

Interstate rendition is a proceeding resting on federal, not on state, law. The authority, power, and duty of the state in such matters is contained in article 4, § 2 of the United States Constitution, which provides: 'A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.'

Sections 5278 and 5279 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (title 18, U.S.C., §§ 662, 663, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 662, 663) prescribe the procedure in such matters. Those sections read as follows:

'Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made Before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the State or Territory to which such person has fled to cause him to be arrested and secured, and to cause notice of the arrest to be given to the executive authority making such demand, or to the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no such agent appears within six months from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged. All costs or expenses incurred in the apprehending, securing, and transmitting such fugitive to the State or Territory making such demand, shall be paid by such State or Territory.' U.S.Rev.Stat. § 5278 (title 18, U.S.C., § 662, 18 U.S.C.A. § 662).

'Any agent so appointed who receives the fugitive into his custody shall be empowered to transport him to the State or Territory from which he has fled. And every person who, by force, sets at liberty or rescues the fugitive from such agent while so transporting him, shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than one year.' U.S.Rev.Stat. § 5279 (title 18, U.S.C.§ 663, 18 U.S.C.A. § 663).

These sections were amended in some slight particulars, not material here, by Act of Congress on March 22, 1934. Chapter 73, § 2, 48 Stat. 455 (title 18, U.S.C. § 662c, 18 U.S.C.A. § 662c).

These provisions constitute the law applicable to extradition, or interstate rendition, of fugitives from justice. In re Foye, 21 Wash. 250, 57 P. 825; In re Baker, 21 Wash. 259, 57 P. 827; In re Sylvester, 21 Wash. 263, 57 P. 829; In re Gillis, 38 Wash. 156, 80 P. 300; Thorp v. Metzger, 77 Wash. 62, 137 P. 330; United States v. Meyerling (C.C.A.) 75 F. (2d) 716; Scott on Interstate Rendition, p. 43, § 35.

Interstate rendition being a proceeding founded on the Federal Constitution and laws, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States govern the construction that must be given to the provisions relating thereto. South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412, 420, 53 S.Ct. 667, 77 L.Ed. 1292; In re Henke, 172 Wis. 36, 177 N.W. 880, 13 A.L.R. 409; Grogan v. Welch, 55 S.D. 613, 227 N.W. 74, 67 A.L.R. 1474; People v. Baldwin, 341 Ill. 604, 174 N.E. 51; Scott on Interstate Rendition, p. 10, § 8.

Under his first contention, appellant asserts that, to constitute one a fugitive from justice, it must be shown that he left the demanding state with the consciousness of guilt, for the purpose of escaping punishment for his crime. The law is to the contrary. To be a fugitive from justice, in the sense and meaning of the Constitution and laws of the United States, it is not necessary that the party charged should have left the state in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, after an indictment found, or for the purpose of avoiding prosecution. If the party charged with the crime was in the place where, and at the time when, the crime was committed, and if thereafter he leaves the state of location, he is a fugitive from justice, within the meaning of the Constitution relating to interstate rendition, regardless of his motive or reason for leaving the state.

In Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, on page 97, 6 S.Ct. 291, 300, 29 L.Ed. 544, the court laid down the rule in these words: 'To be a fugitive from justice, in the sense of the act of congress regulating the subject under consideration, it is not necessary that the party charged should have left the state in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, after an indictment found, or for the purpose of avoiding a prosecution anticipated or begun, but simply that, having within a state committed that which by its laws constitutes a crime, when he is sought to be subjected to its criminal process to answer for his offense, he has left its jurisdiction, and is found within the territory of another.'

In Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222, on pages 226, 227, 27 S.Ct. 122, 123, 51 L.Ed. 161, 7 Ann.Cas. 1073 the contention made here was fully discussed and answered as follows: 'But the appellant contended below, as he does here, that he had no belief when leaving New York at any time that he had violated its criminal laws, and therefore, within the meaning of the Constitution and laws of the United States, he could not be deemed a fugitive from its justice. This contention cannot be sustained; indeed, it could not be sustained without materially impairing the efficacy of the constitutional and statutory provisions relating to fugitives from justice. An alleged fugitive may believe that he has not committed any crime against the laws of the state in which he is indicted, and yet, according to the laws of such state, as administered by its judicial tribunals, he may have done so, and his belief or want of belief may be without foundation in law. It is the province of the courts of New York to declare what its laws are, and to determine whether particular acts on the part of an alleged offender constitute a crime under such laws. The constitutional provision that a person charged with crime against the laws of a state, and who flees from its justice, must be delivered up on proper demand, is sufficiently comprehensive to embrace any offense, whatever its nature, which the state, consistently with the Constitution and laws of the United States, may have made a crime against its laws. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 69, 16...