Ginn v. State
Decision Date | 28 May 2004 |
Citation | 894 So.2d 793 |
Parties | Danny Ray GINN v. STATE of Alabama. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Kathryn Curtis Montgomery (withdrawn 1/14/2004); and Shaunathan Bell, Fort Payne, for appellant.
William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and Nancy M. Kirby, deputy atty. gen., for appellee.
The appellant, Danny Ray Ginn, pleaded guilty to the unlawful possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, a violation of § 13A-12-212(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975, and to the unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, a violation of § 13A-12-218, Ala.Code 1975. He was sentenced, as a habitual offender with three prior felony convictions, to life imprisonment; the sentences were to run concurrently.1
Ginn first contends that his guilty pleas were involuntary because, he says, the trial court did not properly advise him of the minimum and maximum sentences he could receive pursuant to the Habitual Felony Offender Act ("HFOA"), § 13A-5-9, Ala.Code 1975, as required by Rule 14.4, Ala.R.Crim.P. However, Ginn did not present this claim to the trial court. Although Ginn filed a motion for a new trial in which he challenged the voluntariness of his pleas, he did so on a different ground from the one he now raises on appeal.2 "`The statement of specific grounds of objection waives all grounds not specified, and the trial court will not be put in error on grounds not assigned at trial.'" Culp v. State, 710 So.2d 1357, 1359 (Ala.Crim.App.1996), quoting Ex parte Frith, 526 So.2d 880, 882 (Ala.1987). "`[C]laims relating to the voluntariness of guilty pleas must first be presented to the trial court or they are waived on direct appeal.'" Danzey v. State, 703 So.2d 1019, 1019 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), quoting Anderson v. State, 668 So.2d 159, 162 (Ala.Crim.App.1995). Because this specific claim was not first presented to the trial court, it is not properly before this Court for review.
Ginn next contends that his sentences were improperly enhanced under the HFOA. Specifically, he argues that two of the three prior convictions used to enhance his sentences were not valid for use under the HFOA.
At the sentencing hearing, the State introduced into evidence documents relating to three prior convictions — a 1989 conviction in Alabama for burglary, a 1973 guilty-plea conviction in Georgia for burglary, and a 1973 guilty-plea conviction in Georgia for theft. Ginn does not challenge the 1989 Alabama conviction. With respect to the two Georgia convictions, Ginn makes two arguments.
First, Ginn contends that the two prior Georgia convictions were not, in fact, convictions because, he says, they were entered under Georgia's first-offender law, and that, therefore, they were not valid for use under the HFOA.
Although Ginn did not object to the use of these priors at the sentencing hearing but instead raised this issue for the first time in his motion for a new trial, the use of an invalid prior conviction for sentence enhancement renders a sentence illegal, and a challenge to an illegal sentence is jurisdictional and can be raised at any time. See, e.g., Ex parte Casey, 852 So.2d 175 (Ala.2002) ( ); Bell v. State, 845 So.2d 856 (Ala.Crim.App.2002) ( ); Carter v. State, 853 So.2d 1040 (Ala.Crim.App.2002) ( ); and Jones v. State, 585 So.2d 180 (Ala.Crim.App.1991) ( ).
At the time of Ginn's guilty pleas in Georgia, in 1973, Ga.Code Ann. § 27-2727 (1972) (now Ga.Code Ann. § 42-8-60 (2003)), provided:
In addition, Ga.Code Ann. § 27-2728 (now Ga.Code Ann. § 42-8-62) provided:
(Emphasis added.) In Gunter v. State, 182 Ga.App. 548, 356 S.E.2d 276 (1987), the Georgia Court of Appeals explained the first-offender law as follows:
182 Ga.App. at 549, 356 S.E.2d at 277. See also Melton v. State, 216 Ga.App. 215, 454 S.E.2d 545 (1995). In other words, a guilty plea under Georgia's first-offender law is not considered a "conviction" if the terms of probation are completed and the defendant is discharged. Such a plea cannot be used to enhance future sentences, see Williams v. State, 228 Ga.App. 62, 492 S.E.2d 290 (1997), nor can it be used for impeachment, see Matthews v. State, 268 Ga. 798, 493 S.E.2d 136 (1997). See also Priest v. State, 261 Ga. 651, 409 S.E.2d 657 (1991) ( ).
Thus, the question in this case is whether Ginn's guilty pleas in Georgia were, in fact, felony convictions that could be used for sentence enhancement under the HFOA or whether they were entered under Georgia's first-offender law. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that it does not support Ginn's claim that his Georgia pleas were entered under Georgia's first-offender law and were, therefore, not valid felony convictions under the HFOA.
At the sentencing hearing, the State introduced into evidence certified copies of the Georgia indictment charging Ginn with burglary and theft, and the Georgia trial court's sentencing orders regarding the burglary and theft convictions. The copy of the indictment indicated that Ginn waived arraignment, initially pleaded not guilty, and then withdrew the plea of not guilty and entered guilty pleas.3 (C. 114.) The sentencing order for the burglary charge indicates that Ginn pleaded guilty to the charge, and then states, in pertinent part:
(C. 116.) The sentencing order for the theft charge indicates that Ginn pleaded guilty to the charge, and then states, in pertinent part:
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