Gittemeier v. Phillips
| Decision Date | 07 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:18-CV-966 SRW |
| Parties | PAUL GITTEMEIER, Petitioner, v. DON PHILLIPS AND DOMINIQUE CUTTS, Respondent(s). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, or in the Alternative for a Certificate of Appealability, together with a Memorandum in Support. (ECF No. 25, 26). Respondents filed a response in opposition. (ECF No. 28). No reply has been filed, and the time for doing so has passed. Both parties have consented to the exercise of plenary authority by a United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, or for a Certificate of Appealability, is denied.
Petitioner was convicted of driving while intoxicated and trespass in the first degree and sentenced to 15 years in prison. After completing his appeals and post-conviction relief in state court, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1). Petitioner asserted eight grounds for relief in his petition. In his first ground he claimedhis conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. In the remaining seven grounds, he asserted various ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The Court denied the petition and did not grant a certificate of appealability on any ground. (ECF No. 23). Petitioner now asks the Court to reconsider its denial of his petition or, in the alternative, to grant him a certificate of appealability.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) allows a party to seek to alter or amend a judgment within 28 days after the entry of the judgment. Rule 59(e) was adopted to make clear that the district court possesses the power "'to rectify its own mistakes in the period immediately following' its decision." Banister v. Davis, 140 S. Ct. 1698, 1703 (2020) (quoting White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Security, 455 U.S. 445, 450 (1982)). Rule 59(e) motions are used to correct "manifest errors of law or fact, or to present newly discovered evidence." United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006) (). "[C]ourts will not address new arguments or evidence that the moving party could have raised before the decision issued." Banister, 140 S. Ct. at 1703.
Relief pursuant to this rule is subject to a court's broad discretion. Briscoe v. Cty. of St. Louis, Mo., 690 F.3d 1004, 1015-16 (8th Cir. 2012). A court abuses its discretion when it fails to consider an important factor, assigns significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or commits a clear error of judgment weighing those factors. Simmons v. United States, No. 4:11CV01983 ERW, 2013 WL 798046, at *3 (E.D. Mo. March 5, 2013) (citing Rattray v.Woodbury Cty., Iowa, 908 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1008 (N.D. Iowa 2012)). A court does not abuse its discretion in denying a Rule 59 motion when the purpose of the motion is to repeat arguments the district court already rejected. See Preston v. City of Pleasant Hill, 642 F.3d 646, 652 (8th Cir. 2011).
The petition first argued Petitioner's conviction for driving while intoxicated was not supported by sufficient evidence. In his Rule 59(e) motion, Petitioner notes this Court found the Missouri Court of Appeals' holding that sufficient evidence existed to show Petitioner drove the ATV while intoxicated was neither incorrect nor an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established law. This Court also found that the appellate court did not make an unreasonable determination of the facts and identified the correct controlling authority. (ECF No. 26, at 6).
The Court has carefully considered Petitioner's Rule 59(e) Motion as it relates to this claim. The Court does not find any manifest errors of law or fact which need to be corrected, nor did Petitioner present any newly discovered evidence. Petitioner states that a sufficiency of the evidence claim is "fact-intensive" and "deserving of further scrutiny on appeal." Id. at 7. He further alleges this issue could be resolved differently and "deserves further proceedings." Id. However, a court reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence decision "considers only the 'legal' question 'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 243 (2016) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original)). If the reviewing court so finds, sufficient evidence supports the conviction, and due process has been satisfied. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
This Court only has the purview to grant relief if, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury's finding of guilt was so "insupportable as to fall below the threshold of bare rationality." Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 640, 656 (2012). That did not occur in Petitioner's case. Petitioner was observed driving his ATV with a bottle of liquor in his hand, smelled of alcohol, and was visibly intoxicated at the time of his arrest. (ECF No. 23, at 2, 7-9). Petitioner's blood alcohol content, hours after his arrest, was still well over the legal limit. Id. More than bare rationality supports the jury's finding that Petitioner was guilty of driving while intoxicated. Petitioner's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment will be denied as to the sufficiency of the evidence claim.
The Petitioner also alleged seven claims of ineffective assistance of counsel as grounds two through eight. Petitioner claims the Court erred in finding the Martinez exception did not apply to the procedural default of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. In response, the State argues Petitioner's motion repeats his arguments from his petition as to the merits of his grounds for relief, and thus provides no basis for reconsideration under Rule 59(e).
In this case, Petitioner filed a pro se Rule 29.15 motion raising a single claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge whether an ATV is a motor vehicle under Missouri law. (ECF No. 9-7, at 11). The circuit court then appointed counsel who moved for, and was granted, a 30-day extension of time to file an amended motion. Petitioner retained private motion counsel who moved for an additional 60-day extension of time to file an amended PCR motion. (ECF No. 9-7, at 4). The motion court rescinded the appointment of counsel and granted private counsel's motion for an extension of time to file an amended PCR motion. Id. Private counsel filed an amended PCR motion asserting 23 claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.The amended PCR motions raised all but ground seven of the claims raised in the federal habeas petition. The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on the amended PCR motion and denied all 23 claims. (ECF No. 9-7, at 62-73). Petitioner appealed. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, prepared an opinion, but ultimately transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri. (ECF No. 9-11); and Gittemeier v. State, 527 S.W.3d 64 (Mo. 2017).
The Supreme Court of Missouri held the amended PCR motion was filed after the mandatory deadline as clarified in Stanley v. State, 420 S.W.3d 532 (Mo. 2014). Stanley determined Rule 29.15(g) allows a circuit court to extend the time for filing an amended motion for only one additional period, no longer than 30 days. Petitioner's private motion counsel requested and received an extension of time to file his amended motion under authority the circuit court did not have; therefore, the amended PCR motion was ruled untimely. Gittemeier, 527 S.W.3d at 68. The Supreme Court of Missouri only considered the issue raised in Petitioner's pro se motion, which is a claim not presented to this Court. Id. at 71-72.
"[A] state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies before presenting his claim to a federal habeas court." Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2064 (2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)). Exhaustion requires "one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). "A failure to exhaust remedies properly in accordance with state procedure results in procedural default of the prisoner's claims." Welch v. Lund, 616 F.3d 756, 758 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 848)).
The Court found Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims were procedurally defaulted. Petitioner could avoid procedural default only by showing that there was cause for the default and resulting prejudice, or that a miscarriage of justice will result from enforcing theprocedural default in Petitioner's case. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 90-91 (1977). In order to establish cause, Petitioner must show that "some objective factor external to the defense" prevented his compliance with a state procedural rule. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). As the Stanley decision was determined after the circuit court granted private counsel's request for additional time, this Court found there was cause external to the defense which prevented appellate review of Petitioner's PCR claims. (ECF No. 23, at 12).
"Cause," however, is not synonymous with "a ground for relief." A finding of cause and prejudice does not entitle the prisoner to habeas relief. It merely allows a federal court to consider the merits of a claim that otherwise would have been procedurally defaulted.
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 17 (2012). Martinez reversed and remanded ...
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