Glock v. Moore

• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Citation: Glock v. Moore, 776 So.2d 243 (Fla. 2001)
• Decision Date: 05 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. SC00-2432, No. SC00-2535.
• Parties: Robert D. GLOCK, II, Petitioner, v. Michael W. MOORE, Secretary, Department of Corrections, State of Florida, Respondent. Robert D. Glock, II, Appellant, v. State of Florida, Appellee.

776 So.2d 243

Robert D. GLOCK, II, Petitioner, v. Michael W. MOORE, Secretary, Department of Corrections, State of Florida, Respondent.

Robert D. Glock, II, Appellant, v. State of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. SC00-2432, SC00-2535.

Supreme Court of Florida.

January 5, 2001.

Terri L. Backhus of Backhus & Izakowitz, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Petitioner/Appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Robert J. Landry and Scott A. Browne, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, FL, for Respondent/Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Robert D. Glock, a prisoner under sentence of death and scheduled for execution on January 11, 2001, appeals the trial court's order summarily denying his successive motion for postconviction relief. Glock also filed a separate petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. Both the successive motion and the petition were filed after the November 14, 2000, signing of the death warrant. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the trial court's order denying postconviction relief and we deny Glock's petition for writ of habeas corpus.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Glock was charged and convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and robbery and was sentenced to death. We detailed the facts of this case in our initial opinion as follows:

The trial record reflects that on August 16, 1983, the woman victim arrived at a Bradenton shopping mall. As she exited her automobile, Puiatti¹ and Glock confronted her, forced her back inside the car, and drove away with her. They took $50 from her purse and coerced her into cashing a $100 check at her bank. They then took the victim to an orange grove outside Dade City where they took the woman's wedding ring and abandoned her at the roadside. After traveling a short distance, the appellants determined that the woman should be killed, and they returned in the car to her. When the car's window came adjacent to the woman, Puiatti shot her twice. The appellants drove away, but, when they saw she was still standing, they drove by the victim again and Glock shot her. When the woman did not fall, the appellants made a third pass with the automobile, Glock shot her another time, and the woman collapsed.

Four days later, a New Jersey state trooper stopped the victim's vehicle because its license plate was improperly displayed. Puiatti and Glock occupied the automobile. When neither appellant could present a valid driver's license, the officer requested the car's registration. As Puiatti opened the glove box, the trooper saw a handgun. The officer seized that handgun, searched the vehicle, and uncovered another handgun. He then arrested both men for possession of handguns without permits. The police later identified the handgun from the glove box as the murder weapon.

The next day Puiatti and Glock individually confessed to the kidnapping, robbery, and killing. These initial confessions varied only to the extent that each blamed the other as instigator of the killing and each offered a differing sequence of who fired the shots at the victim. Each confessor admitted he had fired shots at the victim. Three days later, on August 24, Puiatti and Glock gave a joint statement concerning their involvement in the murder. In this joint confession, the appellants resolved the inconsistencies in their prior statements: they agreed that Glock initially suggested shooting the victim and that Puiatti fired the first shots and Glock fired the final shots.

Before trial, both appellants moved to sever their trials on the grounds that the state intended to introduce each appellant's individual confession. The trial court denied their motions. At trial, neither appellant testified in his own behalf, and the three confessions—the two individual confessions and the joint confession—were admitted in evidence. The appellants objected only to the introduction of the individual confessions. The trial court overruled appellants' objections, but, before admitting each individual statement, the trial court admonished the jury to disregard each defendant's individual confession as it tended to implicate the other.

The jury found each appellant guilty of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and robbery. In the penalty phase, Puiatti waived any reliance on the mitigating factor of no significant prior criminal history, but offered psychiatric testimony indicating he was under Glock's substantial domination. Glock claimed the application of the mitigating factor of no significant prior criminal history and introduced psychiatric evidence suggesting that he would not have participated in the crime but for his association with Puiatti. The jury, by an 11-to-1 vote, recommended imposition of the death penalty for both Puiatti and Glock.

