Gist v. Pettus
Decision Date | 30 November 1914 |
Docket Number | 14 |
Citation | 171 S.W. 480,115 Ark. 400 |
Parties | GIST v. PETTUS |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Sebastian Circuit Court, Fort Smith District; Daniel Hon, Judge; affirmed.
STATEMENT BY THE COURT.
These suits were instituted by the appellees against the appellants for the possession of certain lands. The suits were consolidated and tried together. The appellees set up in their complaints that they were the children and heirs at law of John W. Pettus, who died on the 8th of January, 1912; that they were the owners of the land by virtue of the will of W W. Pettus, which, omitting clauses that are merely formal (and not necessary for the proper construction of the will) is as follows:
The will was executed on the 3d day of April, 1871. There was a codicil to the will, executed on the 24th of April, 1873, as follows:
"It is the intention that I do hereby devise and direct that all the real estate devised and given in the above and foregoing instrument to my son, John W. Pettus, shall descend at his death to the heirs of his body, and in case he die without issue to the bodily heirs of my said daughter, Mary--and the property given to my daughter, Mary, in the above and foregoing instrument shall descend to the heirs of her body."
Appellants were the grantees of John W. Pettus, and claimed to have a fee simple title under him.
The court instructed the jury that under the will of W. W. Pettus the lands devised therein to John W. Pettus, on the death of the latter, passed to his children, the appellees herein. From a judgment in favor of appellees the appellants have duly prosecuted this appeal.
Judgment affirmed.
Pryor & Miles and Geo. S. Evans, for appellants.
Under the third paragraph of the will the testator devised to his son, John Wright Pettus, a fee simple title to the land.
A gift made by will is not to be cut down by a subsequent codicil in vague and doubtful language nor unless the intention of the testator clearly appears therefrom. Underhill on Wills, 487, § 358; 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 397.
A provision in a will which after devising the property in fee simple to one person, directs that, upon the death of that person, all property undisposed of shall pass to another person named, is void. 81 Ark. 481; 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1028; 109 U.S. 725; 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 920.
Where, as in this case, a will provides that in case the devisee dies without issue the property shall pass to another, if issue is born alive to the first taker, that fixes the fee in him. 245 Ill. 617; 92 N.E. 562; 37 L. R. A. 164.
The codicil to the will merely directed the course of the property's descent upon the death of the testator's son, and such a limitation over after the fee is repugnant to the nature of the estate and is void. 2 Underhill on Wills, § 689; Page on Wills, § 684; Gardner on Wills, 486.
Roberts & Kincannon, for appellees.
The third paragraph, when read in connection with the entire instrument, including the codicil, as it should be, conveyed to John W. Pettus and the heirs of his body a fee tail estate, whereby, under our statute, section 735, Kirby's Digest, he took a life estate with remainder in fee simple to his heirs. 98 Ark. 570; 95 Ark. 333; Id. 18; 75 Ark. 19; 67 Ark. 517; 49 Ark. 125; 44 Ark. 458; 58 Ark. 303; 72 Ark. 336; 80 S.W. 367; 73 Ark. 56-60; Id. 422.
The cardinal rule in the construction of wills is to arrive at the intention of the testator, and when that intent is ascertained, if it is not contrary to some positive rule of law, it will be upheld.
Here, the third paragraph, with the statement as to his intention as set out in the codicil, makes it plain that the testator intended that the heirs of John W. Pettus should have an interest in the estate devised, the fee simple estate therein at his death. 90 Ark. 155; 3 Pet. 346; 40 Cyc. 1386-7-8-9; 104 Ark. 445.
If the testator devised a fee simple estate to John W. Pettus by the third paragraph of the will, he cut it down to a life estate when he added the codicil, for a codicil which makes a disposition of the testator's property inconsistent with the disposition made in the will is, to the extent of such inconsistency, a revocation thereof. 40 Cyc. 1180; Id. 1181. See also 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1045; 25 Ark. 108; 22 Ark. 567; 28 Ark. 102.
OPINIONWOOD, J., (after stating the facts).
The appellants contend that the testator, W. W. Pettus, devised to his son, John W. Pettus, a fee simple title to the lands in controversy under the third paragraph of the will, and that the codicil, in attempting to dispose of the lands devised in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the devise in the third paragraph, is repugnant to this devise, and should be declared void. Appellants rely upon the case of Bernstein v. Bramble, 81 Ark. 480, 99 S.W. 682, where Judge BATTLE, speaking for the court,...
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