Glaser v. Priest

• Citation: 29 Mo.App. 1
• Parties: MORRIS GLASER, Plaintiff, v. JOHN G. PRIEST et al., Interpleaders, Appellants, and UNION TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Interpleader, Respondent.
• Decision Date: 17 January 1888
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

29 Mo.App. 1

MORRIS GLASER, Plaintiff, v. JOHN G. PRIEST et al., Interpleaders, Appellants, and UNION TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Interpleader, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of Missouri, St. Louis.

January 17, 1888

APPEAL from the St. Louis Circuit Court, HON. GEO. W. LUBKE, Judge.

Affirmed.

W. H CLOPTON, for the appellants: Interpleader will not lie where the party filing the bill claims that he is ignorant of the law; but will lie where the interpleader claims that he cannot tell which of the parties has in fact the title to the subject-matter of the interplea. 2 Story's Eq. Jur. [13 Ed.] secs. 806, 807, 812, 813. The ground of jurisdiction in such cases is that the plaintiff is a mere stakeholder claiming no interest in the subject-matter. Hathaway v Foy, 30 Mo. 543. This is not a statutory interpleader. Garrison v. McAllister, 13 Mo. 579. The court erred in allowing Glaser's attorneys' fees to be taxed as costs. Stille v. Wear, 54 Mo. 531. Attorneys' fees are never allowed as costs in this state except as provided by statute. Draper v. Draper, 29 Mo. 13; Bank v. King, 73 Mo. 590. Statutes in reference to costs strictly construed. Shed v. Railroad, 67 Mo. 687; Relfe v. Ins. Co., 9 Mo.App. 586; City v. Gas Company, 11 Mo.App. 245; Waters v. Waters, 49 Mo. 385; Frissel v. Haile, 18 Mo. 21. The Union Trust Company has no power to act in New York as committee of the estate of an habitual drunkard. Corporations have no powers except such as are expressly granted. Ruggles v. Collier, 43 Mo. 353, 375; Blair v. Ins. Co., 10 Mo. 559. It is an established rule of construction, where general words follow particular ones, to construe the power as applicable to the things or persons particularly mentioned. City v. Laughlin, 49 Mo. 559. In construing the power of the Union Trust Company, under its charter, to act as committee of the estate of an habitual drunkard in New York, this court should not be bound by the opinion of the Supreme Court in New York that it was so authorized, if such question had been litigated there. Boyce v. City of St. Louis, 29 Barb. 654; Runyan v. Carter, 14 Peters 122. The Union Trust Company is a foreign corporation and as such has no status here. Const. Mo., sec. 6, art. 12; Rev. Stat., 1879, title, Corporations; Wharton on Conf. Laws, secs. 102, 105 a; United Trust Co. v. Lee, 73 Ill. 143; Carroll v. City of E. St. Louis, 67 Ill. 568; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 181. If it is true that the Union Trust Company is clothed by the laws of New York with the specific power to act as a committee of the estate of an habitual drunkard (which we deny), such law of New York gives it no such corporate power here. State v. Bunce, 65 Mo. 349; Smith v. McCutchin, 38 Mo. 415; Story on Conf. Laws, 539; Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374. The rights and powers of ordinary guardians are purely local. Story on Conf. of Laws, p. 696, sec. 494, p. 701, sec. 504; Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U.S. 681; Wharton on Conf. of Laws, secs. 265, 267, 268; Morton v. Hatch, 54 Mo. 411; Ins. Co. v. Needles, 52 Mo. 19; Nayler's Adm'r, 29 Mo. 126. There is no ground for comity in this case. Weller v. Sugget, 3 Red. 249; Hoyt v. Sprague, supra; Wharton on Conf. of Laws, sec. 100. Comity is never extended where the exercise of powers is repugnant to the policy of the government of the state. In Missouri a foreigner cannot act as administrator. Rev. Stat., p. 3, sec. 10. Guardians of insane persons and habitual drunkards shall possess the same qualifications as administrators. Foreign laws conflicting with home policy invalid. Scoville v. Canfield, 14 Johns. 338; Woodward v. Ruane, 23 Ark. 523; Hoyt v. Thompson, 19 N.Y. 224. There is not even reciprocity between the states of New York and Missouri on this subject, or between New York and the other states. Weller v. Suggett, 3 Red. 249; Boyce v. City of St. Louis, 29 Barb. 654; Ex parte Mc Neally, 26 How. Pr. 402; Morrill v. Dickey, 1 Johns. Ch. 153; Williams v. Storrs, 6 Id. 353; Ex parte Dawson, 4 Bradf. 130; McLoskey v. Reed, 4 Id. 334; Beatty's Est., 1 Tuck. (N. Y.) 442. The rule obtains everywhere. Booth v. Clark, 17 How. (U. S.) 322, 331; Leonard v. Putnam, 51 N.H. 247; Carruth v. Roads, 37 Pa.St. 60; Silence v. Gilman, 1 Id. 193; Ross v. Railroad, 53 Ga. 514. The Supreme Court of New York did not authorize the committee to bring this suit. Alexander v. Relfe, 9 Mo.App. 133; Cox v. Volkert, 86 Mo. 567. The court below erred in excluding proof that Geo. W. Bull is now reformed and capable of managing his affairs. Even in New York the decree of the court that one is an habitual drunkard is only prima-facie evidence of incompetence. Van Wyck v. Brooher, 81 N.Y. 260; Leonard v. Leonard, 14 Pick. (8 N. Y.) 394.

