Glass v. Clark

• Decision Date: 10 August 2012
• Docket Number: 2100829.
• Citation: 100 So.3d 1074
• Parties: Deborah GLASS, as mother and next friend of Laura Leigh Knight, a minor v. Jacquelynn Kristina CLARK.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

100 So.3d 1074

Deborah GLASS, as mother and next friend of Laura Leigh Knight, a minor

v.Jacquelynn Kristina CLARK.

2100829.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 25, 2012.

Certiorari Denied Aug. 10, 2012

Alabama Supreme Court 1111171.

Derek W. Simpson of Warren & Simpson, P.C., Huntsville, for appellant.

Gary K. Grace and Jennifer M. Matthews of Grace, Matthews & Debro, LLC, Huntsville, for appellee.

PITTMAN, Judge.

Deborah Glass, acting on behalf of her minor daughter, Laura Leigh Knight, appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Madison Circuit Court in favor of Jacquelynn Kristina Clark on claims of negligence and wantonness asserted against Clark.

In September 2009, Glass sued Clark, seeking damages on behalf of Knight for injuries Knight had suffered in a motor-vehicle accident while she had been riding in a motor vehicle operated by Clark.¹ Clark moved for a summary judgment. After conducting a hearing on that motion, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Clark. In that judgment, the trial court concluded (1) that Knight had been a “guest” within the scope of Alabama's Guest Statute, Ala.Code 1975, § 32–1–2, while riding in Clark's vehicle when the accident had taken place and, thus, that Clark was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law as to Glass's negligence claim; and (2) that Glass had failed to present substantial evidence to support her wantonness claim against Clark. Glass timely appealed; her appeal was transferred to this court pursuant to § 12–2–7(6), Ala.Code 1975.

On appeal, Glass contends that the evidence adduced in connection with the summary-judgment motion presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Knight was a guest in Clark's vehicle. Additionally, Glass asserts that substantial evidence of wantonness was adduced so as to subject Clark to liability notwithstanding the applicability of the guest statute. The record reveals the following undisputed facts. In June 2009, Knight invited Clark to go on a beach trip with her, Glass, Glass's fiancé, and Glass's fiancé's son on Wednesday, June 17, 2009, through Sunday, June 21, 2009. Knight accepted the invitation. Clark and Knight rode in Clark's vehicle to their destination in Panama City Beach, Florida, while Glass and the others rode in a separate vehicle. Before the trip, the parties agreed that Glass would pay for Clark's accommodations but that Clark would pay for her meals and gasoline during the trip.

The record reveals that on most nights during the trip (Thursday and Friday), Clark and Knight socialized with other young people, consumed alcohol, and smoked cigarettes until midnight each night; they awakened around 11:00 a.m. on Friday and on Saturday. On the last night of the trip, Knight and Clark did not go to bed until between 5:00 and 6:00 a.m. They smoked cigarettes while they were out that night, but no evidence was presented to suggest that they consumed alcohol. Glass testified that she did not recall smelling alcohol on them when they had gotten home that morning. Glass awakened Clark and Knight between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m. Glass testified that they seemed to be fine that morning but that they looked tired. Glass invited them to lunch and expressed her plans to stay for the day, but Clark wanted to go ahead and drive back to Huntsville to spend Father's Day with her father. Knight testified at her deposition that she had wanted to stay and eat with Glass and the others but that Glass had ordered her to ride with Clark so that Clark would not drive back by herself. Knight testified that Glass was “kind of fussing over [Clark]” before they left, but her testimony did not indicate that any conversation had occurred between Glass and Clark; that was the only evidence made part of the record which so much as suggests that any conversation regarding Clark's ability to drive had occurred between Clark and Glass before the girls left on Sunday. Glass testified at her deposition only that she had told Clark it was okay to go back to Huntsville (without Glass's following her) so long as it was okay with Clark's parents. Clark testified that she did not recall having any conversation with Glass in which Glass had raised concerns about her being too tired to drive or about her ability to drive and that she did not recall any conversation about Knight's riding back to Huntsville with Clark solely so that Clark would not be making the drive alone. Clark further stated that she never discussed the possibility of being too tired to drive.

