Goddard v. Watters
| Decision Date | 07 July 1914 |
| Docket Number | 5462. |
| Citation | 82 S.E. 304,14 Ga.App. 722 |
| Parties | GODDARD v. WATTERS. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
Fright may be considered an element of damages, where there is physical injury attending the cause of the fright, or, if no physical injury, where the fright is of such nature as to produce physical or mental impairment directly and naturally resulting from the wrongful act.
To recover damages on account of physical injuries resulting from fright, where there is no actual immediate personal injury, it must appear that the injuries were the natural and proximate result of the fright or shock, and that the defendant could or should have known that the negligent act producing the injuries would with reasonable certainty cause such a result, and it must appear that the injuries resulted from such gross carelessness, coupled with a knowledge of the probable physical results to flow therefrom, as amounted to willful and reckless disregard of consequences, or that the fright (with its consequences) was brought about by a deliberate and malicious intention on the part of the defendant to injure the plaintiff.
Error from City Court of Floyd County; J. H. Reece, Judge.
Action by Mary Goddard against A. W. Watters. Demurrer to the petition sustained, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.
Seaborn Wright, Denny & Wright, and Graham Wright, all of Rome, for plaintiff in error.
Eubanks & Mebane, of Rome, for defendant in error.
WADE J. (after stating the facts as above).
Taking in reverse order, the points raised by the demurrer, we first consider the suggestion that the plaintiff has no right to recover damages for an assault upon her husband. We do not consider, under the allegations made in the petition, that this question is involved, since it appears that plaintiff is seeking to recover for independent damage resulting directly to her on account of or as a consequence of an alleged willful and malicious assault made upon her husband by the defendant, with knowledge of the fact that she was pregnant and in close proximity when the assault was made.
The objection that the petition shows on its face that the fright from which the plaintiff suffered was occasioned by her own act, in approaching the scene of the alleged disturbance, we do not consider well taken, since her conduct in the premises was a natural consequence which should have been anticipated by the fomenter of the disturbance; and the party guilty of the tort must be held liable for the reasonable and natural consequences to be anticipated therefrom. When the plaintiff's husband was called from the house and from her presence, and loud and abusive language, addressed to him by the defendant, thereafter reached her ears the call of both nature and affection must have irresistibly drawn her to the door of the house, where she could discover the cause of the disturbance and the degree of danger, if any, that threatened her husband. This consequence should have been apprehended or expected by the one charged with using loud and abusive language, if any measure of deliberation entered into his conduct.
The first ground of the demurrer presents a somewhat more difficult question. In the case of Williamson v. Central of Georgia Railway Co., 127 Ga. 125, 131, 56 S.E. 119 122, it is said that "it is clear that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for all elements of damages which legitimately flow from the tort," but that, It is said further, however, that:
In Bray v. Latham, 81 Ga. 640, 8 S.E. 64, it is held that "wrongfully to cause, aggravate, or protract illness is an injury to health," and that such a tort may be redressed by damages.
It appears to be clear, under the ruling in the Chapman Case, supra, that one may not recover damages for mental pain and suffering alone, brought about by the negligence of a defendant; but on the other hand, as intimated with equal clearness in the case of Williamson v. Central of Georgia Railway Co., supra, it is otherwise "where there is some physical injury attending the cause of the fright, or, in the absence of physical injury, where the fright is of such character as to produce some physical or mental impairment directly and naturally resulting from the wrongful act."
In the case of Dunn v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 2 Ga.App. 845, 846, 59 S.E. 189, it is held that:
"While mental suffering, unaccompanied by injury to purse or person, affords no basis for an action predicated upon wrongful acts merely negligent, yet such damages may be recovered in those cases where the plaintiff has suffered at the hands of the defendant a wanton, voluntary, or intentional wrong, the natural result of which is the causation of mental suffering and wounded feelings."
In Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Trott, 86 Tex. 412, 25 S.W. 419 40 Am.St.Rep. 866, and in San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Corley, 87 Tex. 432, 29 S.W. 231, the Supreme Court of Texas denies the right of recovery for fright when it is neither attended nor followed by any other injury; but the same court, in the case of Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59, 7 L.R.A. 618, sustained a recovery where a miscarriage was caused by a mental shock unaccompanied by any physical violence whatever to the person of the injured woman. And in Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 54 S.W. 944, 47 L.R.A. 325, 77 Am.St.Rep. 856, the court held that where a physical injury results from a fright or other mental shock, caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the injured party may recover...
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