Godwin v. State

• Decision Date: 02 January 1992
• Docket Number: No. 75881,75881
• Citation: 593 So.2d 211
• Parties: Shirley GODWIN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. 593 So.2d 211, 17 Fla. L. Week. S24
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 211

593 So.2d 211

Shirley GODWIN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 75881.

593 So.2d 211, 17 Fla. L. Week. S24

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 2, 1992.

Rehearing Denied March 3, 1992.

Nancy Daniels, Public Defender and Lynn A. Williams, Asst. Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, for petitioner.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Kathleen E. Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.

HARDING, Judge.

We have for plenary review Godwin v. State, 557 So.2d 955, 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), which certified the following question of great public importance:

WHEN AN INDIVIDUAL SEEKING REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT HAS BEEN RELEASED FROM THAT COMMITMENT PRIOR TO DISPOSITION OF THE APPEAL ON THE MERITS, WHAT SHOWING MUST SHE MAKE TO AVOID DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL ON GROUNDS OF MOOTNESS?

We rephrase the question as follows:

Does an appeal from a civil commitment order under The Baker Act, section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1989), become moot solely because the person subject to that order has already been released?

We granted jurisdiction, pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution, and answer the question in the negative.

On July 19, 1989, the trial court below ordered Shirley Godwin involuntarily committed to the Florida State Hospital. Godwin filed a notice of appeal attacking her commitment; however, the hospital discharged Godwin before the First District Court of Appeal decided her appeal. The State then moved to dismiss Godwin's appeal on the grounds that Godwin's subsequent release made the appeal of the commitment moot. The First District Court ordered the dismissal, but expressed reservations about this procedure and certified the question to this Court. Godwin, 557 So.2d at 956.

Counsel for the State now calls our attention to the fact that Godwin once again has been involuntarily committed on June 4, 1990, during the pendency of the present review. The State notes that Godwin has not appealed the second commitment. As a result, the State moved the Court to dismiss this appeal on the grounds of mootness. We have denied the State's second motion to dismiss, and answer the rephrased question certified by the First District Court of Appeal.

An issue is moot when the controversy has been so fully resolved that a judicial determination can have no actual effect. Dehoff v. Imeson, 153 Fla. 553, 15 So.2d 258 (1943). A case is "moot" when it presents no actual controversy or when the issues have ceased to exist. Black's Law Dictionary 1008 (6th ed.1990). A moot case generally will be dismissed.

Florida courts recognize at least three instances in which an otherwise moot case will not be dismissed. The first two were stated in Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 218 n. 1 (Fla.1984), where we said: "[i]t is well settled that mootness does not destroy an appellate court's jurisdiction ... when the questions raised are of great public importance or are likely to recur." Third, an otherwise moot case will not be dismissed if collateral legal consequences that affect the rights of a party flow from the issue to be determined. See Keezel v. State, 358 So.2d 247 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).

Here, we address the issue of collateral legal consequences flowing from an involuntary commitment. Section 394.457(8) Florida Statutes (1989), states that "[f]ees and fee collections for patients in treatment facilities shall be according to s. 402.33." In turn, section 402.33(8), Florida Statutes (1989), reads as follows:

(8)(a) Unpaid fees for services provided by the department to a client constitute a lien on any property owned by the client or the client's responsible party which property is not exempt by s. 4, Art. X of the State Constitution. If fees are not paid within 6 months after they are billed, the department shall charge interest on the unpaid balance at a rate equal to the average rate of interest earned by the State Treasury on state funds deposited in commercial banks as reported by the Treasurer for the previous year. The department is authorized to negotiate and settle any delinquent account, and to charge off any delinquent account even though the claim of the department may be against the client, a responsible party, or a payor of third-party benefits, either directly for the department or as a fiduciary for the client or responsible party.

