Godfrey v Ruiz
| Decision Date | 04 October 2001 |
| Docket Number | 00-00101 |
| Parties | SUSAN R. GODFREY, et al. v. JESUS RUIZ, et al |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County, No. 97C-503
This case arises from an automobile accident resulting in personal injuries to plaintiffs. The defendants, Mr. & Mrs. Ruiz, filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that their cousin, Mr. Corpus, was driving their vehicle without their permission or knowledge at the time of the accident. The trial court granted the motion and plaintiffs appeal. Plaintiffs assert that under Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-311, defendants are not entitled to summary judgment based solely on their own self-serving affidavits and depositions. We affirm the summary judgment.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court
Affirmed and Remanded
William B. Cain, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Joseph M. Dalton, Jr., Catherine S. Hughes, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Susan R. Godfrey and Rickey E. Godfrey.
Clifton B. Sobel, Jr., Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Jesus Ruiz and wife, Shawanda Ruiz.
This case arises from an automobile accident which occurred on August 4, 1996. Ricardo Corpus was operating a 1984 Chevrolet van owned by Jesus Ruiz and his wife Shawanda Ruiz when it collided with the vehicle in which Rickey Godfrey and his wife Susan Godfrey were riding. Mr. Corpus is the cousin of Mr. Ruiz and had been living with Mr. and Mrs. Ruiz for approximately a month and a half prior to this accident. Both Mr. and Mrs. Ruiz testified that they have not seen Mr. Corpus since the accident.
Mr. and Mrs. Ruiz both testified that they were away from home attending to personal family business at the time of the accident and had no knowledge that Mr. Corpus was driving their van. They testified that the keys to the van were kept in a drawer in their bedroom and that Mr. Corpus did not have their permission to drive the vehicle. The Ruizes testified that Mr. Corpus had never been given permission to drive the vehicle. In fact, they asserted, they learned that Mr. Corpus was driving the vehicle for the first time after the accident that afternoon.
Mr. Ruiz is an independent contractor who hangs drywall for a living. Mr. and Mrs. Ruiz testified that the van Mr. Corpus was driving was maintained for Mr. Ruiz's work in the construction business. Mr. Ruiz did not maintain his own business, but instead was employed by Quality Drywall in Dickson, Tennessee at the time of the accident. Mr. Ruiz testified that Mr. Corpus was not employed by Mr. Ruiz. However, Mr. Ruiz had helped Mr. Corpus obtain employment in the construction business, and Mr. Corpus was working with him in the days before the accident. Mr. Ruiz admits that he paid Mr. Corpus for the work he did on the job. However, Mr. Ruiz testified that they were both employed by and answered to the same boss, Don Cards, of Quality Drywall.
The Godfreys sued the driver of the van, Mr. Corpus, and the owners, Mr. and Mrs. Ruiz, for the injuries they sustained as a result of the accident. The record in this case consists of the pleadings, the Godfreys' depositions under oath, the Ruizes' depositions under oath, and their affidavits in support of their motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Ruiz, finding there was no material fact in controversy and that Mr. and Mrs. Ruiz were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.1
A trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment presents a question of law that we review de novo without a presumption of correctness. Goodloe v. State, 36 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Tenn. 2001); Mooney v. Sneed, 30 S.W.3d 304, 306 (Tenn. 2000); Finister v. Humbolt Gen. Hosp., Inc., 970 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tenn. 1998). Accordingly, the appellate court must make a fresh determination concerning whether the movant has met the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56. Hunter v. Brown, 955 S.W.2d 49, 50-51 (Tenn. 1997); Mason v. Seaton, 942 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tenn. 1997). When faced with a motion for summary judgment, "parties may neither ignore it nor treat it lightly." Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993).
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material facts and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04; Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997); Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995); Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d at 214. A disputed fact is material for summary judgment purposes if it must be decided in order to resolve a substantive claim or defense underlying the summary judgment motion. Id.
