Smith v. Ford Motor Co.
| Decision Date | 16 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 3:12-CV-1084-WKW [WO] |
| Parties | LISA SMITH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Defendant Ford Motor Company ("Ford") removed this action from the Circuit Court of Chambers County, Alabama, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441(a), and 1446(b)(1), on fraudulent joinder grounds. Plaintiffs responded by filing a motion to remand. (Doc. # 6.) In response to the motion to remand, Ford submitted an opposition brief and a motion to realign the allegedly fraudulently joined defendant as an additional plaintiff. (Docs. # 9, 10.) Based upon the arguments of counsel and the relevant law, Plaintiffs' motion to remand is due to be granted and Ford's motion to realign is due to be denied.
This lawsuit arises out of a single-vehicle rollover accident. On February 4, 2012, Annie Lois Perdue was driving a 1998 Ford Explorer on interstate 85 with passengers Betty Jean Willingham, Lisa Smith, and Alice Person. Ms. Perdue lost control of theExplorer, causing it to rollover on the roadway and into the median. Tragically, Ms. Perdue and Ms. Willingham died, and Ms. Smith and Ms. Person sustained serious and permanent injuries.
The administrator of Ms. Willingham's estate, Ms. Smith, and Ms. Person brought suit in state court against Ford and the administratrix of Ms. Perdue's estate. The complaint asserts state-law claims against Ford for product liability, negligence, wantonness, and breach of implied warranty. It also contains a single claim against the administratrix of Ms. Perdue's estate, alleging that Ms. Perdue "negligently operated her vehicle so as to lose control." (Compl. ¶ 41.) In state court, the administratrix of Ms. Perdue's estate filed an answer to the complaint. The answer asserts Alabama's Guest Statute as an affirmative defense. See Ala. Code § 32-1-2 (1975). The administratrix of Ms. Perdue's estate also filed a crossclaim against Ford that mirrors the original Plaintiffs' claims against Ford.
Ford removed this action, asserting diversity of citizenship on the theory that Ford is completely diverse from each Plaintiff, that Plaintiffs fraudulently joined the administratrix of Ms. Perdue's estate, and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. In its notice of removal, Ford asserts that Plaintiffs cannot state a negligence claim against the administratrix of Ms. Perdue's estate because Alabama's Guest Statute bars the claim as a matter of law. Plaintiffs move to remand, arguing that there is nofraudulent joinder and hence no basis for asserting diversity jurisdiction.1 Ford opposes remand and also moves the court to realign the administratrix of Ms. Perdue's estate as a plaintiff, asserting that realignment would confer diversity jurisdiction over this removed action and moot the motion to remand.
The discussion contains two parts. Part A addresses Plaintiffs' motion to remand and the allegedly fraudulent joinder of the administratrix of Ms. Perdue's estate. Part B addresses Ford's motion for realignment of the parties.
Federal courts owe a "strict duty" to exercise the limited jurisdiction Congress confers on them. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996); see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (). The law favors remand where federal jurisdiction is not absolutely clear, and courts must construe removal statutes narrowly. Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 2006).
Ford's § 1441(a) removal rests on § 1332(a)'s diversity jurisdiction. Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity. "Complete diversity requires that no defendant . . . be a citizen of the same state as any plaintiff." MacGinnitie v. Hobbs Group, LLC, 420 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005). Although Ms. Perdue and Plaintiffs are Georgia citizens,2 Ford contends that Plaintiffs joined the administratrix of Ms. Perdue's estate solely to defeat diversity jurisdiction.
The presence of a fraudulently joined, non-diverse defendant does not defeat diversity jurisdiction. Where the joinder is fraudulent, the court "must dismiss the non-diverse defendant and deny any motion to remand the matter back to state court." Florence v. Crescent Res., LLC, 484 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007). A defendant'sjoinder is fraudulent when no "reasonable possibility" exists that the plaintiff can establish a cause of action against the non-diverse defendant. Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Stillwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 663 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011).
