Goddard v. APG Security-RI, LLC

• Decision Date: 07 March 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2014–239–Appeal.,2014–239–Appeal.
• Parties: Melissa E. GODDARD v. APG SECURITY–RI, LLC, alias John Doe Corporation et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

134 A.3d 173

Melissa E. GODDARD

v.APG SECURITY–RI, LLC, alias John Doe Corporation et al.

No. 2014–239–Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 7, 2016.

David R. Comerford, Esq., Johnston, for Plaintiff.

Frank R. Saccoccio, Esq., Johnston, Mark A. Pogue, Esq., Providence, for Defendants.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice SUTTELL, for the Court.

Which period of limitation applies to a civil action alleging a violation of the employer drug testing statute (EDTS)¹ —ten years as provided in G.L.1956 § 9–1–13(a)² or three years as provided in § 9–1–14(b)³ —is the central question of this appeal. This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issue raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After considering the parties' written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that this case may be decided without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

IFacts and Procedural History

On March 27, 2014, Melissa Goddard (plaintiff) filed a complaint against APG Security–RI, LLC, as well as against Scott Hemingway and Anna Vidiri in their capacities as employees/agents of APG Security–RI, LLC (collectively, defendants). The complaint alleged that, in January 2010, when plaintiff was employed as a security guard by APG Security–RI, LLC, defendants violated G.L.1956 § 28–6.5–1 when they required her to submit to a drug test without the reasonable grounds set forth by the statute and subsequently terminated her employment based on the result of that test. The plaintiff sought damages pursuant to both the EDTS and § 9–1–2.⁴ The defendants responded to plaintiff's complaint with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, in which they asserted that the complaint was not timely filed. A hearing justice of the Superior Court held a hearing on June 9, 2014, at which defendants argued that the three-year statute of limitations in § 9–1–14(b) applied to civil actions arising out of alleged violations of the EDTS, and plaintiff argued that the ten-year statute of limitations in § 9–1–13(a) applied instead. The hearing justice agreed with defendants and found that the three-year statute of limitations in § 9–1–14(b) governed plaintiff's cause of action. The hearing justice also found that the statute of limitations began to run from the date that the drug test was administered, and that plaintiff's complaint had been filed more than three years after the administration of the drug test. Accordingly, the hearing justice granted defendants' motion and dismissed plaintiff's complaint. The plaintiff filed a premature notice of appeal, which we nevertheless deem to be timely. See Miller v. Saunders, 80 A.3d 44, 47 n. 8 (R.I.2013).⁵

IIStandard of Review

"In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), this Court applies the same standard as the hearing justice." Ho–Rath v. Rhode Island Hospital, 115 A.3d 938, 942 (R.I.2015) (quoting Woonsocket School Committee v. Chafee, 89 A.3d 778, 787 (R.I.2014) ). "Because the sole function of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, our review is confined to the four corners of that pleading." Id. (quoting Chafee, 89 A.3d at 787 ). "We will ‘assume [ ] the allegations contained in the complaint to be true and view[ ] the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.’ " Id. (quoting Chafee, 89 A.3d at 787 ). "A motion to dismiss is properly granted when it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief from the defendant under any set of facts that could be proven in support of the plaintiff's claim." Id. (quoting Chafee, 89 A.3d at 787 ).

This appeal also presents us with a question of law regarding which of two general civil action statutes of limitations will apply to causes of action arising from alleged violations of the EDTS. It is well settled that " ‘[t]he question of whether a statute of limitations has run against a plaintiff^[’^] s claim is * * * a question of law,' which this Court reviews de novo. " Ho–Rath, 115 A.3d at 942–43 (quoting Balletta v. McHale, 823 A.2d 292, 294 (R.I.2003) ). "[T]his Court [also] reviews questions of statutory construction and interpretation de novo. " Id. at 943 (quoting National Refrigeration, Inc. v. Capital Properties, Inc., 88 A.3d 1150, 1156 (R.I.2014) ).