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Godfreys and must also draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. Robinson v. Omer, 952 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tenn. 1997); Mike v. Po Group, Inc., 937 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tenn. 1996). Thus, summary judgment should be granted only when the undisputed facts reasonably support one conclusion, namely, that Mr. and Mrs. Ruiz are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995); Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d at 26.
In their complaint, the Godfreys alleged that Mr. Corpus was operating the van owned by Mr. and Mrs. Ruiz with their permission and, consequently, his negligence was imputed to them. Mr. and Mrs. Ruiz moved for summary judgment on the basis that Mr. Corpus was driving their vehicle at the time of the accident without their permission or knowledge. They argued that in the face of their testimony that they never gave Mr. Corpus permission to drive their van, no evidence existed to establish a basis for their liability under any theory of imputed liability.2
As to the issue relevant in this appeal, Mr. and Mrs. Ruiz argued that their undisputed testimony established that there was no agency relationship between them and Mr. Corpus, thereby overcoming the presumption, or prima facie evidence, of an agency relationship created by the statute relied upon by the Godfreys, Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-311. The Godfreys used that statute to establish proof that the van was being operated with the knowledge and consent of Mr. and Mrs. Ruiz and by their agent. That statute provides, in pertinent part:
In all actions for injury to persons and/or to property caused by the negligent operation or use of any automobile, auto truck, motorcycle, or other motor propelled vehicle within this state, proof of ownership of such vehicle shall be prima facie evidence that the vehicle at the time of the cause of action sued on was being operated and used with authority, consent and knowledge of the owner in the very transaction out of which the injury or cause of action arose, and such proof of ownership likewise shall be prima facie evidence that the vehicle was then and there being operated by the owner, or by the owner's servant, for the owner's use and benefit and within the course and scope of the servant's employment.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-311(a) (1998 & Supp. 2000).
The Godfreys assert that the statute meets their burden of proof and that summary judgment for defendants was improper. The prima facie case of agency created by the statute can be rebutted by "credible proof that the driver was in fact operating a vehicle without authority of the owner." Hunter v. Burke, 958 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Ferguson v. Tomerlin, 656 S.W.2d 378, 381-82 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)). The burden of overcoming the statutory prima facie case rests upon the owner, once proof of ownership is established. Id. That burden can be met by presenting credible evidence that the driver took the car without the owner's knowledge or consent. Id. Consequently, "[i]f it can be said as a matter of law that there was no agency, a motion for summary judgment on that issue should be sustained." Yearby v. Shannon, No. 03A01-9509-CV-00345, 1996 WL 87446, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 29, 1996) (no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed) (citing Haggard v. Jim Clayton Motors, Inc., 393 S.W.2d 292 (Tenn. 1965)("before a trial judge may take the question from the jury, the evidence must be such that it can be said, as a matter of law, that there was no agency")). Uncontradicted evidence that there was no agency displaces the statutorily created prima facie case of such agency "where such evidence is uncontradicted and comes from witnesses whose credibility is not in issue." Id. (citing McConnell v. Jones, 33 Tenn. App. 14, 228 S.W.2d 117 (1949); McParland v. Pruitt, 39 Tenn. App. 399, 284 S.W.2d 299 (1955); Sadler v. Draper, 46 Tenn. App. 1, 326 S.W.2d 148 (1959)).
The question of whether the statute's prima facie case of agency precludes summary judgment was answered by this court in Ferguson v. Tomerlin, 656 S.W.2d 378, 381 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), wherein this court set aside a jury verdict against the owner of a car on the basis that the trial court should have granted summary judgment to the owner prior to trial. At the time of the defendant owner's motion for summary judgment, the record consisted of the pleadings and interrogatories with the owner's answers thereto. The owner answered he had furnished the car to his daughter for her use only and with specific instructions not to allow anyone else to drive it. Id. at 380. The daughter had loaned the car to a friend, contrary to her father's instructions, and the friend was driving when the accident occurred. In analyzing the situation at the time the motion was made, this court stated:
More specifically, Mr. Tomerlin contends that at...
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