(b) If negotiation and settlement cannot be effected within a time period established by its rules, and if charging off the account is not appropriate, the department shall, if it is cost-effective to do so, file the lien for the unpaid fees for recordation by the clerk of the circuit court in such county or counties which the department determines to be in the best interest of the State. Services for which fees were charged shall constitute a claim against the client, the client's responsible party, or any insurer obligated to pay for the services provided. Such liens and claims shall be enforced on behalf of the State by the department. Liens and claims upon recordation by the clerk of the circuit court shall be continuing obligations until 3 years after the demise of the client or the client's responsible party, unless satisfied earlier.

(c) Upon the death of a person against whom the department has a claim, the department shall file such caveats as are in the best interest of the State. If the department effects recovery, the fund from which the filing fee for the caveat was paid shall be reimbursed.

The imposition of a lien under section 402.33(8) on the property of an involuntarily committed person is a collateral legal consequence. In all probability, a lien will be filed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) long after the expiration of the time for filing an appeal from an order of commitment. In fact, the discretion as to whether and when to file the lien rests solely with HRS. Because section 402.33(8) affects a person involuntarily committed beyond the person's initial release, the statute has collateral legal consequences.

The State argues that even if section 402.33(8) does provide a collateral legal consequence, Godwin failed to show that the consequences applied to her case. The State notes that section 402.33(2)(g) reads in part: "[f]ees, other than third-party benefits and benefit payments, may not be charged for services provided to indigents whose only sources of income are from state and federal aid."

Further, section 402.33(1)(g) defines "state and federal aid" as "cash assistance of cash equivalent benefits based on an individual's proof of financial need, including, but not limited to, aid to families with dependent children and food stamps." The statutory exceptions are limited to protecting persons whose sole income is from "[s]tate and federal aid." Even if Godwin does not receive state or federal aid she nevertheless may be indigent, and subject to imposition of a lien in the future despite her indigency. The State further argues that section 402.33(6)(a) keeps HRS from collecting fees against Godwin. Section 402.33(6)(a) provides: "[t]he department may not require a client or responsible party to pay fees it may assess that exceed the client's or responsible party's ability to pay." While section 402.33(6)(a) may restrict HRS's ability to collect fees from Godwin, the statute does not rule out the possibility that HRS may attach a lien to Godwin's property in the future. In this case, HRS has been silent as to whether it will file a lien in the future, and, therefore Godwin still is subject to the possibility of a collateral legal consequence.

The State asserts that Godwin can challenge the lien at the time that HRS files it, and, until the lien is filed, Godwin has not been subjected to collateral legal consequences. There are two reasons, however, for allowing Godwin's appeal of her involuntary commitment to proceed in the Court. First, there is no statutory means provided to challenge a lien imposed after an improper commitment short of challenging the validity of that commitment. Second, Godwin's appeal is timely. If a person is allowed to challenge the involuntary commitment only after the lien has been imposed, the courts will be faced with the problem of reconstructing the record of the involuntary commitment some time in the future. The validity of the initial commitment is best examined while a record is readily available.

In State v. Kinner, 398 So.2d 1360 (Fla.1981), we held that a person's release from confinement made the issue of evidence supporting an involuntary commitment moot. However, in Kinner, the parties did not raise the issue of collateral legal consequences, and the Court did not address the issue which is presented here. Thus, we distinguish Kinner.

Godwin's appeal is not moot because section 402.33(8) allows for the imposition of a lien for unpaid fees flowing from an involuntary commitment, and HRS has not indicated a waiver of its right to impose a lien. We recognize that other consequences may follow an involuntary commitment under The Baker Act, such as the stigma that society may attach, as well as some restrictions on a person's privileges and opportunities. See, e.g., Sec. 322.05(5), Fla.Stat. (1989) (restriction on drivers' licenses); Sec. 97.041(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1989) (restriction on right to vote); Sec. 790.06(10), Fla.Stat. (1989) (restriction on right to carry a concealed weapon). While we recognize these consequences are significant, we hold that they do not rise to the level of collateral legal consequences. Restrictions imposed as the result of a commitment can be or are removed when the patient is discharged or released from active treatment. See Sec. 394.469(4), Fla.Stat. (1989).

Thus, we answer the rephrased question in the negative. We quash the opinion below and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

OVERTON, McDONALD and GRIME...