Glasscock Underground Water Conservation Dist. v. Pruit

• Citation: 915 S.W.2d 577
• Decision Date: 11 January 1996
• Docket Number: No. 08-94-00358-CV,08-94-00358-CV
• Parties: GLASSCOCK UNDERGROUND WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT, Appellant, v. Royce PRUIT, Chief Appraiser of Glasscock County Appraisal District and Byron Bitner, Chief Appraiser of Reagan County Appraisal District, Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas

Page 577

915 S.W.2d 577

GLASSCOCK UNDERGROUND WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT, Appellant, v. Royce PRUIT, Chief Appraiser of Glasscock County Appraisal District and Byron Bitner, Chief Appraiser of Reagan County Appraisal District, Appellees.

No. 08-94-00358-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas El Paso.

Jan. 11, 1996.

Rehearing Overruled Feb. 14, 1996.

Daniel H. Byrne, James V. Sylvester, Ford & Ferraro, L.L.P., Austin, for appellant.

Roy L. Armstrong, McCreary, Veselka, Beck & Allen, P.C., Austin, Royce Pruit, Garden City, for appellees.

Before BARAJAS, C.J., and McCLURE and CHEW, JJ.

OPINION

McCLURE, Justice.

Appellant Glasscock Underground Water Conservation District appeals an adverse trial court judgment on its suit seeking a declaration that it, and not the Santa Rita Underground Water Conservation District, has the right to tax certain severed mineral estates underlying land that the surface owners annexed into Glasscock's district. The trial court concluded that the severed mineral estates were not affected by the surface owners' annexation, and Glasscock appealed to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Glasscock County and Reagan County are adjoining counties of West Texas. Glasscock County lies due south of Big Spring, Texas and directly north of Reagan County and the Santa Rita district. In 1989, the 71st Texas Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1634 ("S.B. 1634") which created the Santa Rita Underground Water Conservation District ("Santa Rita"). Act of May 24, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 653, § 3, 1989 Tex.Sess.Law Serv. 2153 (Vernon). Santa Rita's territorial boundaries generally coincide with the boundaries of Reagan County, however, the Legislature provided two methods for Reagan County landowners to annex their land into the Glasscock County Underground Water Conservation District ("Glasscock") instead of the Santa Rita district. First, S.B. 1634, § 14(a) excepted from the Santa Rita district "any lands ... annexed into the Glasscock County Underground Water Conservation District pursuant to Section 51.714 et seq., Water Code ..." prior to the June 14, 1989 effective date of the act. S.B. 1634, § 14(a). The owners of surface estates in 95 parcels of land in northern Reagan County, some of whom did not own all of the minerals underlying the surface estate, petitioned for annexation into the Glasscock district prior to the effective date of S.B. 1634. The petitions and the descriptions of the land attached to the surface owners' petitions failed to mention these severed mineral interests. Glasscock granted all of the annexation petitions. The owners of the severed mineral interests in these 95 parcels did not file separate petitions for annexation into Glasscock.

Second, S.B. 1634, § 14(b) allowed certain landowners to file a petition to exclude the owner's land from Santa Rita within one year after the legislation's effective date. Twenty-two surface land owners, some of whom did not own all of the underlying mineral interests, filed petitions for exclusion from Santa Rita in accordance with S.B. 1634, § 14(b). Santa Rita granted 21 of the petitions. Each of the 21 successful petitioners then filed for annexation into the Glasscock district pursuant to TEX.WATER CODE ANN. § 52.521 et seq. Glasscock accepted each of the 21 petitions. None of the 21 successful petitions for exclusion from Santa Rita, and none of the 21 petitions for annexation into Glasscock, mention the severed mineral estates. No mineral owner associated with any of the 21 parcels annexed into Glasscock pursuant to S.B. 1634, § 14(b) filed a separate petition for exclusion from Santa Rita or a petition for annexation into Glasscock.

A total of 116 Reagan County surface estate landowners annexed their property into Glasscock pursuant to S.B. 1634, § 14(a) and (b). In tax years 1990 through 1993, the Glasscock County Appraisal District prepared tax rolls for Glasscock that included the surface value, and the value of any mineral interests owned by the 116 surface owners, but excluded the value of any severed mineral interests in the 116 parcels. In the same tax years, the Reagan County Appraisal District prepared tax rolls for Santa Rita that, with the exception of a minor error not relevant to this appeal, included the value of the severed mineral estates in the 116 parcels, but excluded the surface value and the value of any mineral interests owned by the surface owners. No owner of any severed mineral interest in any of the 116 parcels has filed any protest to Santa Rita's taxation of his or her mineral estate.