NOBLE & ORRICK and GEO. R. LOCKWOOD, for the respondent: Dr. Bull being a non-resident drunkard, the statutes of Missouri do not provide any means for the appointment of a trustee or committee of his estate in Missouri. 2 Rev. Stat., sec. 5835. The statutes of New York, the state of his residence, make ample provision for the care of his person and property, and the latter, including his estate in Missouri, has been lawfully entrusted to respondent as a trustee, or committee. 4 Rev. Stat. of New York [7 Ed.] title 6, chap. 17; Acts New York 1882, pp. 304, 305; Charter of Union Trust Company; Perry on Trusts, secs. 42, 45. Therefore, the courts of this state, in the exercise of their general equity powers, will, through comity, recognize the right of respondent to receive the rents of the property of its cestui que trust in Missouri. Darby v. Cabanne, 1 Mo.App. 129; 2 Story's Eq. Jur. [13 Ed.] chap. 36, sec. 1362, et seq.; Dodge v. Cole, 97 Ill. 338. And, although respondent be regarded as a receiver, it will be allowed to sue in a foreign jurisdiction by comity when no detriment would result to the citizens of the state where suit is brought. High on Receivers [2 Ed.] sec. 241, and authorities cited; Runk v. St. John, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 585; Hoyt v. Thompson, 5 N.Y. 320; Bagby v. Railroad, 86 Pa.St. 291; Bank v. McLeod, 38 Ohio St. 174; Ross v. Railroad, 53 Ga. 514; Farmers v. Needles, 52 Mo. 17.

ALBERT ARNSTEIN, for the plaintiff: A bill of interpleader is properly filed whenever plaintiff holds a fund in which he asserts no interest whatever, and which is claimed by rival claimants, where a reasonable doubt may arise as to the true rights of the respective parties. Adams Eq. *203; Freeland v. Wilson, 18 Mo. 380; Hathaway v. Foy, 40 Mo. 540; Cheever v. Hodson, 9 Mo.App. 565-8; Farley v. Blood, 30 N.H. 354; Hastings v. Cropper, 3 Del.Ch. 165. The tenancy of the plaintiff did not prevent him from filing this interplea. Kitchen v. Coal Co., 88 Ind. 515; McWharter v. Halstead, 24 F. 828; Badeau v. Tyler, 1 Sand. Ch. 270. Where a bill of interpleader is properly filed, complainant is entitled to his costs out of the fund. Adams Eq. *206; 2 Daniels Ch. Prac. *1569; Aymer v. Gault, 2 Paige 284; Print Works v. Stimson, 2 R.I. 415; Farley v. Blood, 30 N.H. 354.

OPINION

ROMBAUER J.

In June, 1885, George W. Bull, one of the appellants, and then and now a resident of the city of New York, was, on proceedings duly had, adjudged an habitual drunkard by the Supreme Court of the state of New York, and the respondent by said court appointed a committee of his estate.

At the above date, and ever since, Bull owned certain real estate in the city of St. Louis, held and occupied under a lease for years by the plaintiff, Glaser, and the appellant, Priest, was Bull's St. Louis agent for the collection of rents derived therefrom.

After the appointment of the Trust Company as a committee of Bull's estate, Bull requested Priest to pay the rents accruing from his St. Louis property to such committee, which Priest did, but in April, 1886, there being some disagreement between Bull and his said committee, the former revoked the order.

In October, 1886, the Trust Company demanded of Glaser the payment of the rents, and Priest, disputing the right of the company to receive them, made a similar demand that they should be paid to him. Glaser thereupon, being harassed by the contending claimants and by the institution of a suit against him by one of them, filed this bill of interpleader, stating in substance the above facts, and his inability to determine to whom the rents were payable, and asked leave to bring the money into court, so that the rival claimants might interplead therefor.

To the bill of interpleader the defendants, Priest and Bull, answered, denying the facts therein stated. Upon a trial of this branch of the case, the court found that the bill was properly filed, and supported by the evidence. The court, shortly after the commencement of the proceedings, appointed Priest a receiver of the rents, and continued said appointment in its final decree, hereinafter mentioned.

The defendants, Priest and Bull, excepted to the ruling of the court, in deciding that the case was a proper one for an interpleader, and also objected and excepted to the allowance of forty dollars made to the plaintiff for expenses incurred in filing his bill.

Thereupon the defendants, being ordered by the court so to do, filed their respective interpleas, and the court after a full hearing entered its decree to the following effect:

(1) That the amount of $1,103.10, which the plaintiff, Glaser, had paid to the receiver, Priest, as rent accrued during the pendency of the proceedings, be paid by said receiver to the Trust Company, and be by it appropriated to the payment of the board-bill of said Bull in New York, deducting from said sum only reasonable counsel fees incurred in its collection.

(2) Requiring the receiver to file, on the first day of the October term, 1887, an account of the rents received from the estate, and if the...