Leaptrot v. State
| Decision Date | 30 March 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. A04A1797.,A04A1797. |
| Parties | LEAPTROT v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Martin G. Hilliard, Savannah, for appellant.
Spencer Lawton, Jr., District Attorney, Gregory M. McConnell, David T. Lock, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Harold Edward Leaptrot, Jr. appeals following his conviction by a Chatham County jury of one count of attempted child molestation, one count of enticing a child for indecent purposes, three counts of child molestation, one count of attempted statutory rape and one count of burglary. We affirm.
1. Leaptrot first challenges his convictions on the general grounds. The victims in the case were two teenage girls, C.A. and R.H. Leaptrot asserts that the state failed to carry its burden of proof with regard to the attempted child molestation of C.A. because the evidence did not show that he took a substantial step toward molesting her. He argues that, at most, the evidence showed that C.A. was "being groomed" to be his victim. Leaptrot also asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the remaining convictions, involving R.H., because at trial, R.H. recanted her prior statements to police with regard to these offenses.
On appeal from a criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence. We do not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility, but only determine if the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Citations omitted.) Colbert v. State, 255 Ga.App. 182, 564 S.E.2d 787 (2002).
When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that both C.A. and R.H. knew each other and both were introduced to Leaptrot through mutual friends. C.A., who was 13 at the time, met Leaptrot in December 1998 at a party attended mostly by teenagers. Leaptrot was then 50 years old and indicated that he came to the party to find a girlfriend. Upon meeting C.A., Leaptrot gave her marijuana, money and a cell phone and offered to take her on an expensive shopping trip. C.A. testified that she knew that Leaptrot wanted to have sex with her, but she said that she was just using Leaptrot because he gave her "[a]nything you could imagine that a 13-year-old girl might want." During their relationship, Leaptrot gave C.A. makeup, clothes, jewelry, CDs, roses, balloons, cash and marijuana. He also paid her monthly cell phone bill. Leaptrot gave C.A. a key to his house and allowed her to visit after school, where he would leave marijuana and cash for C.A. and her friends. At least once per week, Leaptrot reminded C.A. that he expected her to have sex with him in return for his generosity. During their relationship, Leaptrot repeatedly placed his hand on C.A.'s leg and asked her to have sex, but she always tried to avoid the situation. In September 1999, C.A. disclosed her relationship with Leaptrot to her counselor, who reported the matter to police.
In order to prove attempted child molestation, the state was required to show that Leaptrot performed an act that constituted a substantial step toward doing "any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or [himself]." OCGA §§ 16-4-1; 16-6-4(a). See also Tanner v. State, 259 Ga.App. 94, 96(1)(b), 576 S.E.2d 71 (2003).
To constitute an attempt there must be an act done in pursuance of the intent, and more or less directly tending to the commission of the crime. In general, the act must be inexplicable as a lawful act, and must be more than mere preparation. Yet it can not accurately be said that no preparations can amount to an attempt. It is a question of degree, and depends upon the circumstances of each case.... The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.
(Footnote omitted.) New v. State, 270 Ga.App. 341, 343(1), 606 S.E.2d 865 (2004). "[T]he `substantial step' requirement is intended to (1) ensure firmness of the defendant's criminal intent, (2) insulate from liability `very remote preparatory acts,' and (3) allow for apprehension of offenders at an early stage without providing immunity for their actions." Dennard v. State, 243 Ga.App. 868, 872(1)(a), 534 S.E.2d 182 (2000).
Here, Leaptrot, who was looking for a teenage girlfriend, met C.A. at a party and began showering her with gifts and marijuana with the express intent of inducing her to engage in sexual intercourse with him. Toward that end, he repeatedly placed his hand on her leg and asked her for sex. We find that the evidence at trial was sufficient to enable the jury to convict Leaptrot of attempted child molestation. See Wittschen v. State, 259 Ga. 448, 449(2), 383 S.E.2d 885 (1989); Lopez v. State, 258 Ga.App. 92, 94, 572 S.E.2d 736 (2002). Cf. Dennard v. State, 243 Ga.App. at 872-873(1), 534 S.E.2d 182(a).
