Gilstrap v. State

Decision Date05 December 1991
Docket NumberNo. S91G0888,S91G0888
Citation410 S.E.2d 423,261 Ga. 798
PartiesGILSTRAP v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Bobby Lee Cook, Cook & Palmour, Summerville, Alan J. Baverman, Atlanta, Robert E. Andrews, Gainesville, for Gilstrap.

C. Andrew Fuller, Dist. Atty., Northeastern Judicial Circuit, Lee Darragh, Asst. Dist. Atty., Gainesville, for the State.

Leonard C. Parks, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Gainesville, Attorney register.

WELTNER, Justice.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of L.G. Gilstrap of child molestation and aggravated child molestation. Gilstrap v. State, 199 Ga.App. 223, 404 S.E.2d 629 (1991). We granted certiorari to consider the admissibility of "similar transactions" evidence.

1. (a) In Womack v. State, 260 Ga. 21, 22(4), 389 S.E.2d 240 (1990), we quoted from Sears v. State, 182 Ga.App. 480, 482, 356 S.E.2d 72 (1987), as follows:

"The purpose of a statute of (limitation) is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanction. Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past...."

(b) A like rationale applies to the admission of "similar transaction" evidence, and is the basis for excluding evidence of events that are remote in time. Where "similar transaction" evidence has been admissible otherwise, lapses of time of 11 years (Rich v. State, 254 Ga. 11, 14(1), 325 S.E.2d 761 (1985)) and of 19 years (Cooper v. State, 173 Ga.App. 254, 255, 325 S.E.2d 877 (1985)) have not demanded that the evidence was inadmissible. It should be clear, however, that an event 31 years in the past is too remote. 1

2. The trial court, over objection, permitted the state to introduce evidence of nine similar transactions before it offered any evidence concerning the charges contained in the indictment on trial. While the court has discretion as to the order of admission of evidence ( Williams v. State, 123 Ga. 138, 140(1), 51 S.E. 322 (1905)), that discretion is not unlimited. The procedure followed in the trial court raises a substantial possibility that the jury could have settled upon the guilt of the defendant based solely upon evidence of a large number of similar transactions, and before hearing a single witness to the indicted offenses. However, in view of the holding in Division 1, we need not determine in this appeal the outer limit of discretion.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur.

BENHAM, Justice, concurring.

We accepted certiorari in this case to determine, in part, whether the state should be time-barred from introducing evidence of some types of similar transactions in the trial of a criminal case.

I agree fully with the principle stated in Division 1(a) of the main opinion, with the application in Division 1(b) of that principle to evidence of similar transaction, and with the conclusion that an event which occurred 31 years in the past is too remote for evidence of that event to be admissible as a similar transaction. However, I believe that remoteness in time is not, alone, a...

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73 cases
  • Jones v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 13, 2020
    ...testimony and J. C. testified after all five of the victims had testified, thus distinguishing this case from Gilstrap v. State , 261 Ga. 798, 799 (2), 410 S.E.2d 423 (1991). In that case, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence of nine s......
  • Slakman v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • July 13, 2000
    ...violence, occurring between 1970 and 1974, was too remote in time, and therefore, inadmissible as a matter of law. In Gilstrap v. State, 261 Ga. 798, 410 S.E.2d 423 (1991), this Court sanctioned the exclusion of similar transaction evidence on the basis that the event was 31 years in the pa......
  • Leaptrot v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 30, 2005
    ...of similar transaction evidence involving incidents occurring 11 to 19 years prior to the crime at issue. Gilstrap v. State, 261 Ga. 798, 799(1), 410 S.E.2d 423 (1991); Godbey v. State, 241 Ga.App. 529, 530(1), 526 S.E.2d 415 (1999) (18 years). "Where, as here, the similar transaction evide......
  • Gibbins v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • December 3, 1997
    ...requested charge regarding the remoteness of similar transaction evidence and in particular the 31-year rule announced in Gilstrap v. State, 261 Ga. 798, 410 S.E.2d 423. It is a fundamental rule in this state that jury instructions must be considered as a whole in determining whether there ......
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