The trial judge, in accordance with the jury recommendation, imposed the death penalty on both appellants, finding no mitigating circumstances and the following three aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was committed to avoid arrest [section 921.141(5)(e), Florida Statutes (1983)]; (2) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain [section 921.141(5)(f), Florida Statutes (1983)]; and (3) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification [section 921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (1983)].

Puiatti v. State, 495 So.2d 128, 129 (Fla. 1986), vacated in part, 481 U.S. 1027, 107 S.Ct. 1950, 95 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).

Glock appealed his murder conviction and death sentence, but he did not appeal his convictions for kidnapping and robbery.² We affirmed on direct appeal.³ See Puiatti, 495 So.2d at 128. Thereafter, Governor Bob Martinez signed a death warrant, setting execution for January 17, 1989, and Glock filed a rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief in the trial court. The trial court summarily denied each of Glock's claims.⁴See Glock v. Dugger, 537 So.2d 99 (Fla.1989). Glock appealed to this Court, and he also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and request for stay of execution. See id. at 100. As stated by this Court, Glock raised two principal claims: "(1) that the admission of codefendant Puiatti's confession violated Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 107 S.Ct. 1714, 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987), and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968); and (2) that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain additional information from Glock's family to aid the mental health experts in showing deficiencies in Glock's personality that affected Glock's confession and presentation of evidence in the penalty phase." Glock, 537 So.2d at 101-02. This Court rejected these claims, affirmed the trial court's summary denial of the 3.850 motion, denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus, and denied the stay of execution.⁵See id. at 103.

Following this Court's 1989 decision, Glock sought relief in the federal courts by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the federal district court denied. See Glock v. Dugger, 752 F.Supp. 1027, 1031 (M.D.Fla.1990).⁶ On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit set aside the death sentence, finding that the trial court's jury instructions regarding the "heinous, atrocious and cruel" ("HAC") aggravator violated Glock's Eighth Amendment rights as interpreted by Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992). See Glock v. Singletary, 36 F.3d 1014, 1027 (11th Cir.1994). Subsequently, the Eleventh Circuit reheard the case en banc and determined, based on an analysis of the principles announced in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), that Glock was not entitled to the benefit of the retroactive application of Espinosa. See Glock v. Singletary, 65 F.3d 878, 890 (11th Cir.1995).⁷ The en banc Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to the Eleventh Circuit panel for consideration of Glock's other sentence-related challenges that the panel had not previously addressed. See id. at 891.

On remand, the Eleventh Circuit panel determined that four of Glock's claims were meritless and affirmed the denial thereof, but remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the claim of whether Glock's attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to discover and present mitigating evidence. See Glock v. Singletary, 84 F.3d 385, 386 (11th Cir.1996). The federal district court, on remand, referred the case to a magistrate, who held two days of evidentiary hearings during which Glock's counsel examined ten witnesses in order to elicit evidence that Glock claimed his trial counsel would have discovered during trial had counsel been constitutionally effective. See Glock v. Moore, 195 F.3d 625, 632 (11th Cir.1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 213, 148 L.Ed.2d 150 (2000). The magistrate issued a report and recommendation that the district court deny Glock's writ of habeas corpus. See id. The district court adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation, and denied the writ. Glock appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed the district court's denial. See id. at 626.

Governor Bush signed Glock's death warrant on November 14, 2000, and execution was set for December 8, 2000. Glock thereafter filed an application for stay, which this Court granted, thereby staying execution to and including 6 p.m. on January 10, 2001. Execution was reset for January 11, 2001. On November 20, 2000, postconviction counsel served public records requests on a number of state agencies. On December 1, 2000, the trial court held a status hearing at which it ordered that Glock file his postconviction motion by December 4, 2000. Glock timely filed his motion and the trial court held a hearing on December 7, 2000, at which the court orally denied Glock's motion. The trial court entered its written order on December 18, 2000, and this appeal followed.

3.850 MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

Adoption of State's Proposed Order

In his first claim...