Giordano v. Amity Regional High School District# 5
| Citation | 313 F. Supp. 403 |
| Decision Date | 13 May 1970 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 13490. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | Anthony GIORDANO, Plaintiff, v. AMITY REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT #5, by David J. Chase, Chairman, Amity Regional Board of Education, by David J. Chase, Chairman, Town of Bethany, by Gordon V. Carrington, First Selectman, and Town of Woodbridge, by Theodore R. Clark, First Selectman, Defendants. |
John R. Gorman, Orange, Conn., for plaintiff.
Bruce Lewellyn and Michael J. Dorney, of Tyler, Cooper, Grant, Bowerman & Keefe, New Haven, Conn., for defendants Amity Regional High School District #5 and Amity Regional Board of Education.
Gerald P. Dwyer, of Gormley & Gormley, New Haven, Conn., for defendant Town of Bethany.
William J. Cousins, of Cousins & McGoldrick, New Haven, Conn., for defendant Town of Woodbridge.
In this action brought by a taxpayer and voter of the Town of Orange, Connecticut, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the establishment and operation of the Amity Regional Board of Education pursuant to Conn. P.A. 698 (1969), Conn. Gen.Stat. § 10-39, et seq., plaintiff's essential claim is that, by reason of the disproportionately larger population of the Town of Orange than of the Towns of Bethany and Woodbridge combined, the equal representation of the three towns on the Amity Regional Board of Education so debases the voting rights of plaintiff and other voters of Orange in the choice of members of the Board as to result in an invidious discrimination against plaintiff and others similarly situated who thereby are denied the equal protection of the laws.
Defendants Amity Regional High School District #5 and the Amity Regional Board of Education ("Amity defendants") have moved, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or, in the alternative, to convene a three-judge district court to hear and determine the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284 (1964).
For the reasons stated below and particularly in view of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hadley v. Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas City, Missouri, 397 U.S. 50 (1970), the Court denies the motion to dismiss the complaint and grants the motion to convene a three-judge district court.
In view of the elapse of almost five months between the hearing on the instant motions and the granting of the motion to convene a three-judge district court, a brief summary of proceedings is in order.
The action was commenced October 30, 1969 with the filing of the complaint seeking a permanent injunction and a declaratory judgment; plaintiff did not request that a three-judge district court be convened.
Defendants Town of Bethany and Town of Woodbridge filed answers to the complaint on November 18, 1969 and November 30, 1969, respectively.
The Amity defendants brought on for hearing on December 15, 1969 their motions to dismiss the complaint or to convene a three-judge district court. Plaintiff opposed both motions. Comprehensive briefs were filed. Counsel were fully heard. Decision was reserved.
While these motions were pending sub judice, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment without supporting affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions or any other documentary support. The Amity defendants, treating plaintiff's motion as one for judgment on the pleadings, Rule 12(c), Fed.R.Civ.P., opposed it on the ground the pleadings had not been closed; and moved for a stay of proceedings thereon pending decision on the motions argued on December 15, 1969. At a brief hearing on March 16, 1970, counsel for plaintiff and counsel for the Amity defendants agreed that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and the Amity defendants' motion for a stay should be held in abeyance pending decision on the earlier motions.
In the meanwhile, on February 25, 1970, the Supreme Court decided Hadley v. Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas City, Missouri, supra. Reversing the Missouri Supreme Court, 432 S.W.2d 328 (Mo.Sup.Ct.1968), the Supreme Court held that the one man, one vote principle applied to the election of the trustees of a consolidated junior college district comprised of several component districts. 397 U.S. at 56. In view of the close analogy between the Hadley case and the instant case,1 it has been necessary for the Court to reexamine the issues raised by the Amity defendants' motions of December 15, 1969—not only as to subject matter jurisdiction and the sufficiency of the complaint in stating a claim upon which relief can be granted, but, of perhaps greater difficulty, upon the issue of the existence of a substantial constitutional question whether "this is a case where the state statute that is challenged applies generally to all . . . school boards of the type described", Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105, 107 (1967), and whether the statute is being administered by defendants who, though not state officers, are "functioning pursuant to a statewide policy and performing a state function" rather than "performing matters of purely local concern", Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97, 102 (1967).