The record shows that Clark and Knight stopped approximately three times on their way to Huntsville. Knight testified that they had stopped to smoke cigarettes because they could not smoke in the vehicle. Knight stated that Clark never said anything to her about being tired or being too tired to drive. Clark stated that she did not feel tired and did not recall being fatigued at all; her father also testified that Clark had telephoned him on the way home and that she had not mentioned being tired to him. Clark testified that, beforethe accident, she had been listening to music, which she said was “not too loud” because Knight was sleeping, and “blasting cold air.”

Clark and Knight were involved in a single-car accident while traveling north on Interstate 65. The record reveals that the last thing Clark remembered was driving in the far right lane and Knight's being asleep in the passenger seat. It is undisputed that, after the accident, Clark did not, and still does not, know whether she fell asleep at the wheel, blacked out, or was cut off by another driver. However, the affidavit of the state trooper who responded to the scene of the accident stated that Clark had told him that she had fallen asleep due to a lack of sleep the night before, which had caused her to lose control of the vehicle she was operating and had caused the vehicle to leave the roadway and roll down a hill. The notes of the paramedic who treated Clark at the scene of the accident, as well as the deposition transcript of the emergency-room doctor who treated Clark, report that the accident occurred after Clark had fallen asleep at the wheel. When asked about the statements recorded by the aforementioned authorities at the scene, Clark stated that she did not recall telling anyone that she had blacked out and that she knew that Knight had assumed she had fallen asleep, so she had simply gone along with that scenario when being questioned by the authorities. Knight sustained permanent injuries as a result of the accident.

It is well settled that an appellate court is to review a summary judgment de novo, using the same standard applied by the trial court. Neal v. Sem Ray, Inc., 68 So.3d 194, 196 (Ala.Civ.App.2011). Under Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., we must review the evidence to determine whether the movant established that no genuine issue of material fact existed, thereby entitling the movant to a judgment as a matter of law. If the movant makes that showing, the nonmovant thereafter bears the burden to adduce “substantial evidence” to rebut the movant's contention that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin Cnty., 538 So.2d 794, 797–98 (Ala.1989). “[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.” West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989).

We begin by addressing the issue whether Knight was a guest in Clark's vehicle under Alabama's guest statute. That statute, Ala.Code 1975, § 32–1–2, provides:

“The owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest while being transported without payment therefor in or upon said motor vehicle, resulting from the operation thereof, unless such injuries or death are caused by the willful or wanton misconduct of such operator, owner, or person responsible for the operation of said motor vehicle.”

In Neal v. Sem Ray, Inc., supra, this court reviewed a trial court's summary judgment in favor of a driver on a negligence claim asserted by an occupant of that vehicle, in which the trial court concluded that, as a matter of law, the occupant had been a guest. In that case, the occupant and the driver were cousins. The driver, employed as a dump-truck driver, had initially asked the occupant's mother to accompany her on a job-related delivery; the occupant instead accompanied the driver on the delivery because the occupant's mother could not go and requestedthat she go in her place. The driver and the occupant were involved in an accident during the delivery trip, injuring the occupant and prompting her action against the driver.

We affirmed the summary judgment entered in the driver's favor in Neal. In that opinion, we elaborated on the definition of the term “guest,” as it is used in § 32–1–2:

“ ‘ “ ‘The general rule is that if the transportation of a rider confers a benefit only on the person to whom the ride is given, and no benefits other than such as are incidental to hospitality, goodwill or the like, on the person furnishing the transportation, the rider is a guest; but if his carriage tends to promote the mutual interest of both himself and the driver for their common benefit, thus creating a joint business relationship between the motorist and his rider, or where the rider accompanies the driver at the instance of the latter for the purpose of having the rider render a benefit or service to the driver on a trip which is primarily for the attainment of some objective of the driver, the rider is a passenger and not a guest.’ ”

“ ‘Quoting Hasbrook v. Wingate, 152 Ohio St. 50, 87 N.E.2d 87 (1949).’ ”

Neal, 68 So.3d at 198 (quoting Cash v. Caldwell, 603 So.2d 1001, 1003 (Ala.1992)). We proceeded to discuss Cash v....