In 1990, the parties requested an Attorney General's opinion on whether the surface owners' petitions had the effect of annexing the severed mineral estates into Glasscock. The Attorney General concluded that the surface owners' petitions did not affect the severed mineral estates. See Op.Tex.Att'y Gen. No. JM-1221 (1990). Nevertheless, the Glasscock district demanded that the Reagan County Appraisal District delete the severed mineral interests from the Santa Rita tax rolls, and that the Glasscock County Appraisal District include them on the Glasscock tax rolls. Both Appraisal Districts declined to do so. In 1991, Glasscock filed suit against the chief appraisers of the Glasscock and Reagan County Appraisal Districts and against Santa Rita seeking a declaration that the 116 surface owners' petitions effectively annexed the severed mineral estates into the Glasscock district for all purposes, including taxation. ¹ The parties submitted the case to the court on stipulated facts. The trial court found that the surface owners' petitions did not have the effect of annexing the 116 parcels into the Glasscock district. In one point of error, Glasscock asserts that the trial court incorrectly interpreted the Legislature's intent in enacting S.B. 1634 and other provisions of the Water Code, and thereby erred in its determination. For convenience, all appellees will be collectively referred to as "Santa Rita."

SANTA RITA'S CROSS-POINT

Santa Rita asserts that the trial court erred in failing to find that Glasscock was precluded from filing its lawsuit on the ground that Glasscock failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. We will address Santa Rita's cross-point before reaching the merits of this appeal. A taxing unit that believes an appraisal district has incorrectly identified property taxable by the taxing unit has an administrative remedy in the form of a hearing before the appraisal review board for that district. TEX.TAX CODE ANN. §§ 41.03, 41.05 (Vernon 1992). If the appraisal review board rules against the taxing unit, the taxing unit can appeal the order to a district court for a trial de novo. TEX.TAX CODE ANN. §§ 42.031, 42.23 (Vernon 1992). The parties stipulate that Glasscock did not seek administrative remedies or hearing before any appraisal review board pursuant to the Tax Code.

In most instances, a party must exhaust available administrative remedies before resorting to the courts. See Webb County Appraisal District v. New Laredo Hotel, Inc., 792 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tex.1990). In this case, however, the parties seek declaratory relief on stipulated facts. The only issue presented is a question of law relating to statutory interpretation of the Water Code and S.B. 1634. Section 41.03 of the Tax Code does not purport to place the resolution of questions of law regarding statutory declarations before the appraisal review board. The administrative reviewing agency in this case therefore is unable to provide the remedy requested: a declaration on a question of law. Thus, the matter is properly before the court without first exhausting administrative remedies. Houston Federation of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Houston Independent School District, 730 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex.1987) (where administrative reviewing body is unable to afford requested relief, parties may seed redress in the courts before pursuing administrative relief); Calvin V. Koltermann, Inc. v. Underream Piling Co., 563 S.W.2d 950, 954-55 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Ector County Independent School District v. Hopkins, 518 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1974, no writ) (parties may bypass administrative remedies when only question is one of law and not of fact). Accordingly, we overrule Santa Rita's cross-point.

LAW APPLICABLE TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

When the court is confronted with a question of statutory construction, it must first determine whether the statute is ambiguous. Cail v. Service Motors, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex.1983). If the meaning of the statute is clear and unambiguous, extrinsic aids and rules of construction are inappropriate, and the statute should be given its common, everyday meaning. Cail, 660 S.W.2d at 815. The contentions of the parties in this case amount to a claim of ambiguity. When an apparent ambiguity exists, the court is to give the statute a reasonable construction in keeping with the legislative intent. City of Mason v. West Texas Utilities Co., 150 Tex. 18, 237 S.W.2d 273, 278 (1951). Legislative intent should be determined from the entire act, not from isolated portions thereof. Acker v. Texas Water Commission, 790 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex.1990). Additionally, the court must consider "the consequences that would follow" from its construction of a statute and avoid absurd results. Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991). Finally, this Court must keep in mind that the Legislature is assumed to enact a statute with complete knowledge of the existing law and with reference to it. Acker v. Texas Water Commission, 790 S.W.2d at 301.

GLASSCOCK'S POINT OF ERROR

The parties agree that the statutory language is ambiguous. Glasscock argues that the Legislature intended to enable an owner of any interest in a parcel of land in Reagan County to annex all of the various estates in the parcel into the Glasscock...