Goette v. Darvoe

• Decision Date: 21 February 1969
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 44194,44194,1
• Citation: 119 Ga.App. 320,166 S.E.2d 912
• Parties: Catherine GOETTE v. Ted R. DARVOE
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 912

166 S.E.2d 912

119 Ga.App. 320

Catherine GOETTE v. Ted R. DARVOE.

No. 44194.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1.

Feb. 21, 1969.

Rehearing Denied March 6, 1969.

Connerat, Dunn, Hunter, Houlihan, Maclean & Exley, James P. Googe, Jr., Malcolm Maclean, Savannah, for appellant.

Adams, Adams, Brennan & Gardner, Edward T. Brennan, Savannah, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

PANNELL, Judge.

Catherine Goette brought an action against Ted R. Darvoe, seeking recovery of damages for breach of an oral contract praying for process, accounting, and, in prayers numbered 3 and 4, for certain alleged items of damage, for jury trial, and for general relief. The defendant filed a document entitled 'motion' and stated 'his motions as follows: 1. The complaint should be dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 2. The complaint seeks to recover upon a contract not to be performed within one year, which alleged contract is void as not in writing as required by the Statute of Frauds, Ga.Code Ann. § 20-401(5). 3 Defendant moves to strike Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the plaintiff's prayers on the ground that said prayers are inconsistent, redundant and immaterial and the relief asked for in said prayers is not supported by any allegations in the complaint.' The trial judge entered an order on the defendant's 'motion' adjudging 'the defendant's motion to dismiss be sustained on all three grounds and that said petition be and the same is hereby dismissed.' The plaintiff appealed to this court. Held:

1. Under the rulings of this court construing Section 8 of the Civil Practice Act (Ga.L.1966, pp. 609, 619, as amended; Code Ann. Ch. 81A-108), the claim here was sufficient as against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. A parol contract to be performed within a year, its renewal for periods of less than a year, its performance by the plaintiff, and its breach by the defendant during the last renewal period was alleged. It is no longer necessary to state a complete and particularized cause of action. See Harper v. DeFreitas, 117 Ga.App. 236(1), 160 S.E.2d 260; Seaboard A.L.R. Co. v. Hawkins, 117 Ga.App. 797(3), 161 S.E.2d 886; American Southern Ins. Co. v. Kirkland, 118 Ga.App. 170, 162 S.E.2d 862; Byrd v. Ford Motors Co., 118 Ga.App. 333(2), 163 S.E.2d 327. See also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80.

Whether, because of lack of particulars, the claim may have been subject to a motion for a more definite statement, we do not decide.

2. Paragraph 5 of Code § 20-401 is no bar to the claim, as the original parol agreement was to be performed in less than a year, and each renewal thereof was to be performed in less than a year. Craig v. Baggs, 64 Ga.App. 850(1), 14 S.E.2d 156. This ground of dismissal was also without merit.

3. A motion, such as ground 3 of the 'motion' in the present case, to strike certain paragraphs of a complaint is not a motion to dismiss the complaint, and the trial judge erred in...