IIIDiscussion

The plaintiff argues that the ten-year statute of limitations in § 9–1–13(a) should apply to alleged violations of the EDTS because § 9–1–13(a) specifically states that the ten-year statute of limitations applies "[e]xcept as otherwise specially provided," the EDTS does not indicate the applicable statute of limitations, and none of the other established statutes of limitations apply. The plaintiff also argues that actions brought pursuant to the EDTS do not meet this Court's common law definition of § 9–1–14(b)'s "injuries to the person" because "the legislature intended the rights created in the [EDTS] to accrue to an individual by reason of a peculiar status and not as rights to which one is entitled by reason of being a person in the eyes of the law." The plaintiff asserts that § 9–1–14(b) does not apply, therefore, because "the right to be free from unreasonable drug testing is a right that accrues to an individual by reason of a peculiar status * * * " plaintiff contends that the "peculiar statuses" in question are created by the separate sections within the EDTS that delineate different drug testing rules for employees as opposed to job applicants.

The defendants counterargue that the three-year statute of limitations in § 9–1–14(b) applies because a violation of the rights protected by the EDTS results in an injury to the person as defined by this Court and because plaintiff's rights do not arise from any peculiar status. The defendants assert that "the rights conferred and protected by the [EDTS] are * * * analogous" to civil rights even though the EDTS rights are not " ‘civil right [s]’ in the classical sense of th[e] term." The defendants also argue that the application of the three-year limit on causes of action arising out of alleged violations of the EDTS is "consistent with the General Assembly's use of short limitations periods in other employment-related statutes" and supports the policy considerations in favor of short statutes of limitations in the employment context.

The EDTS provides employees with a right to be free from drug tests that are not administered in accordance with the process set forth within the statute. See § 28–6.5–1(a). The EDTS sets out several conditions under which an employer may request, require, or subject an employee to a drug test using a sample of the employee's blood, urine, or other bodily fluids. Id. A violation of the EDTS can lead to a misdemeanor conviction of the employer as well as to an award of punitive damages, attorney's fees, costs, and injunctive relief in favor of an employee-plaintiff in a civil action against the employer. Section 28–6.5–1(b), (c). The EDTS does not, however, provide a limitation on the time in which an employee has to bring a civil action. See § 28–6.5–1.

When a statute creates a civil remedy for its violation but is silent regarding the applicable limitations period, we have often decided between one of two residual statutes of limitations provided in chapter 1 of title 9: either the three years provided in § 9–1–14(b) or the ten years provided in § 9–1–13(a). See Paul v. City of Woonsocket, 745 A.2d 169, 169, 172 (R.I.2000) (holding that § 9–1–14(b) applied to a cause of action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to recover payment of an allegedly improper water tapping fee); Lyons v. Town of Scituate, 554 A.2d 1034, 1035, 1036 (R.I.1989) (holding that the statute of limitations in § 9–1–14(b) applied to recovery sought pursuant to § 9–1–2 ). Section 9–1–14(b) provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ctions for injuries to the person" must be initiated within three years from the date that the cause of action accrued. We have previously held that the phrase " ‘injuries to the person’ * * * is to be construed comprehensively and as contemplating its application to actions involving injuries that are other than physical." Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, 98 R.I. 14, 20, 22, 199 A.2d 606, 610 (1964) (Commerce Oil ) (determining that an action for malicious prosecution was to be considered an injury to the person and therefore subject to the statute of limitations in § 9–1–14 ). In Commerce Oil, we commented that the purpose of the phrase "injuries to the person" is:

"to include within that period of limitation actions brought for injuries resulting from invasions of rights that inhere in man as a rational being, that is, rights to which one is entitled by reason of being a person in the eyes of the law. Such rights, of course, are to be distinguished from those which accrue to an individual by reason of some peculiar status or by virtue of an interest created by contract or property." Id. at 20–21, 199 A.2d at 610.

We have repeatedly applied the framework established in Commerce Oil to determine which statute of limitations applies to various causes of action. See, e.g., Paul, 745 A.2d at 172 ; McBurney v. Roszkowski, 687 A.2d 447, 448–49 (R.I.1997) (holding that an action for intentional interference with a contract was subject to the ten-year statute of limitations); Church v. McBurney, 513 A.2d 22, 23, 24, 26 (R.I.1986) (holding that actions for legal malpractice were essentially claims for negligent breach of contract and were therefore subject to the statute of limitations in § 9–1–13 ); Mikaelian v. Drug Abuse Unit, 501 A.2d 721, 724 (R.I.1985) (holding that the statute of limitations in § 9–1–14(b) applied to...