Glen v. Sec'y, Case No. 3:15-cv-525-J-32JBT
Decision Date | 06 August 2018 |
Docket Number | Case No. 3:15-cv-525-J-32JBT |
Parties | CHARLES TERRY GLEN, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Charles Glen, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Doc. 1; Petition) on April 21, 2015.1 Glen challenges a 2012 state court (Duval County, Florida) conviction for the sale or delivery of cocaine. The circuit court sentenced Glen to incarceration for a term of nine years.
The Petition raises one ground for relief. See Doc. 1 at 5. Respondents filed a Response to the Petition. See Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 15; Resp.) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). On March 1, 2017 Glen requested to supplement the Petition with three additional grounds for relief. See Doc. 18 (Supplemental Petition). The Court granted Glen's request to supplement. See Doc. 21. Respondents filed aSupplemental Response on August 24, 2017. See Respondents' Response to Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 22; Supp. Resp.). Glen filed a pro se Reply. See Response to Respondent's Response (Doc. 25; Reply). This case is ripe for review.
A jury convicted Glen of the sale or delivery of cocaine on January 10, 2012. Resp. Exs. 4; 5. On February 24, 2012, the circuit court sentenced Glen as a Habitual Felony Offender (HFO) to incarceration for a term of nine years. Resp. Ex. 6 at 52-53; 7 at 4-5. The First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) per curiam affirmed Glen's conviction and sentence on December 19, 2012 without a written opinion. Resp. Ex. 11. The Mandate was issued on January 4, 2013. Resp. Ex. 11.
On April 26, 2013, Glen filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Resp. Ex. 14. Glen filed an amended Rule 3.850 Motion on March 8, 2014. Resp. Ex. 15. The circuit court denied Glen's Rule 3.850 Motions on July 2, 2014. Resp. Ex. 16. The First DCA per curiam affirmed the summary denial on October 30, 2014 without a written opinion. Resp. Ex. 20. The Mandate was issued on November 25, 2014. Id.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 by adding the following subsection:
The AEDPA governs a state prisoner's federal habeas corpus petition. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016). cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017). "'The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in thestate criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'" Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)).
Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner's claims on the merits, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court's adjudication of the claim was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). A state court's factual findings are"presumed to be correct" unless rebutted "by clear and convincing evidence." Id. § 2254(e)(1).
AEDPA "imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings" and "demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). "It bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. [at 102] (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed lower federal courts that an unreasonable application of law requires more than mere error or even clear error. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) ().
Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal citations modified).
There are prerequisites to federal habeas review. Before bringing a § 2254 habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court remedies that are available for challenging his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must "fairly present[]" every issue raised in his federal petition to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989) (emphasis omitted). Thus, toproperly exhaust a claim, "state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).
In addressing exhaustion, the United States Supreme Court explained:
Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the "'"opportunity to pass upon and correct" alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.'" Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971)). To provide the State with the necessary "opportunity," the prisoner must "fairly present" his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim. Duncan, supra, at 365-366, 115 S. Ct. 887; O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).
Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).
A state prisoner's failure to properly exhaust available state remedies results in a procedural default which raises a potential bar to federal habeas review. The United States Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of procedural default as follows:
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