Gilmer County v. City of East Ellijay

Decision Date11 September 2000
Docket NumberNo. S00A0641.,S00A0641.
Citation533 S.E.2d 715,272 Ga. 774
PartiesGILMER COUNTY et al. v. CITY OF EAST ELLIJAY.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Meadows, Ichter & Trigg, Michael J. Bowers, T. Joshua R. Archer, Atlanta, for appellant.

George W. Weaver, Jeffrey L. Floyd, Jasper, for appellee.

Walter E. Sumner, Atlanta, for amicus appellee.

SEARS, Justice.

Appellants Gilmer County, the Gilmer County Board of Commissioners, and the Director of Gilmer County's Emergency Management Services, William Wright (collectively "the County"), appeal the trial court's grant of mandamus relief requiring the County to provide non-emergency police dispatching services for the Appellee City of East Ellijay ("the City"). Under the facts of this appeal, we conclude that there is no clear legal duty incumbent upon the County to gratuitously provide non-emergency dispatching services on behalf of the City's police. We also conclude that the County's decision to stop providing non-emergency dispatching services for the City, which was based upon the City's refusal to pay its proportional share of the cost of such services, did not constitute an abuse of discretion. It follows that mandamus was not an available remedy in this matter, and therefore we reverse.

The appellee City is located within the appellant County's boundaries. Historically, the County (through its sheriff's office) has provided basic police dispatching services for both 911 emergency and non-emergency situations (collectively "911 dispatching services")1 to all of Gilmer County, including the appellee City and its police force, without charging a fee for such services. In 1999, the County upgraded its 911 dispatching service system to one that provides dispatchers with computer-generated caller identification data and caller location mapping, thereby enhancing the ability of the County's dispatchers to respond quickly and effectively to service request calls. In addition to acquiring a new computer system and the necessary programming software, the County also acquired a new building in which to headquarter its 911 dispatching services, a high-band radio repeater system that expands the communication abilities of the County's dispatchers, new recorders, and a new telephone system.

In total, these enhancements to the 911 dispatching system cost the County approximately $690,000, and the County estimated that the annual operating costs for its enhanced 911 dispatching system would be approximately $373,000. The County anticipated that approximately $180,000 of this annual operating cost would be paid from the proceeds of the $1.50 operating charge it imposes upon each phone line operating within the County.2 Nonetheless, the County anticipated that it faced a $193,000 shortfall in the amount necessary to operate the enhanced 911 dispatching system in its first year of existence.

The County reviewed operations data from its outdated 911 dispatching system, and determined that from 1997 to 1999, approximately eight percent of all calls to the system sought dispatching services on behalf of the City's police department. Based upon that information, the County requested that the City pay an annual payment equal to eight percent of the additional $193,000 that was needed to operate the enhanced 911 dispatching system. The City refused, and on August 15, 1999, the County ceased providing non-emergency dispatching services for the City's police department. The County did not cease providing emergency dispatching services for the City's police department, and it presently provides emergency dispatching services for the City's police.

The City filed suit, and the trial court granted it temporary injunctive relief. A trial was conducted, after which the trial court granted mandamus relief requiring the County to provide non-emergency 911 dispatching services on behalf of the City's police department at no charge to the City. In explaining its rationale behind this ruling, the trial court stated that although the County initially was not obligated by law to provide non-emergency 911 dispatching services to the City's police without charge, once the County undertook to provide those services free of charge, it was obligated by law to continue doing so after enhancing its 911 dispatching system. The trial court further explained that it was not necessary that the County's obligation to provide free non-emergency dispatching services be statutory in nature, but that the obligation could arise solely from the County's previous course of conduct.

1. "Mandamus will issue against a public official only where the petitioner has demonstrated a clear legal right to relief []."3 The duty which a mandamus complainant seeks to have enforced "must be a duty arising by law, either expressly or by necessary implication; and the law must not only authorize the act be done, but must require its performance."4

Our research in this matter has uncovered neither a statute, an ordinance, nor any case law that states or implies that once a county undertakes to gratuitously provide a service on behalf of a municipality located within its boundaries, it is legally obligated to continue doing so regardless of any changes that occur in the nature or circumstances of the service being provided. In making the contrary conclusion in its order, the...

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16 cases
  • Soloski v. Adams
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • 2 Marzo 2009
    ...that the respondent grossly abused his or her discretion in taking or refusing to take official action." Gilmer County v. City of East Ellijay, 272 Ga. 774, 533 S.E.2d 715, 717 (2000) (citing Dougherty County v. Webb, 256 Ga. 474, 350 S.E.2d 457 (1986)). The Court finds as a matter of law t......
  • Curling v. Raffensperger
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • 21 Mayo 2019
    ...implication; and the law must not only authorize the act to be done, but must require its performance." Gilmer County v. City of East Ellijay , 272 Ga. 774, 533 S.E.2d 715, 717 (2000) (citations omitted). Where performance is required by law, a clear legal right to relief will exist either ......
  • Bibb Cnty. v. Monroe Cnty.
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 10 Marzo 2014
    ...to issue, “ ‘the law must not only authorize the act to be done, but must require its performance’ ”); Gilmer County v. City of East Ellijay, 272 Ga. 774(1), 533 S.E.2d 715 (2000); Aspinwall v. Harris, 217 Ga. 485, 486–487, 123 S.E.2d 652 (1962). Where performance is required by law, a clea......
  • Alford v. Hernandez, A17A1124
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 24 Octubre 2017
    ...a clear legal right to relief or a gross abuse of discretion.") (citation and punctuation omitted); Gilmer County v. City of East Ellijay, 272 Ga. 774, 776 (1), 533 S.E.2d 715 (2000).19 Civil Action File No. 1:16-CV-3310-TWT, 2017 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 73284, 2017 WL 2062078 (N.D. Ga. May 15, 2......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Local Government Law - R. Perry Sentell, Jr.
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 53-1, September 2001
    • Invalid date
    ...for 'emergency situations.'" Id. 286. Id. The court held error in the trial judge's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss. Id. 287. 272 Ga. 774, 533 S.E.2d 715 (2000). 288. Id. at 776, 533 S.E.2d at 717. The county continued to provide the city with free emergency dispatching services, bu......

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