R.H., who was 13 or 14 years old at the time, met Leaptrot through her mother. R.H. is blind and walks with a limp. In addition to her physical limitations, R.H. is in the borderline range of mental ability, which means somewhere between mental impairment and low-average intelligence. As he did with C.A., Leaptrot plied R.H. with jewelry, money and other gifts. R.H. testified at trial that she fell in love with Leaptrot when she was 14 and he was around 49. But she denied that anything improper had ever happened between them. During the state's examination of R.H., the prosecutor introduced a letter that R.H. admitted writing to Leaptrot, in which she professed her love for him and stated,
In January 2000, the Chatham County Department of Family and Children Services received a report about the possibility of an improper relationship between R.H. and an adult male. The DFACS caseworker who interviewed R.H. testified that R.H. told him that she met Leaptrot at a friend's house when she was 14; Leaptrot gave her a calling card, cash and a diamond ring. Leaptrot told R.H. that he was in love with her, and she said that she also had strong feelings for him. They had discussed sexual matters and planned to marry when she turned 17.
(i) During the time of his relationship with R.H., Leaptrot lived with his adult girlfriend, Delilah Mendez. On April 24, 2000, Mendez came home from work and upon opening Leaptrot's bedroom door, discovered R.H. and Leaptrot standing very close together by the bed. It appeared that Leaptrot was fondling R.H. around the neck and ears, with his head very close to her neck. Mendez also smelled a strong odor of marijuana, which she did not allow in her house. Mendez called 911 to report the incident, but Leaptrot and R.H. fled before the police arrived.
The police found R.H. a short time later in the parking lot of a nearby grocery store. She told the officers that Leaptrot had picked her up from a friend's house and taken her to Mendez's house where he smoked marijuana. He offered R.H. some marijuana, but she refused. Leaptrot then tried to kiss and fondle her, but she told him to stop, which he did. Leaptrot returned to Mendez's house later that day to retrieve his wallet. He told Mendez that he was in love with R.H. and that they planned to get married in two years.
Leaptrot was charged with enticing a child for indecent purposes in connection with this incident. "A person commits the offense of enticing a child for indecent purposes when he or she solicits, entices, or takes any child under the age of 16 years to any place whatsoever for the purpose of child molestation or indecent acts." OCGA § 16-6-5(a). Here, the evidence showed that Leaptrot picked up R.H. from a friend's house and took her to a bedroom at Mendez's house, where Mendez observed him stroking and fondling the child's neck and ears. R.H. later told police that Leaptrot had tried to fondle and kiss her. The fact that R.H. testified at trial that nothing improper had occurred between Leaptrot and her does not render the evidence insufficient to support the verdict. "It is for the jury and not this Court to resolve conflicts and to assess witness credibility." (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Cheek v. State, 265 Ga.App. 15, 16(1), 593 S.E.2d 55 (2003).
And viewed to support the verdict, a rational trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that R.H. changed her story because she was in love with Leaptrot, hoped to marry him and felt bad about getting him in trouble. Cf. King v. State, 268 Ga.App. 707, 709, 603 S.E.2d 54 (2004). We find, therefore, that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find Leaptrot guilty of this charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Hicks v. State, 254 Ga.App. 814, 816(3), 563 S.E.2d 897 (2002).
(ii) In the early morning hours of August 3, 2000, R.H.'s older sister heard sounds coming from R.H.'s bedroom and went to investigate. As she attempted to open R.H.'s door, she realized that the bed had been moved to block the door. The sister got help from a family friend to push the door open. She observed that the bed was messed up, and R.H. appeared to be in shock. R.H. said that Leaptrot had been in her room, and the sister noticed that the blinds were messed up. She called the police.
Officers from the Savannah Police Department responded to the call. The sister told police what had happened and said that she had seen Leaptrot crawling out of her sister's window. R.H. told the officers that Leaptrot had come in through her window uninvited and had placed his hand over her mouth, telling her not to say...
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