Glaspie v. Holmes
| Decision Date | 03 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:17-CV-3171-B-BH,3:17-CV-3171-B-BH |
| Parties | KEVIN NEAL GLASPIE, Plaintiff, v. TRACY HOLMES, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
By Special Order No. 3-251, this pro se case has been automatically referred for findings, conclusions, and recommendation. Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the plaintiff's complaint should be DISMISSED with prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
On November 28, 2016, Kevin Neal Glaspie (Plaintiff) filed this pro se civil rights action against a judge of the 363rd Judicial District Court in Dallas County, Texas (Judge), an assistant district attorney of Dallas County (ADA), three defense attorneys (Counsel), the complainant (Complainant), and a Rowlett, Texas police officer (Officer), based on their roles in his October 2016 conviction for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.1 (See doc. 3 at 1, 3; doc. 7 at 2-10.)2 He appears to raise claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the code of judicial conduct, the federal rules of evidence, the local criminal rules, his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, and state law claims for false imprisonment, entrapment, perjury, and legalmalpractice. (See id.)3 He asks that the trial transcripts be reviewed and for "just compensation." (See doc. 7 at 3, 5-10, 12.)
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, his complaint is subject to screening under § 1915(e)(2). Section 1915(e)(2)(B) provides for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
A complaint is frivolous when it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Id. at 327. A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it fails to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
Plaintiff sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 "provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States" and "afford[s] redress for violations of federal statutes, as well as of constitutional norms." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege facts that show (1) he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation occurred under colorof state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005).
An official capacity claim is merely another way of pleading an action against the entity of which the individual defendant is an agent. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). Any suit against the Judge in her official capacity is therefore a suit against the State of Texas. See Florance v. Buchmeyer, 500 F. Supp. 2d 618, 638-39 (N.D. Tex. 2007); see also Thomas v. State, 294 F. Supp. 2d 576, 592 (N.D. Tex. 2016). When acting in their official prosecutorial capacities, Texas district attorneys and assistant district attorneys are considered agents of the State, so any suit against the ADA in her official capacity is also a suit against the State of Texas. See Neinas v. Texas, 217 F.3d 275, 280 (5th Cir. 2000); Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 1997); Quinn v. Roach, 326 F. App'x 280, 292-293 (5th Cir. May 4, 2009).
The Eleventh Amendment states that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." "This withdrawal of jurisdiction effectively confers an immunity from suit." P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993). Therefore, "an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). This immunity applies to both federal and state law claims brought in federal court. See Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 328-29 (5th Cir. 2013) ().
Although Congress has the power to abrogate that immunity through the Fourteenth Amendment, Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-76 (2000), and the State may waive its immunity by consenting to suit, AT&T Commc'ns v. BellSouth Telecomms. Inc., 238 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2001), the State has not waived its immunity by consenting to suit, nor has Congress abrogated the Eleventh Amendment immunity by enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 42 U.S.C. § 1985. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Hines v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., No. 00-60143, 2000 WL 1741624, at *3 (5th Cir. Nov. 14, 2000) (per curiam).
Any claims against the Judge and ADA in their official capacities are subject to dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Judge is also immune from suit in her individual capacity. The Supreme Court has recognized absolute immunity for judges acting in the performance of their judicial duties. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 745-46 (1982). Judges are immune from suit for damages resulting from any judicial act. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). Allegations ofbad faith or malice do not overcome judicial immunity. Id. at 11. A plaintiff can overcome the bar of judicial immunity only under two very limited circumstances. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12; see also Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994).
First, a judge is not immune from suit for actions that are not "judicial" in nature. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. "[W]hether an act by a judge is a 'judicial' one relate[s] to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity." Davis v. Tarrant County, Tex., 565 F.3d 214, 222 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12). "[T]he relevantinquiry is the 'nature' and 'function' of the act, not the Id.
[The Fifth Circuit] has adopted a four-factor test for determining whether a judge's actions were judicial in nature: (1) whether the precise act complained of is a normal judicial function; (2) whether the acts occurred in the courtroom or appropriate adjunct spaces such as the judge's chambers; (3) whether the controversy centered around a case pending before the court; and (4) whether the acts arose directly out of a visit to the judge in his official capacity. These factors are broadly construed in favor of immunity.
Davis, 565 F.3d at 222-23 (citations omitted). "The absence of one or more factors will not prevent a determination that judicial immunity applies." Carter v. Carter, No. 3:13-CV-2939-D (BF), 2014 WL 803638, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2014) (citing Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 515 (5th Cir. 2005)). Second, a judge is not immune from suit for actions that although judicial in nature, are taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12; see also Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121, 1124 (5th Cir. 1993).
Because the alleged conduct by Judge was judicial in nature and undertaken under the jurisdiction provided to the 363rd Judicial District Court, she is entitled to absolute immunity from claims for monetary damages against her in her individual capacity.
Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity to initiate and pursue criminal prosecutions. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976). Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for acts taken in prosecuting cases, even against allegations that they acted "maliciously, wantonly, or negligently." Rykers v. Alford, 832 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing Morrison v. City of Baton Rouge, 761 F.2d 242, 248 (5th Cir. 1985)); Thomas v. State, 294 F.Supp.3d 576, 605 (N.D. Tex. 2018). The Supreme Court has recognized that a prosecutor has only qualified immunity withrespect to his or her administrative and investigative duties. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993).
Plaintiff has not alleged that ADA acted other than in her adjudicative role as a prosecutor. Because all of the acts of which he complains were taken during the course and scope of her duties as a prosecutor, ADA is entitled to prosecutorial immunity for any individual capacity claims. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423.
With regard to Plaintiff's claims against the attorneys who represented him in the state criminal proceeding, it is well-established that an attorney does not act under color of state law in representing a defendant at trial or on direct appeal. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (); Mills v. Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 3, 837 F.2d 677, 679 (5th Cir. 1988) (). A...
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