While the jurisdictional basis of plaintiff's claims are not articulated as precisely as they might be, the Court believes that a fair reading of the complaint shows that the jurisdiction of this Court over the subject matter and the parties is invoked pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 (1964) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) and (4) (1964). See Butterworth v. Dempsey, 229 F.Supp. 754, 758 (D.Conn. 1964), aff'd sub nom. Pinney v. Butterworth, 378 U.S. 564 (1964).
Since the action draws into question the constitutionality of a state statute and seeks injunctive relief with respect thereto (discussed more fully below), a special statutory district court of three judges to hear and determine the action is being convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284 (1964).
Plaintiff is a Connecticut citizen and a resident, taxpayer and voter of the Town of Orange, suing for himself and other Orange taxpayers and voters similarly situated.
Defendants are the Amity Regional High School District #5 and the Amity Regional Board of Education, each sued through David J. Chase in his official capacity as chairman of the respective boards; and the Town of Bethany and the Town of Woodbridge, sued through Gordon V. Carrington and Theodore R. Clark in their official capacities as first selectmen of the respective towns.
In 1953 the Towns of Orange, Bethany and Woodbridge, in separate town meetings, voted to establish a regional senior and junior high school system known as the Amity Regional High School District #5 (Amity District), pursuant to Conn.Gen.Stat. § 10-39, et seq., (later amended, Conn.P.A. 698 (1969)).3
The Amity Regional Board of Education (Amity Board) was formed pursuant to the procedures set forth in Conn. Gen.Stat. § 10-46, as amended, Conn. P.A. 698, § 8(a) (1969). This statute provides that a regional board of education shall consist of no more than nine and no less than five members; that the total number of members of a regional board and the representation of each town shall be determined by a majority vote of a joint meeting of the boards of education of the towns comprising the district; that at such joint meeting each such board shall have one vote; and that each town shall have at least one representative on the regional board.
Orange, Bethany and Woodbridge are each equally represented by their members on the Amity Board which has a total of nine members. Board members are elected by the electors in their respective towns.
The complaint alleges that, although only one-third of the members of the Amity Board represent Orange, that town has a larger population and a greater number of electors than Bethany and Woodbridge combined. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Orange has a population slightly in excess of 14,700 and has 7,172 electors; that Bethany has a population slightly in excess of 3,300 and has approximately 1,550 electors; and that Woodbridge has a population slightly in excess of 8,000 and has 3,773 electors.
Plaintiff's primary claim is that the Amity Board as presently constituted, and Conn.P.A. 698 (1969), Conn.Gen.Stat. § 10-39, et seq., governing the establishment and operation of the regional board, deny him, as a voter of the Town of Orange, the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.4 He asserts that the equal representation of the towns comprising the Amity District on the Amity Board, rather than their representation in accordance with their respective populations and numbers of electors, renders his vote, as an elector of Orange, of less effect and weight in the election of Amity Board members than the votes of Bethany and Woodbridge electors. This follows, plaintiff alleges, from the fact that Orange is represented by only one-third of the members of the Board, although the population and number of electors in Orange is greater than that of Bethany and Woodbridge combined.
Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that the method of election and composition of the Amity Board and the Connecticut statutes which govern its establishment and operation impair his constitutional rights. He also seeks a mandatory injunction requiring defendants to formulate a plan under which each town in the Amity District would be represented on the Amity Board in proportion to its population or upon any other basis which would not impair his constitutional rights.
The Amity defendants in their arguments and briefs (and the other defendants in their answers) deny that the Amity Board as presently constituted and the...
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