The removing party bears the burden of proving fraudulent joinder by "clear and convincing evidence," and this burden is "a heavy one." Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997). A court examines fraudulent joinder based on the plaintiff's pleadings at the time of removal, but it also "may consider affidavits or deposition transcripts submitted by the parties." Id.; see also Legg, 428 F.3d at 1324. Additionally, the court construes "the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1538. In this way, the inquiry resembles that required on a motion for summary judgment; however, the inquiry differs in that the court may not "weigh the merits of a plaintiff's claim beyond determining whether it is an arguable one under state law." Id.
The broad question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that Plaintiffs can prove a negligence cause of action against the administratrix of Ms. Perdue's estate. Ford contends that there is not because Alabama's Guest Statute bars Plaintiffs' claim for negligence against the administratix of Ms. Perdue's estate. Thus, the discussion turns to the Guest Statute.
Alabama's Guest Statute is an affirmative defense. Neal v. Sem Ray, Inc., 68 So. 3d 194, 195 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011). The Eleventh Circuit has "acknowledged that, under some circumstances, application of an affirmative defense can support a finding of fraudulent joinder" in a removed case. Florence v. Crescent Res., LLC, 484 F.3d 1293, 1298 n.3 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Henderson v. Wash. Nat'l Ins. Co., 454 F.3d 1278, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2006)). The Guest Statute was not at issue in either Florence or Henderson, but the court will assume without deciding that in an appropriate circumstance, the Guest Statute can preclude liability and, thus, prove fraudulent joinder so as to establish diversity jurisdiction.
The Alabama Legislature adopted the Guest Statute to counteract the injustice that occurred "where generous drivers, having offered rides to guests, later found themselves defendants in cases that often turned upon close questions of negligence." Boggs v. Turner, 168 So. 2d 1, 3 (Ala. 1964). It provides:
The owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest while being transported without payment therefor in or upon said motor vehicle, resulting from the operation thereof, unless such injuries or death are caused by the willful or wanton misconduct of such operator, owner, or person responsible for the operation of the motor vehicle.
Ala. Code § 32-1-2 (1975). The Guest Statute precludes a rider who is injured or killed during transport in a motor vehicle from recovering against the vehicle's driver forpersonal injuries or death unless (1) the driver was guilty of willful or wanton misconduct or (2) the rider was not a "guest . . . being transported without payment." Id. Plaintiffs concede that they do not allege a claim of willful misconduct or wantonness against the administratrix of Ms. Perdue's estate; thus, Plaintiffs may avoid the Guest Statute's bar on their negligence claim only if Ms. Willingham, Ms. Smith, and Ms. Person were not guests traveling with Ms. Perdue on the day in question.
The Guest Statute does not define "guest," other than to disqualify one who provides payment for the ride, but the Alabama courts have provided some guidance. Whether a rider qualifies as a guest or a "passenger for hire" depends upon the circumstances of the case. Boggs, 168 So. 2d at 3. "If the transportation of a rider confers a benefit only to the person to whom the ride is given, and no benefits other than hospitality, goodwill, or the like are conferred on the person furnishing the transportation, then the rider is a guest." Glass v. Clark, 100 So. 3d 1074, 1078 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, where the only benefit the rider provides the driver is companionship, the rider is a guest. Neal v. Sem Ray, Inc., 68 So. 3d 194, 201 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011). The benefit must be "material and tangible" for the rider to lose "guest" status. Id. at 199. Where, for example, the rider's presence promotes "the mutual interest of both the rider and the driver for their common benefit, thus creating a joint business relationship," or is "primarily for theattainment of some objective of the driver," then the rider is a passenger for hire and not a guest. Glass, 100 So. 3d at 1078 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Baker v. Tri-Nations Express, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1314 (M.D. Ala. 2008) ().
The narrow question is whether Ford, as the removing defendant, has demonstrated that Ms. Willingham, Ms. Person, and Ms. Smith were guests within the scope of the Guest Statute at the time of the accident. The short answer is that it has not.
Ford submits no affidavits or other evidence. Instead, Ford relies on the Complaint and...
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