Godard v. Ridgway
| Decision Date | 14 October 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 3698,3698 |
| Citation | 445 P.2d 757 |
| Parties | Stella Lee GODARD, by her next friend, Arthur R. Godard, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. E. C. RIDGWAY, Appellee (Defendant below). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Ross D. Copenhaver, of Copenhaver & Castberg, Powell, for appellant.
G. L. Spence, Riverton, for appellee.
Before HARNSBERGER, C. J., and GRAY, McINTYRE, and PARKER, JJ.
Stella Lee Godard through her next friend filed a complaint in two counts against E. C. Ridgway for damages in the amount of $52,000, (1) as a result of his negligence (malpractice) as an M.D., and (2) for breach of warranty.
The complaint in the first count stated that defendant was a licensed physician, that plaintiff for compensation employed him to provide her with a contraceptive device and that he undertook as a physician to insert an intrauterine contraceptive device into the uterus of plaintiff on January 6, 1966; that on February 15 plaintiff asked him to inspect the same and he complied, and on May 25 she asked for another inspection at which time defendant caused X rays to be taken of her; that he did not use due care or skill in the services, failed to make the insertion in a proper manner, inserted an unsafe, dangerous, and harmful device, failed to inform her of the dangers and risks incident, incorrectly and negligently in February 1966 diagnosed the position of the device, failed to take X rays, and failed to advise her of the consequences which could result from the facts which he observed or should have observed at the time of the examination; that on May 25 he negligently failed to read or view the X rays and to read the X-ray report made by the radiologist and to advise her of the facts disclosed by the X rays or to treat her for the injury and condition disclosed by them; that by reason of such failure and negligence, plaintiff suffered damage to the uterus, became pregnant, was required to both undergo an abdominal operation for removal of the contraceptive device and a Caesarean section for the delivery of her child, suffered pain and mental anguish, was unable to perform her usual duties, and would have future expense for medical attention and hospitalization; and that plaintiff had been damaged in the sum of $1,500 for hospitalization and medical services, $500 for drugs and help in her home, and was otherwise damaged in the sum of $50,000.
The complaint in the second count stated that defendant for compensation on January 6, 1966, sold her and inserted an intrauterine contraceptive device, known as a 'Bow'; that she relied upon the warranties, skill, experience, and judgment of the defendant in the choice of such device and particularly the representation and warranty that such device was fit, proper, and safe for human use; that the bow was not of merchantable quality, fit, suitable, or safe for human use, but was dangerous and harmful, which facts defendant should have known; and that said device caused and tore holes in the wall of her uterus, passed through such wall into the abdominal cavity, causing her pain, suffering, and mental anguish, caused plaintiff to undergo an abdominal operation and Caesarean section, and medical attention and hospitalization, all to her damage in the amount of $52,000.
Defendant answered, admitting that as a physician he was employed to provide and insert the device for plaintiff but otherwise denied the allegations and affirmatively alleged that she assumed the risk; that her injuries, if any, were not the result of negligence but were unavoidable; and alternatively that any injuries were the result of the negligence of third parties or negligent manufacture, design, and breach of implied warranties of the manufacturer of the device, which was not sold by him to plaintiff.
Thereafter, following the presentation and answering of certain interrogatories, the filing of depositions from several doctors and plaintiff, and pretrial conference, defendant filed motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed an affidavit in opposition, reciting facts purporting to relate to the issues. The court found that there was no genuine issue of any material fact, that defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and issued summary judgment, from which plaintiff has appealed.
Plaintiff argues that summary judgment was improper because there existed genuine issues of fact to be determined in respect to (1) defendant's negligence and the standard of care required, (2) causation of...
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...Wyo., 496 P.2d 908 (1972); McClure v. Watson, Wyo., 490 P.2d 1059 (1971); Low v. Sanger, Wyo., 478 P.2d 60 (1970); Godard v. Ridgway, Wyo., 445 P.2d 757 (1968). On the other hand, the whole purpose of the procedural technique of a summary judgment would be defeated if cases could be forced ......
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