Godin v. Niebuhr

• Decision Date: 14 October 1920
• Citation: 236 Mass. 350
• Parties: ARSENE GODIN v. HENRY C. NIEBUHR.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

236 Mass. 350

ARSENE GODIN v. HENRY C. NIEBUHR.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

October 14, 1920

September 23, 1920.

Present: RUGG, C.

J., DE COURCY CROSBY, CARROLL, & JENNEY, JJ.

Unlawful Interference. Damages, In tort.

The harmful circulation of libellous statements for the purpose of injuring the business of another is an unlawful interference with such other person's property rights for which the wrongdoer is answerable in an action of tort.

The handing out to passers-by in front of a barber shop by the business agent and secretary of a local barber's union of printed cards stating that the proprietor was "Unfair to Organized Labor. He refuses to employ

Union Barbers or conduct a Union Barber Shop," where it appears that, of three employees in the shop, two were members of the union in good standing and the third had a union book, duly stamped showing receipt of dues, but, under some alleged law of the international union, not known to the proprietor of the shop was, in the opinion of the business agent and secretary "readmitted" at a wrong local union, may be found to be an unlawful and unjustifiable interference with the business of the proprietor of the shop for which an action of tort may be maintained.

At the trial of an action brought under the circumstances above described, the plaintiff testified that the distribution of the cards hurt his business, that because of them people that used to patronize him stayed away and that the damage he sustained thereby was about $800 or $900.

There was no evidence indicating his weekly earnings nor showing bow he sustained.the damages to, which he testified nor how an estimate of his damages could be made, nor the names or identity of customers who refrained from patronizing the shop. The jury found for the plaintiff in the sum of $220 and the judge reported the case for determination by this court. Held, that

(1) For the invasion of his rights the plaintiff was entitled to at least nominal damages;

(2) There was evidence of specific damages; (3) The jury might well have inferred that the intended and natural result of the defendant's wrongdoing was substantially to injure the plaintiff's business.

TORT, with a declaration containing a third count based upon an unlawful interference with the plaintiff's business as the proprietor of a barber shop. Writ dated November 16, 1915.

In the Superior Court the action was tried before Irwin, J. The material evidence on the question of liability is described in the opinion. It was stated in the report by the trial judge that the plaintiff testified in direct examination, on the question of damages, "That because of the distribution of the cards customers were kept away. That distribution of the cards hurt his business. That people remained or stayed away that used to patronize him because of these cards.

That the damage he sustained thereby was about $800 or $900. . . . There was no testimony indicating the weekly earnings of the plaintiff in his business after the trouble began, nor showing how the plaintiff sustained the damage of $800 or $900, and there was no evidence from which an estimate of the damage alleged to have been sustained could be made. There was no evidence of the names or identity of any customers who refrained from patronizing the plaintiff's shop as a result of the distribution of the cards, nor any evidence, other than that of the plaintiff which herebefore appears, that any customers refrained from patronizing the plaintiff as a result of the distribution of cards by the defendant or by any other person, or that if he lost any customers they refrained from patronizing him because the defendant made such distribution, or some other person.

"

The jury found for the plaintiff on the third count of the declaration in the sum of $220, and the judge thereupon ordered a verdict for the defendant and reported the case for determination by this court, with the stipulation that, if the evidence warranted the finding for the plaintiff, it was to stand; otherwise, judgment was to be entered on the verdict ordered for the defendant.

The case was submitted on briefs. C. L. Young, for the plaintiff.

G. D. Cummings, G.

F. Leary & P.

E. Tierney, for the defendant.

DE COURCY, J. The right to conduct a lawful...